The Family Court properly denied the appellant's motion to vacate his default in appearing at the fact-finding hearing. To vacate the default, the appellant had to provide a reasonable excuse for his default and offer a meritorious defense to the proceeding ( see Matter of Helena W., 6 AD3d 541; Matter of Ricky V., 4 AD3d 368; Matter of Iris R., supra; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 AD2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 AD2d 340). The appellant's excuse that he believed the hearing was at a different time was unconvincing in view of the fact that he was in court when the date and time for the hearing were selected ( see Matter of Shakyra M., 270 AD2d 941).
"The determination whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court" ( Matter of Samantha P., 297 AD2d 348; see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 AD2d 532). To vacate the order, the mother was obligated to show that there was a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense ( see Matter of Iris R., 295 AD2d 521, 522; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 AD2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 AD2d 340). We agree with the Family Court that the mother did not make the requisite showing.
"The determination whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court" ( Matter of Samantha P., 297 AD2d 348; see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 AD2d 532). In seeking to vacate her default, the mother was required to show that there was a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense ( see Matter of Iris R., 295 AD2d 521, 522; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 AD2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 AD2d 340). We agree with the Family Court that the mother did not make the requisite showing.
The determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is within the sound discretion of the Family Court ( see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 AD2d 532; Matter of Latisha I., 238 AD2d 340). A party seeking to vacate such an order must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Daquan Malik B., supra; Matter of Tiffany L., 294 AD2d 365, 366).
The Family Court properly denied the mother's motion to vacate her default in appearing at the fact-finding hearing. To vacate the default, the mother had to provide a reasonable excuse for her default and offer a meritorious defense to the proceedings ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Matter of Iris R., supra; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 A.D.2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340) . The mother's excuse that she was delayed by the "unpredictability of the subway system" is unconvincing in view of the fact that she had traveled to the courthouse on previous occasions ( see Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is left to the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 A.D.2d 532; Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340). A party seeking to vacate such an order must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Ann D., 239 A.D.2d 575; Matter of Latisha I., supra; Matter of Naajila J., 235 A.D.2d 540). Since the father's conclusory, unsupported allegations failed to demonstrate either of these requisite elements, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to vacate his default (see Matter of James Edward M. III, 250 A.D.2d 685). The father's remaining contentions are without merit.
"The determination whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court" (Matter of Samantha P., 297 A.D.2d 348; see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 A.D.2d 532). In seeking to vacate the fact-finding order, the mother was obligated to show that there was a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Iris R., 295 A.D.2d 521, 522, lv denied in part 99 N.Y.2d 530; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 A.D.2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340). We agree with the Family Court that the mother did not make the requisite showing.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The determination whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 A.D.2d 532; Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340). Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her motion to vacate her default in appearing at the fact-finding and dispositional hearings since she did not offer a reasonable excuse for twice failing to appear in court on dates scheduled for commencement of the hearing, and did not demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to the termination petition (see Matter of Samaria Ann B., supra; Matter of Tiffany L., 294 A.D.2d 365 [2d Dept, May 2, 2002]; Matter of Adam S., 287 A.D.2d 723; Matter of Willie Mays J., 287 A.D.2d 504, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 610). We note that the mother's recent rehabilitative efforts do not constitute a meritorious defense (see Matter of Adam S., supra).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The decision to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court (see Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340). In seeking to vacate the order entered December 6, 1999, the appellant was obligated to show that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Latisha I., supra; Matter of Naajila J., 235 A.D.2d 540; Matter of Little Flower Children's Servs. [Sean Courtney G.] v. Vernon J., 213 A.D.2d 548).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court was correct in utilizing CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to determine her motion to vacate the order of disposition terminating her parental rights ( see, Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340; Matter of Geraldine Rose W., 196 A.D.2d 313). Thus, the Family Court properly denied the motion to vacate the order of disposition upon finding that she failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense ( see, Matter of Ann D., 239 A.D.2d 575; Matter of Latisha I., supra).