1992); In re Carpenter, 14 B.R. 405 (M.D.Tenn. 1981); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (W.D.Wis. 1982). In re Briggs is particularly enlightening as it involves facts very similar to this case.
Those decisions which have found an administrative freeze to be in violation of the automatic stay have based their holding upon the prohibitions against postpetition offsets contained in Section 362(a)(7) and the necessity to prevent any interruption of the debtor's business in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Compare those cases validating an administrative freeze, In Re Edgins, 36 B.R. 480 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984); Stan v. Mid-American Credit Union, 39 B.R. 246 (D.Kan. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (W.D.Va. 1982) rev'g 12 B.R. 390 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1981); In Re Hoffman, 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1985); In Re Owens-Peterson, 39 B.R. 186 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1984); In Re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wisc. 1982); In Re Carpenter, 14 B.R. 405 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1981); with those cases finding an administrative freeze violates the automatic stay, United Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (D.W.D.Va. 1982) ref'g 12 B.R. 390 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1981); In Re Owens-Peterson, 39 B.R. 186 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1984); In Re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wisc.
Moreover, the existence of the bank's right of setoff makes the funds on deposit cash collateral subject to the restraints of 11 U.S.C. ยง 363, and the debtor or trustee may not properly use the cash collateral without court permission, after notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. ยง 363; In re Raanes, 17 B.R. 164 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1982); In re Edgins, 36 B.R. 480 (Bkrtcy.App. 9th Cir. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (Dist.Ct.W.D.Va., Roanoke D. 1982); Matter of Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wisc. 1982); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ยถ 363.02 (15th Ed. 1985). At 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ยถ 506.04 (15th Ed. 1985) it is stated:
1981); In re Norton, Civil Action Nos. 82-0990; 82-0991 (E.D.Pa. October 25, 1981) (Hannum, J.). Contra, Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (W.D.Va. 1982); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (W.D.Wis. 1982). All of the cited cases involved facts similar to those of the Cusanno matter.
Citizens Bank cites a substantial body of persuasive caselaw for the proposition that a bank's placing of an administrative hold on a debtor's account pending the disposition of a motion asserting the bank's right of setoff is not a violation of the automatic stay. See e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust Sav. Ass'n v. Edgins, 36 B.R. 480 (9th Cir.Bankr.App. 1984); Rio v. Army Aviation Center Fed. Credit Union, 82 B.R. 138 (M.D.Ala. 1986); Stann v. Mid. Am. Credit Union, 39 B.R. 246 (D.Kan. 1984); In re Archer, 34 B.R. 28 (B.C.N.D.Tex. 1983); In re Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 84 B.R. 1009 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1988); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Cent. Fidelity Bank, NA, 22 B.R. 747 (W.D.Va. 1982); In re Williams, 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1986); In re Hoffman, 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1985); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1982); and In re Carpenter, 14 B.R. 405 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1981).
See Nat'l Bank of Georgia, Inc. v. Air Atlanta, Inc. (In re Air Atlanta, Inc.), 74 B.R. 426, 427 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1987) and In re Williams, 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1986). So too, the two cases cited by SEFCU, Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (W.D.Va. 1982) and In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1982) both involved corporate debtors that had filed chapter 11 petitions. As noted above, the Debtor is not operating a business.
1994) (including discussions of the statutory scheme and economic distinctions between setoff and freeze); In re Lough, 163 B.R. 586 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1994); In re Pimental, 142 B.R. 26 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1992); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1992); United States v. Orlinski (In re Orlinski), 140 B.R. 600 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 1991); R.H. Williams v. Am. Bank of Mid-Cities, N.A. (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1986); Craig Shackelford Farms, Inc. v. Portland Bank (In re Hoffman), 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1985); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1982); Third National Bank in Nashville v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 B.R. 405 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1981).
1994) (including discussions of the statutory scheme and economic distinctions between setoff and freeze); In re Lough, 163 B.R. 586 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1994); In re Pimental, 142 B.R. 26 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1992); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1992); United States v. Orlinski ( In re Orlinski), 140 B.R. 600 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 1991); R.H. Williams v. Am. Bank of Mid-Cities, N.A. ( In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1986); Craig Shackelford Farms, Inc. v. Portland Bank ( In re Hoffman), 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1985); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1982); Third National Bank in Nashville v. Carpenter ( In re Carpenter) 14 B.R. 405 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1981).
See e.g., In re Gazelle, 17 B.R. 617 (Bankr.W.D.Wisc. 1982); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, N.A., 22 B.R. 747 (W.D.Va. 1982). Although the case law supporting the imposition of an administrative freeze on a debtor's account which is cited by the Credit Union is plentiful and compelling, it is significant to note that a large majority of the cases cited are not Chapter 13 cases.
(Chapter 13); In re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 91 B.R. 392 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Va. 1988) (Chapter 11); National Bank of Georgia v. Air Atlanta, 74 B.R. 426 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga. 1987) (Chapter 11); In re Williams, 61 B.R. 567 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex. 1986) (Chapter 11) (In this case, the court said if the bank had not held a valid, ripe right of setoff under Texas law the freeze would have been a violation of the stay.); and In re Hoffman, 51 B.R. 42 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ark. 1985) (Chapter 11), and did not consider in terms of Section 362(a)(3). However, most cases holding a freeze was not a violation of the stay were pre-1984 amendment, including the following: In re Edgins, 36 B.R. 480 (9th Cir.BAP 1984) (Chapter 13); Stann v. Mid-American Credit Union, 39 B.R. 246 (D.Kan. 1984) (Chapter 7); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 B.R. 747 (D.W.D.Va. 1982) (Chapter 11); In re Owens-Peterson, 39 B.R. 186 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga. 1984) (Chapter 13); In re Lee, 40 B.R. 123 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich. 1984) (Chapter 7); In re Gazelle, 17 B.R. 617 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wisc. 1982) (Chapter 11); and In re Carpenter, 14 B.R. 405 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn. 1981) (Chapter 7).