Summary
In Hauptman v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 158 A.D.2d 600, 551 N.Y.S.2d 572 [2 Dept., 1990] the Second Department found that 15 NYCRR § 136.5(a) was not in conflict with the authorizing statute, but was instead in harmony with the express legislative intent to insure highway safety by keeping recidivist drunk drivers off the road (see, also, Quealy v. Passidomo, 124 A.D.2d 955, 508 N.Y.S.2d 706 [3 Dept., 1986]).
Summary of this case from Gaebel v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor VehiclesOpinion
February 20, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified by (1) deleting the provision thereof dismissing the proceeding, (2) adding thereto a provision pursuant to CPLR 103 converting so much of the proceeding as was for declaratory relief to an action for declaratory judgment, (3) adding thereto a provision declaring that so much of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2) (c) as prohibits the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from issuing a new license where a person has been twice convicted of a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) or driving while intoxicated and where personal injury has resulted from such offense in each instance is constitutional, and (4) adding thereto a provision declaring that promulgation of 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a) was a valid exercise of delegated authority; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner asserted before the Supreme Court that the statute prohibiting the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from issuing a new license to, among others, a person who has been twice convicted of driving while intoxicated and where personal injury resulted from each offense (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 [c], recodified from Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510 [a], as amended by L 1988, ch 47) was not meant to apply where the personal injuries were sustained only by the person charged with driving while intoxicated or where the injuries sustained were relatively minor. He concomitantly contended that 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a), which also prohibits issuance of a new license to a person with "two convictions for driving while intoxicated, with personal injury involvement in each, regardless of the extent of such injury", is invalid because it conflicts with the overriding statutory prohibition. Finally, the petitioner contended that the statutory prohibition is unconstitutional because it is vague and because it interferes with his right to travel.
The Supreme Court correctly determined that the petitioner's arguments are without merit. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see, Matter of Quealy v Passidomo, 124 A.D.2d 955), the plain language of the statute suggests that the Legislature intended to permanently keep off of our highways any persons who, by repeated convictions for driving while intoxicated arising from automobile accidents where persons are hurt, manifests that he or she is a danger to the public regardless of who was hurt or that, fortuitously, the injury was not serious. Moreover, the challenged regulation is in harmony with the express legislative intent and is therefore valid.
With respect to the petitioner's constitutional challenges, we conclude that the statute is sufficiently precise to put reasonable people on notice as to what is required of them and as to the consequences of particular conduct so as to withstand a challenge premised on vagueness (cf., People v Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64; see, People v Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 618; People v Two Wheel Corp., 128 A.D.2d 507, 510). Moreover, conditions which attach to the privilege of driving (see, People v Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115) and violation of which will result in revocation of the privilege do not constitute interference with the right of travel.
Although the Supreme Court correctly determined by memorandum decision that the constitutional aspects of this proceeding should be converted to a declaratory judgment action (see, CPLR 103; Matter of Gold v Lomenzo, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 476, n 4) and although it correctly upheld the validity of the challenged statute and the challenged regulation, the judgment entered provided merely for dismissal of the petition (but see, Lanza v Wagner , 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334 , cert denied 371 U.S. 901). We therefore modify the judgment only to the extent indicated.
We have considered the petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.