Opinion
July 7, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burke, J.).
Judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
It is well settled that municipalities, in granting a special use permit, may place reasonable zoning restrictions upon educational uses carried on by private educational institutions (see, Matter of New York Inst. of Technology v Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d 125; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526), so long as the conditions so established relate directly to, and are incidental to, the proposed use of the real property and not to the manner of the operation of the particular enterprise conducted on the premises which are the subject of the special permit (Matter of Summit School v Neugent, 82 A.D.2d 463, 466-467; see, Matter of Community Synagogue v Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445; Bernstein v Board of Appeals, 60 Misc.2d 470, appeal dismissed 31 A.D.2d 650, lv denied 23 N.Y.2d 646). Furthermore, conditions imposed by a Board of Zoning Appeals must be authorized by the zoning ordinance (Matter of Community Synagogue v Bates, supra; Matter of Schlosser v Michaelis, 18 A.D.2d 940; Bernstein v Board of Appeals, supra).
Applying these principles of law to the instant proceeding, Special Term properly determined that the three conditions challenged by the petitioner were within the power of the respondent to impose. We merely note that should the petitioner wish to apply for development of the "environmental [study] area", after the 10-year moratorium contained in condition No. 8 expires, it may also, at that time, apply for a modification of condition No. 6 so as to allow motor vehicle access between that area and Whitney Lane. Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Gibbons and Spatt, JJ., concur.