The plea agreement, signed by Windsor, expressly stated that the maximum penalty for the offenses was fifty years incarceration. During the plea colloquy, Windsor stated that he understood each offense was punishable by two to twenty-five years of incarceration and that the maximum penalty he could receive was up to fifty years of incarceration, of which twelve years was a minimum-mandatory sentence. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47. See also In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del.1988) (stating Superior Court had no duty to consider pro se motions filed by criminal defendant represented by counsel).Haskins, 551 A.2d at 67.

The plea agreement, signed by Windsor, expressly stated that the maximum penalty for the offenses was fifty years incarceration. During the plea colloquy, Windsor stated that he understood each offense was punishable by two to twenty-five years of incarceration and that the maximum penalty he could receive was up to fifty years of incarceration, of which twelve years was a minimum-mandatory sentence. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47. See also In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del.1988) (stating Superior Court had no duty to consider pro se motions filed by criminal defendant represented by counsel).Haskins, 551 A.2d at 67.

In re Hovey, 545 A.2d 626, 628 (Del.1988). In re Schoolfield, 1998 WL 280359, at *1 (Del. May 14, 1998); In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66-67 (Del. 1988). --------

In re Humes, 2006 WL 1547970, at *1 (Del. June 5, 2006) (citing In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988)). NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED.

In re Humes, 2006 WL 1547970, at *1 (Del. June 5, 2006) (citing In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988)). (5) Second, Webb has not shown he has no other adequate remedy or that the Superior Court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform a clear duty to him.

Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(5); 10 Del. C. § 6901; In re Cantrell, 678 A.2d 525, 526 (Del. 1996).In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66–67 (Del. 1988). NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED.

In re Brookins, 736 A.2d 204, 206 (Del.1999) (citing In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del.1988)).Id. (citing In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del.1988)). NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED.

Const. art. IV, § 11(5); 10 Del. C. § 6901; In re Cantrell, 678 A.2d 525, 526 (Del. 1996).In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66–67 (Del. 1988). NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED.

In re Brookins, 736 A.2d 204, 206 (Del.1999) (citing In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del.1988)).Id. (citing In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del.1988)). NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED.

Nor has he demonstrated that our affirmance of his conviction in the face of his Rule 47 challenge was clearly in error. See In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988) ("The decision to allow a criminal defendant to participate in his own defense, along with his counsel, in "hybrid representation" is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. …A criminal defendant who is represented by counsel has no right to participate pro se as co-counsel. …[the defendant] has neither requested nor been granted the discretionary opportunity to participate in his own representation.