Matter Meldish v. Braatz

5 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Dantzler

    117 F. Supp. 3d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    New York courts have found multiple offenses to represent a single criminal transaction in cases where, given similar facts, federal courts would likely find the crimes to have been committed on separate occasions under the ACCA. Compare, e.g., People v. Boyd, 272 A.D.2d 898, 709 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269–70 (2000) (one day after defendant was arrested for burglary, strip search uncovered quantity of crack cocaine; possession of controlled substance “so closely related in time, place and date” to the other charge to have been part of same criminal transaction); Meldish v. Braatz, 99 A.D.2d 316, 472 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701–02 (1984) (entire incident constituted single criminal transaction when co-defendants initially struck victim with fists—and attack abated and victim's associate assisted him into an adjoining barn—but the altercation eventually resumed, when defendant struck victim with shotgun and fired weapon in his direction), People v. Biltsted, 151 Misc.2d 620, 574 N.Y.S.2d 256, 259–62 (Crim.Ct.1991) (same result, where defendants were charged with rioting over the course of a four and a half hour period of “tumult” in and directly adjacent to a single city park; and defendants were specifically accused of bottle-throwing, setting fires in two separate locations, and other property damage and “assaultive conduct”), and

  2. Matter of Meldish v. Braatz

    61 N.Y.2d 608 (N.Y. 1984)

    Decided March 29, 1984 Appeal from (2d dept: 99 A.D.2d 316) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

  3. People v. Kaid

    43 A.D.3d 1077 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding that counts not duplicitous even though more than one dangerous instrument allegedly used by defendants because the identity of a dangerous instrument is not an element of either assault in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05 and menacing in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14

    Prohibiting duplicitous counts also prevents the possibility that individual jurors might vote to convict a defendant of a count on the basis of different offenses, thus permitting a conviction even though no unanimous verdict has been reached ( see People v Davis, 72 NY2d at 38; People v Keindl, 68 NY2d at 418). Here, the defendants were properly charged with one count of assault in the second degree and one count of menacing in the second degree because the charges against them stemmed from a single criminal transaction ( see CPL 40.10; Matter of Meldish v Braatz, 99 AD2d 316, 318-319). According to the testimony presented to the grand jury, the four defendants, acting in concert, committed one continuous assault upon the complainant over a short period of time, with no pronounced break.

  4. People v. Judkins

    139 A.D.2d 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)   Cited 6 times

    Clearly, defendant's act of refusing the correction officers' order and emphasis of that refusal by use of physical force constitute a single criminal incident. Commission of this sequence of acts, at the same time and place, involving the same victims and closely related in criminal purpose and objective cannot be other than part of a single criminal venture (see, People v. Haxhijaj, 99 A.D.2d 973; Matter of Meldish v. Braatz, 99 A.D.2d 316, 318-319, lv denied 61 N.Y.2d 608; People v Pellegriti, 98 A.D.2d 950; People v. Silvagnio, 79 A.D.2d 1112; compare, People v. O'Neil, 116 A.D.2d 853). The plea minutes do not support the existence of two "separate and distinct" incidents but, rather, evince an effort, albeit in good faith, to skew the facts to remove the case from the sentencing proscriptions set down by statute.

  5. People v. Urena

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50992 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    Prohibiting duplicitous counts also prevents the possibility that individual jurors might vote to convict a defendant of a count on the basis of different offenses, thus permitting a conviction even though no unanimous verdict has been reached (see People v. Davis, 72 NY2d, at 38; People v. Keindl, 68 NY2d, at 418). Here, the defendant was properly charged with first degree burglary, first degree assault and second degree assault because the charges against him stemmed from a single criminal transaction (see CPL 40.10; Matter of Meldish v. Braatz, 99 AD2d 316, 318-319 [2d Dept.], app. den. 61 NY2d 608). According to the testimony presented to the Grand Jury by the victim, her treating physician, one of the rescuing firefighters and the investigating fire marshal, the defendant, entered and remained in the victim's apartment after the victim expressly informed the defendant he would have to leave the apartment.