Matter Burns v. Miller Constr

12 Citing cases

  1. Bettelon v. Metalock Repair Service

    358 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    See also Roberts v Whaley, 192 Mich. 133; 158 N.W. 209 (1916). This approach has also been adopted in other jurisdictions. SLW v Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, 490 P.2d 42 (Alas, 1971); Morgan v Susino Construction Co, 130 N.J.L. 418; 33 A.2d 607 (1943), aff'd 131 N.J.L. 329; 36 A.2d 604 (1944); In the Matter of Claim of Burns, 55 N.Y.2d 501; 435 N.E.2d 390; 450 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1982); Lehigh Foundations, Inc v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa. Commw. 416; 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Texas Employers' Ins Ass'n v Shea, 410 F.2d 56 (CA 5, 1969); Shelley v Central Woodwork, Inc, 207 Tenn. 411; 340 S.W.2d 896 (1960); Goins v Lott, 435 N.E.2d 1002 (Ind App, 1982). The determination of paternity shall relate solely to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, and shall not constitute a determination of paternity made pursuant to the provisions of MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq.

  2. Claim of Racha v. Vernon Racha/Vern's Truck & Diesel Service

    151 A.D.2d 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    Under the Workers' Compensation Law, a posthumous child is treated the same as other children (Workers' Compensation Law § 2), and if the posthumous child is born out of wedlock, the claimant must meet the requirements applicable to other out-of-wedlock children (Matter of Burns v. Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 506-507). Prior to 1983, the statute required a showing of acknowledgment and dependency for out-of-wedlock children (Workers' Compensation Law § 2 [former (11)]).

  3. Johnson v. City of N.Y.

    38 N.Y.3d 431 (N.Y. 2022)   Cited 9 times

    Yet Mr. Johnson now winds up with nothing. "As a remedial statute serving humanitarian purposes, the Workers’ Compensation Law should be liberally construed" ( Burns v. Robert Miller Constr., Inc. , 55 N.Y.2d 501, 508, 450 N.Y.S.2d 173, 435 N.E.2d 390 [1982] ). Try convincing Mr. Johnson of that after today's decision.

  4. Johnson v. City of New York

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 2579 (N.Y. 2022)

    Yet Mr. Johnson now winds up with nothing. "As a remedial statute serving humanitarian purposes, the Workers' Compensation Law should be liberally construed" (Burns v Robert Miller Constr., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 508 [1982]). Try convincing Mr. Johnson of that after today's decision.

  5. Debra v. Janice

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 3755 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 53 times
    Reaffirming its prior rejection of judicially created de facto parenthood and refusing to exercise its equitable powers to do so absent legislative action

    The United States and New York constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection mandate a hearing to determine whether visitation is in M.R.'s best interests. ( Young v Young, 212 AD2d 114; Planned Parent-hood of Central Mo. v Danforth, 428 US 52; Smith v Organization of Foster Families For Equality Reform, 431 US 816; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v LaFleur, 414 US 632; Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248; Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110; Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57; Weber v Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 406 US 164; Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535.)

  6. Matter of Jacob

    86 N.Y.2d 651 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 139 times
    Holding that “the unmarried partner of a child's biological [parent], whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is raising the child together with the biological parent, can become the child's second parent by means of adoption.”

    or other objectionable results" (Kauffman Sons Saddlery Co. v Miller, 298 N.Y. 38, 44 [Fuld, J.]; see also, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 150). Given that section 117 is open to two differing interpretations as to whether it automatically terminates parental rights in all cases, a construction of the section that would deny children like Jacob and Dana the opportunity of having their two de facto parents become their legal parents, based solely on their biological mother's sexual orientation or marital status, would not only be unjust under the circumstances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in light of the adoption statute's historically consistent purpose — the best interests of the child. (See, e.g., Gomez v Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 [Equal Protection Clause prevents unequal treatment of children whose parents are unmarried]; Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 [State may not direct the onus of parent's perceived "misconduct against his (or her) children"]; Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 507-510 [New York statute requiring child born out of wedlock to prove "acknowledgment" by deceased parent did not further legitimate State interest]; see also, Matter of Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 160, n 4, supra).

  7. Crosby v. Workers' Comp

    57 N.Y.2d 305 (N.Y. 1982)   Cited 40 times
    Sustaining scheme requiring approval by the Workers' Compensation Board of a worker's attorneys' fees against state and federal constitutional challenges; federal equal protection challenge rejected on ground that statute "clearly promotes the over-all objective of ensuring adequate economic relief to the employee or his family"

    Thus, the statute will withstand judicial scrutiny if the resulting classification bears a reasonable relationship to some legitimate legislative objective ( Vance v Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97; Dandridge v Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485; People v Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457, 460; Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332). The broad scheme of compensation for work-related injuries or death contained in the Workers' Compensation Law has as its purpose the provision of a swift and sure source of benefits to injured employees or the dependents of deceased employees ( Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 158; O'Rourke v Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 222). The compensation law was intended to obviate, among other things, the delay and expense to the claimant caused by the protracted litigation involved in pursuing a negligence claim ( Shanahan v Monarch Eng. Co., 219 N.Y. 469, 477-478, supra).

  8. Matter of Burns v. Miller Constr. Co., Inc.

    57 N.Y.2d 674 (N.Y. 1982)

    Decided July 2, 1982 Appeal from ( 55 N.Y.2d 501) MOTIONS TO AMEND REMITTITUR

  9. Cruz v. New Millennium Constr

    17 A.D.3d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 23 times
    In Cruz v. Millenium Const. & Restoration Corp, 17 A.D.3d 19, 793 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dept. 2005), the Appellate Division, Third Department held that an insurance company could not declare a workers compensation policy carrier void ab initio.

    with some subsequent amendments not relevant to the issue before us ( see L 1992, ch 164; L 1985 ch 417). While the rationale behind the 1982 amendment delineating between cancellations for nonpayment and all other reasons was to benefit employers who had insurance cancelled through no fault of their own (which is not our case) ( see Mem of State Dept of Labor, Workers' Compensation Bd, 1982 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2472), the underpinning of the provision remained, that is, a legislative intent to preclude retroactive cancellation. Furthermore, we find it difficult to reconcile the existence of a right to rescind a workers' compensation policy ab initio with the public policy considerations underlying the compulsory workers' compensation statutory scheme ( see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 10, 50), namely, to surely and swiftly compensate an injured employee or a dependent of a deceased employee ( see e.g., Crosby v. State of N.Y., Workers' Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305, 313; Matter of Burns v. Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501, 508; O'Rourke v. Long, 41 NY2d 219, 222). The serious potential adverse effects of retroactive cancellation on employees mandate exacting and strict compliance with the requirements for cancellation and termination under Workers' Compensation Law § 54 (5), even when such termination is based on fraud perpetrated by the employer ( see Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, supra).

  10. Zizersky v. Life Quality Inc.

    21 Misc. 3d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)   Cited 8 times
    Including "loaner" vehicles would "raise a question about the constitutionality of the [Graves] Amendment" because "[n]othing has been proffered on this motion to suggest that a ‘loaner’ vehicle, even if connected to the purchase or lease of another vehicle, has any effect whatsoever on the market for leased or rented vehicles"

    And "where there are two possible interpretations the court will accept that which avoids constitutional doubts." ( Courtesy Sandwich Shop v Port of NY. Auth., 12 NY2d 379, 389; see also Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501, 505.)