Opinion
October 9, 1997
Appeal from Family Court, New York County (Sheldon Rand, J.).
Under the facts of this case, the speedy fact-finding hearing provisions of Family Court Act § 340.1 were observed. Good cause was demonstrated for the three-day adjournment on the 14th day following appellant's initial appearance while appellant was in detention ( see, Family Ct Act § 340.1, [4] [a]), since the presentment agency demonstrated an unanticipated and unavoidable confusion in the notification of police witnesses, and there was no prejudice to appellant ( see, Matter of Jamell H., 219 A.D.2d 531; Matter of Michael M., 201 A.D.2d 288; Matter of Bryant J., 195 A.D.2d 463, 464).
On the adjourned date of September 10th, appellant was released and the 60-day period for the commencement of the fact-finding hearing now applied (Family Ct Act § 340.1). As a result, the Family Court was free to adjourn the fact-finding hearing at its discretion, without a showing of good cause or special circumstances ( see, Matter of Jamal H., 235 A.D.2d 270, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 815). Thus, in this case, the rule that release is not a remedy for a violation of the 14-day speedy fact-finding requirement is inapplicable; there was complete conformity with the statute up to the adjourned date ( cf., Matter of Jamel P., 207 A.D.2d 298, 299, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 811). Accordingly, the motion court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Ellerin and Nardelli, JJ.