Opinion
December 22, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Green, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, the proceeding is converted into an action for a declaratory judgment (see, CPLR 103 [c]), with the petition deemed the complaint, and it is declared the respondents' regulations 7 NYCRR 720.3 (b) (15), (17); (e) (6), which in effect require the intended recipient of inmate mail be identified as the addressee, and 7 NYCRR 720.3 (e), which permits inspection of business mail, do not implicate the petitioner's 1st Amendment rights, and further legitimate governmental objectives in a rational manner. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements (see, Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334, appeal dismissed 371 U.S. 74, cert denied 371 U.S. 901).
This appeal does not concern mail addressed to and intended for news media personnel, nor direct personal correspondence, nor content restrictions, and thus does not implicate the petitioner's 1st Amendment interests in protected speech (see, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396; Matter of Milburn v. McNiff, 108 A.D.2d 860, appeal discontinued 65 N.Y.2d 812; cf. Pell v Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129-131). The petitioner has failed to establish that he has a 1st Amendment right to engage in business correspondence (see, Valentine v. Gray, 410 F. Supp. 1394), and thus the respondents' regulation concerning inspection of business mail in order to prevent credit purchases by inmates (obligation of inmate funds) is rational and valid (see, Matter of Milburn v. McNiff, supra, at p 862). Further, the respondents may require that the intended recipient of inmate mail be the addressee identified on the envelope in order to enable the respondents to supervise correspondence with minors, persons under parole and probation supervision and other inmates, to distinguish business mail from other mail and to ensure that the addressee is not on a negative correspondence list. That inmates may be able to circumvent the regulations, standing alone, does not render them irrational. And, in the absence of 1st Amendment considerations, the respondents need not employ the least restrictive measures to further legitimate institutional objectives. Weinstein, J.P., Rubin, Kooper and Sullivan, JJ., concur.