Opinion
June 2, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hall, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a general provision does not overrule a particular provision but applies only where the particular provision is inapplicable (see, People v. Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200; People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192; People ex rel. Davidson v. Gilon, 126 N.Y. 147, 155-156; F N Corvette Classics v. Corvette Repairs, 206 A.D.2d 349; AP Propane v. Sperbeck, 157 A.D.2d 27, 29; Matter of Prospect v. Cohalan, 109 A.D.2d 210, affd 65 N.Y.2d 867). Moreover, in the absence of a contrary intention, general provisions do not overreach particular prohibitions founded on special reasons of policy or convenience and an explicit statement controls general language of an earlier enactment (see, Gwynne v. Board of Educ., 259 N.Y. 191). In this case, the court properly determined that the specific requirements of the bylaws providing for the specific manner in which a member of the Board of Managers was to be removed overrode the general provisions of the by-laws that provided that the unit owners were allowed to act without a meeting.
The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.
Copertino, J.P., Thompson, Santucci and Friedmann, JJ., concur.