Opinion
September 18, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (William Davis, J.).
Petitioner's husband, the decedent, became a police officer in 1966. In 1977 he was diagnosed as having hypertension. In 1979, cardiac catheterization indicated that the decedent did not have coronary artery disease. In 1985, an angiogram indicated evidence of occlusive disease of the lower extremities.
On August 20, 1985, the decedent was admitted to the hospital after falling in the bathtub. Several diagnostic tests were performed which showed no evidence of congestive heart failure. A C.T. scan showed that the decedent suffered an acute stroke. The decedent died several days later.
The death certificate listed as the immediate cause of death "cerebral thrombosis with left hemiplegia", which was "due to, or as a consequence of: arteriosclerotic heart disease". "Essential hypertension" was another significant condition contributing to death.
Two years later, in May 1987, the decedent was exhumed and an autopsy was performed by Dr. Taff. The autopsy report noted that there was severe arteriosclerosis in the right and left coronary arteries. However, the vasculature of the brain could not be identified and the presence of a cerebral thrombosis could not be confirmed. Dr. Taff opined that the death of the decedent was due to arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Dr. Sabatini reviewed the autopsy report and other evidence before concluding that the cause of death was massive cerebral infarction. In addition while the autopsy findings indicated arteriosclerosis, there was no evidence of ischemic heart disease.
Ultimately, the Medical Board recommended denial of petitioner's application concluding that the cause of death was cerebral thrombosis. On May 20, 1988, the Board of Trustees denied petitioner's application for accidental death benefits. The IAS court dismissed the petition, on the ground that the record supported the Medical Board's findings.
As is well established, courts cannot weigh the medical evidence or substitute their own judgment for that of the Medical Board. (See, e.g., Matter of Brady v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 601, 606.) Only if the Board of Trustees' determination is "wholly irrational" should the court step in and upset the Board's determination. (Matter of Whitton v. Spinnato, 143 A.D.2d 274, 275.)
Petitioner urges that the decedent's stroke was clearly caused by coronary arteriosclerosis. However, the record indicates that the evidence presented to the Board of Trustees consisted of conflicting medical conclusions regarding the cause of the stroke. Facts were never presented establishing that the decedent's stroke was the natural and proximate result of coronary arteriosclerosis. Hence, under these circumstances, the Board of Trustees did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by relying upon the opinion of its own medical experts. (See, Matter of Canfora v. Board of Trustees, 90 A.D.2d 751, 752, affd 60 N.Y.2d 347.)
Petitioner's reliance on the provisions of General Municipal Law § 207-k (the Heart Bill) is misplaced. General Municipal Law § 207-k creates "a presumption that a disabling or fatal heart condition suffered by a New York City police officer or fireman was accidentally sustained as a result of his employment if not rebutted by contrary proof" (Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v Beekman, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 472-473). However, the presumption applies only if it is demonstrated that the disabling or fatal condition was caused by heart disease in the first instance (see, Matter of Kreie v. Board of Trustees, 143 A.D.2d 350, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 703), a burden which petitioner has not met.
We have considered petitioner's other claims and find them to be of no merit.
Concur — Ross, J.P., Rosenberger, Kassal, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.