Opinion
July 10, 1997
Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
As part of the employer's reduction in workforce, claimant voluntarily resigned from her employment, in consideration for which she received dismissal pay from January 3, 1995 through November 5, 1995. The payments were guaranteed, even if claimant obtained new employment during this period. Claimant remained unemployed up to the time she applied for unemployment insurance benefits on December 6, 1995. We agree with the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that claimant was ineligible to receive benefits because she lacked sufficient weeks of employment in her base period, having been employed during only five of the 52 weeks preceding her application ( see, Labor Law § 527 [d]). The fact that the employer may have, as claimant argues, labeled the payments as "salary continuance" is not dispositive in this case ( see, Matter of Woody [Roberts], 139 A.D.2d 879, 880). It is uncontested that claimant performed no work for any employer during the time she collected dismissal pay. Hence, this period did not constitute a period of employment that would render claimant eligible for benefits ( see, Matter of Terranova [Hudacs], 211 A.D.2d 847, 848; Matter of Barrett [Hudacs], 191 A.D.2d 920, 921).
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Carpinello, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the decisions are affirmed, without costs.