Opinion
October 14, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On March 24, 1983, the petitioner, a permanent employee, agreed to a stipulation wherein he accepted "time and attendance probation for one year" in settlement of certain disciplinary charges against him. He was subsequently dismissed without a hearing on February 1, 1984, when he failed to return to work several weeks after sustaining a job-related injury.
The petitioner contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his contractual rights as a permanent employee to a hearing prior to dismissal, and that he should therefore be reinstated to his former position of employment. We find this contention to be untenable. Initially, the petitioner served a probationary term prior to achieving his permanent position and thus was undoubtedly aware of the ramifications of accepting probation with respect to the time and attendance charges (see, Whitehead v State of New York, Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 71 A.D.2d 653, 654, affd 51 N.Y.2d 781). He does not, moreover, allege either that his signature was obtained involuntarily or that he was denied the assistance of his union representative, whose signature also appears on the settlement agreement. Special Term therefore properly found that his waiver of permanent status was "open, knowing and voluntary" (Matter of Juul v Board of Educ., 76 A.D.2d 837, 838, affd 55 N.Y.2d 648), and that the respondent was entitled to terminate his services without a hearing (see, Matter of Talamo v Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 637, 639; Matter of Ostoyich v State of New York, 99 A.D.2d 839, lv denied 62 N.Y.2d 605).
We similarly reject the petitioner's assertion that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious (see, Matter of King v Sapier, 47 A.D.2d 114, 116, affd 38 N.Y.2d 960). The petitioner has failed to establish that the termination was made in bad faith (see, Tomlinson v Ward, 110 A.D.2d 537, 538, affd 66 N.Y.2d 771; Matter of Macklin v Powell, 107 A.D.2d 964).
We have examined the petitioner's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Niehoff and Rubin, JJ., concur.