Matter of Bone

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Ford

    53 B.R. 444 (W.D. Va. 1984)   Cited 28 times
    Stating the general rule that "in the eleventh hour a debtor may convert a part of his property which is not exempt into exempt items for the purpose of placing the property out of reach of his creditors when he claims the exemption," and stating that "[t]he courts have long recognized a limitation of this rule: If the evidence reveals fraud apart and distinct from the mere transfer of non-exempt property into exempt, the debtor has transferred the property with the intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors."

    However, an inference of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud may be drawn from the defendant's actions. In re Rubin, 12 B.R. 436 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Bone, 7 B.R. 549 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 1980). See also Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Company, 212 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1954); In re Woods, 71 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1934).

  2. In re Compton

    70 B.R. 60 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)   Cited 9 times

    As stated in White, supra, the Code presumes that creditors know the law and assume the risk that debtors may invest their assets in exempt property. While recognizing this rule, the courts have developed a limitation relating to the conversion of property from non-exempt to exempt status — if the evidence presented reveals an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the transfer of nonexempt to exempt property should be rescinded. An inference of actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud may be drawn from the debtors actions. See In re Rubin, 12 B.R. 436 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Bone, 7 B.R. 549 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 1980). Thus, the courts may look at both the actions taken and their timing to determine whether an allowable transfer occurred.

  3. In re Peery

    40 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984)   Cited 29 times
    Denying discharge based on fraudulent conveyance by way of renunciation of inheritance

    See, e.g., State Bank of Albany v. Martinez, 31 B.R. 299, 301 (Bankr.D.Vt. 1983); In re Fragetti, 24 B.R. 392, 296 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1982); Johnston Memorial Hospital v. Hess, 21 B.R. 465, 467 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1982); Semmerling Fence Supply, Inc. v. Ramos, 8 B.R. 490, 496 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1981). However, actual intent may be inferred from the debtor's actions.Daniels v. Keenan, 19 B.R. 724, 725, 731 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1982); Lewis v. Bone, 7 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 1980). Intent is rightfully inferred if the transfer is surrounded by badges or indicia of misconduct. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 32 B.R. at 628; Aetna Insurance Co. v. Nazarian, 18 B.R. 143, 150 (Bankr.D.Md. 1982); Nakagawa v. Sergio, Inc., 16 B.R. 898, 908 (Bankr.D.Hawaii 1981); Loeber v. Loeber, 12 B.R. 669, 675 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1981).

  4. In re Reed

    18 B.R. 462 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)   Cited 23 times

    New York, 1981). In re Bone, 7 B.R. 549 (Bkrtcy. Georgia, 1980). Also see Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Company, 212 F.2d 584 (C.A.2d 1954). In re Woods, 71 F.2d 270 (C.A.2d 1934).

  5. In re Rubin

    12 B.R. 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)   Cited 55 times

    An inference of actual intent to defraud creditors may be drawn from the extrinsic evidence of the debtor's actions. This inference is compelling and inescapable and precludes any conclusion other than one of actual intent to defraud. See In re Bone, 7 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr.Ct.M.D.Ga. 1980). "The law forbids all efforts to put property beyond the reach of creditors, no matter what its value; so long as courts are tolerant of such conduct, men will engage in it and the purposes of the bankruptcy act will be balked."