Opinion
March 1, 1993
Appeal from the Family Court, Queens County (Clark, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
We reject the appellant's contention that the Family Court Judge who heard and determined his petition acted in contravention of an order previously issued by another Family Court Judge in the same case. While the prior order precluded contact between the appellant and his children until such time as he submitted therapists' reports indicating the safety and appropriateness of resumed visitation, that prior order cannot reasonably be construed to mean that the appellant is automatically entitled to renewed contact with the children upon his mere submission of a brief and conclusory note from a psychiatrist. Rather, the court appropriately interpreted the prior order as permitting a subsequent application by the appellant to modify the protective provision for good cause shown (see, Family Ct Act § 1061; see generally, Matter of Williams, 106 Misc.2d 280) and upon proof that resumed visitation would be in the best interests of the children (see generally, Matter of Erin G., 139 A.D.2d 737). Moreover, the court in this case properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction to safeguard the best interests of the children (see generally, Matter of Samantha S., 80 Misc.2d 217; Besharov, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 1061, at 461) by inquiring into the merits of the application.
Furthermore, the evidence adduced at the hearing and during the in-camera interviews of the appellant's daughters overwhelmingly supports the Family Court's denial of that branch of the application which was for the resumption of visitation between the appellant and his daughters. Accordingly, we discern no basis for disturbing the order under review. Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Miller and Santucci, JJ., concur.