Opinion
June 17, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that when there is a tie vote of the Board of Trustees of the New York City Fire Department in determining whether accident disability retirement is appropriate, the Board of Trustees must retire the applicant on an ordinary disability pension (see, Matter of City of New York v. Schoeck, 294 N.Y. 559), and the Board's decision can be set aside on judicial review only if it can be determined as a matter of law on the record that the disability was a natural and proximate result of a service-related accident (see, Matter of Canfora v. Board of Trustees, 60 N.Y.2d 347; Matter of Flynn v. Board of Trustees, 201 A.D.2d 730; Matter of Causarano v. Board of Trustees, 178 A.D.2d 474). The petitioner has the burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that a causal relationship exists between the service-related accident and the claimed disability (see, Matter of Nicolosi v. Board of Trustees, 198 A.D.2d 282; Matter of Draves v. Board of Trustees, 203 A.D.2d 568, 569). A service-related accident is considered the natural and proximate cause of the petitioner's disability if the accident either precipitated the development of a latent condition or aggravated a preexisting condition (see, Matter of Tobin v. Steisel, 64 N.Y.2d 254, 259). It is only when circumstances admit but one inference that the court may decide as a matter of law what inference should be drawn (see, Matter of Radigan v. O'Connell, 304 N.Y. 396, 397; Matter of Flynn v. Board of Trustees, supra, at 730). However, in determining the question of causal relation, the Medical Board's findings must be supported by some credible evidence (see, Matter of Drayson v. Board of Trustees, 37 A.D.2d 378, affd 32 N.Y.2d 852).
Here, the only examining physician who expressed an opinion as to the connection between the accident of August 19, 1992, and the subsequent disability concluded that a causal relationship existed. The physician also found that the petitioner was unable to return to full fire duty after the line-of-duty accident. Moreover, the petitioner's disability was classified by the Medical Division of the Fire Department as permanent and partial. These medical records constituted the only competent evidence before the Board of Trustees on the issue of causation. We therefore concur with the finding of the Supreme Court that no question of fact existed with respect to this issue (see, Matter of Bridgwood v. Board of Trustees, 204 A.D.2d 629; Matter of Jones v. Board of Trustees, 123 A.D.2d 628). Rosenblatt, J.P., Thompson, Pizzuto and Hart, JJ., concur.