. "A trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and for sufficient reasons, may allow a party to reopen and supply defects in evidence which have inadvertently occurred" ( Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Shirley U., 266 A.D.2d 459, 460, 698 N.Y.S.2d 535 ; seeMRI Enters., Inc. v. Comprehensive Med. Care of N.Y., P.C., 122 A.D.3d 595, 596, 996 N.Y.S.2d 119 ; Kay Found. v. S & F Towing Serv. of Staten Is., Inc., 31 A.D.3d 499, 501, 819 N.Y.S.2d 765 ). Such discretion, however, should be exercised sparingly (seeCafferata v. Cafferata, 165 A.D.3d 878, 878, 85 N.Y.S.3d 214 ).
Finally, we conclude with respect to appeal No. 2 that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' posthearing motion to reopen the record. Although a court has discretion to grant leave to reopen a matter to allow additional proof ( see Kay Found, v S F Towing Serv. of Staten Is., Inc., 31 AD3d 499, 501; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459, 460), that discretion should be exercised sparingly ( see Kay Found., 31 AD3d at 501; Lindenman v Kreitzer, 7 AD3d 30, 33; King v Burkowski, 155 AD2d 285, 286). Here, the motion was made belatedly ( see Noga v Noga, 235 AD2d 1002; Shapiro v Shapiro, 151 AD2d 559, 560-561), and "[t]his is not an instance in which a party [sought] `to reopen and supply defects in evidence which have inadvertently occurred'" ( Matter of Radisson Community Assn., Inc. v Long, 28 AD3d 88, 91, quoting Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs., 266 AD2d at 460).
"A trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and for sufficient reasons, may allow a party to reopen and supply defects in evidence which have inadvertently occurred" (Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 A.D.2d 459, 460; see MRI Enters., Inc v Comprehensive Med. Care of N.Y., P.C., 122 A.D.3d 595, 596; Kay Found. v S & F Towing Serv. of Staten Is., Inc., 31 A.D.3d 499, 501). Such discretion, however, should be exercised sparingly (see Cafferata v Cafferata, 165 A.D.3d 878, 878).
A finding of neglect constitutes "a permanent and significant stigma" which might indirectly affect the mother's status in future proceedings ( Matter of Justin P. [Damien P.], 148 A.D.3d 903, 904, 48 N.Y.S.3d 773 ; Matter of Grayson J. [Sharon H.], 119 A.D.3d 575, 577, 989 N.Y.S.2d 95 ). The Family Court has the authority to reopen a Family Court Act article 10 proceeding to allow a party to present additional testimony at a fact-finding hearing (see e.g.Matter of Dior Z.J. [Dior J.], 139 A.D.3d 1065, 30 N.Y.S.3d 851 ; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Shirley U., 266 A.D.2d 459, 459–460, 698 N.Y.S.2d 535 ). Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court should have exercised its discretion to reopen the fact-finding hearing to afford the mother the opportunity to present her case.
A finding of neglect constitutes "a permanent and significant stigma" which might indirectly affect the mother's status in future proceedings (Matter of Justin P. [Damien P.], 148 AD3d 903, 904; Matter of Grayson J. [Sharon H.], 119 AD3d 575, 577). The Family Court has the authority to reopen a Family Court Act article 10 proceeding to allow a party to present additional testimony at a fact-finding hearing (see e.g. Matter of Dior Z.J. [Dior J.], 139 AD3d 1065; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459, 459-460). Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court should have exercised its discretion to reopen the fact-finding hearing to afford the mother the opportunity to present her case.
Subsequently, in an order of disposition and a permanency hearing order, both dated February 11, 2015, the Family Court placed the subject child in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services until the completion of the next permanency hearing. Contrary to the contention of the father and the attorney for the child, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in, sua sponte, permitting the petitioner to reopen its case to present additional testimony from a caseworker at the fact-finding hearing (see MRI Enters., Inc. v Comprehensive Med. Care of N.Y., P.C., 122 AD3d 595, 596; Sweet v Rios, 113 AD3d 750, 752; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459, 459-460; see also People v Johnson, 82 AD3d 415, 415; People v Medina, 284 AD2d 122, 122). Moreover, the Family Court properly determined that the petitioner established the father's neglect by a preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act §§ 1012[f][i]; 1046[b][i]) based on the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing and the adverse inference that the Family Court correctly drew based upon the father's failure to testify (see Matter of Honesti H. [Ted H.], 126 AD3d 972, 973; Matter of Gada B. [Vianez V.], 112 AD3d 1368, 1369).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to reopen his direct case ( see Atlas Refrigeration-Air Conditioning, Inc. v Lo Pinto, 33 AD3d 639; Kay Found, v S F Towing Serv. of Staten Is., Inc., 31 AD3d 499, 501; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459).
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying leave to reopen the nonjury trial. A trial court, in the exercise of discretion and for sufficient reasons, may allow a party to reopen and supply defects in evidence that have inadvertently occurred ( see Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459; see also Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636, 643-644). While it is true that a trial court's discretion to reopen a case after a party has rested should be sparingly exercised (see King v Burkowski, 155 AD2d 285), here, it appears that the court would have been better advised to reopen the case to permit the submission of what it considered to be crucial evidence ( see Felice v Gershkon, 34 AD2d 1008; see also Lindenman v Kreitzer, 7 AD3d 30, 33)
We conclude that the court neither abused its discretion nor improvidently exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen the proceedings with respect to the petitions for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 tax years ( see Orlando, 255 AD2d at 804; Shapiro v. Shapiro, 151 AD2d 559, 560). This is not an instance in which a party is seeking "to reopen and supply defects in evidence which have inadvertently occurred" ( Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Shirley U., 266 AD2d 459, 460). It is well established that petitioner had the burden of establishing that the valuation of the tax assessor was not valid, yet petitioner offered no evidence to meet that burden for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 tax years.
The trial court denied the request. While the trial court has discretion in determining whether or not to allow a party to reopen his or her case (see, Feldsberg v. Nitschke, 49 N.Y.2d 636, 643; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Soc. Servs. [ex rel. Sabrina T.] v. Shirley U., 266 A.D.2d 459, 460), when a motion to reopen is made, the trial court should consider whether the movant has provided a sufficient offer of proof, the possible prejudice to the opposing party, and whether significant delay in the trial will result if the motion is granted (see, Frazier v. Campbell, 246 A.D.2d 509, 510; Veal v. New York City Tr. Auth., 148 A.D.2d 443, 444-445; Lagana v. French, 145 A.D.2d 541, 542). The most important consideration is the possibility of prejudice to the opposing party, even without a proper offer of proof, and where there is no prejudice the request to reopen should be granted (see, Harding v. Noble Taxi Corp., 182 A.D.2d 365, 370).