See also Roberts v Whaley, 192 Mich. 133; 158 N.W. 209 (1916). This approach has also been adopted in other jurisdictions. SLW v Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, 490 P.2d 42 (Alas, 1971); Morgan v Susino Construction Co, 130 N.J.L. 418; 33 A.2d 607 (1943), aff'd 131 N.J.L. 329; 36 A.2d 604 (1944); In the Matter of Claim of Burns, 55 N.Y.2d 501; 435 N.E.2d 390; 450 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1982); Lehigh Foundations, Inc v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa. Commw. 416; 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Texas Employers' Ins Ass'n v Shea, 410 F.2d 56 (CA 5, 1969); Shelley v Central Woodwork, Inc, 207 Tenn. 411; 340 S.W.2d 896 (1960); Goins v Lott, 435 N.E.2d 1002 (Ind App, 1982). The determination of paternity shall relate solely to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, and shall not constitute a determination of paternity made pursuant to the provisions of MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq.
Under the Workers' Compensation Law, a posthumous child is treated the same as other children (Workers' Compensation Law § 2), and if the posthumous child is born out of wedlock, the claimant must meet the requirements applicable to other out-of-wedlock children (Matter of Burns v. Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 506-507). Prior to 1983, the statute required a showing of acknowledgment and dependency for out-of-wedlock children (Workers' Compensation Law § 2 [former (11)]).
Yet Mr. Johnson now winds up with nothing. "As a remedial statute serving humanitarian purposes, the Workers’ Compensation Law should be liberally construed" ( Burns v. Robert Miller Constr., Inc. , 55 N.Y.2d 501, 508, 450 N.Y.S.2d 173, 435 N.E.2d 390 [1982] ). Try convincing Mr. Johnson of that after today's decision.
Yet Mr. Johnson now winds up with nothing. "As a remedial statute serving humanitarian purposes, the Workers' Compensation Law should be liberally construed" (Burns v Robert Miller Constr., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 508 [1982]). Try convincing Mr. Johnson of that after today's decision.
The United States and New York constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection mandate a hearing to determine whether visitation is in M.R.'s best interests. ( Young v Young, 212 AD2d 114; Planned Parent-hood of Central Mo. v Danforth, 428 US 52; Smith v Organization of Foster Families For Equality Reform, 431 US 816; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v LaFleur, 414 US 632; Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248; Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110; Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57; Weber v Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 406 US 164; Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535.)
or other objectionable results" (Kauffman Sons Saddlery Co. v Miller, 298 N.Y. 38, 44 [Fuld, J.]; see also, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 150). Given that section 117 is open to two differing interpretations as to whether it automatically terminates parental rights in all cases, a construction of the section that would deny children like Jacob and Dana the opportunity of having their two de facto parents become their legal parents, based solely on their biological mother's sexual orientation or marital status, would not only be unjust under the circumstances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in light of the adoption statute's historically consistent purpose — the best interests of the child. (See, e.g., Gomez v Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 [Equal Protection Clause prevents unequal treatment of children whose parents are unmarried]; Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 [State may not direct the onus of parent's perceived "misconduct against his (or her) children"]; Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501, 507-510 [New York statute requiring child born out of wedlock to prove "acknowledgment" by deceased parent did not further legitimate State interest]; see also, Matter of Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 160, n 4, supra).
Thus, the statute will withstand judicial scrutiny if the resulting classification bears a reasonable relationship to some legitimate legislative objective ( Vance v Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97; Dandridge v Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485; People v Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457, 460; Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332). The broad scheme of compensation for work-related injuries or death contained in the Workers' Compensation Law has as its purpose the provision of a swift and sure source of benefits to injured employees or the dependents of deceased employees ( Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.2d 501; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 158; O'Rourke v Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 222). The compensation law was intended to obviate, among other things, the delay and expense to the claimant caused by the protracted litigation involved in pursuing a negligence claim ( Shanahan v Monarch Eng. Co., 219 N.Y. 469, 477-478, supra).
Decided July 2, 1982 Appeal from ( 55 N.Y.2d 501) MOTIONS TO AMEND REMITTITUR
with some subsequent amendments not relevant to the issue before us ( see L 1992, ch 164; L 1985 ch 417). While the rationale behind the 1982 amendment delineating between cancellations for nonpayment and all other reasons was to benefit employers who had insurance cancelled through no fault of their own (which is not our case) ( see Mem of State Dept of Labor, Workers' Compensation Bd, 1982 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2472), the underpinning of the provision remained, that is, a legislative intent to preclude retroactive cancellation. Furthermore, we find it difficult to reconcile the existence of a right to rescind a workers' compensation policy ab initio with the public policy considerations underlying the compulsory workers' compensation statutory scheme ( see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 10, 50), namely, to surely and swiftly compensate an injured employee or a dependent of a deceased employee ( see e.g., Crosby v. State of N.Y., Workers' Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305, 313; Matter of Burns v. Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501, 508; O'Rourke v. Long, 41 NY2d 219, 222). The serious potential adverse effects of retroactive cancellation on employees mandate exacting and strict compliance with the requirements for cancellation and termination under Workers' Compensation Law § 54 (5), even when such termination is based on fraud perpetrated by the employer ( see Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, supra).
And "where there are two possible interpretations the court will accept that which avoids constitutional doubts." ( Courtesy Sandwich Shop v Port of NY. Auth., 12 NY2d 379, 389; see also Matter of Burns v Miller Constr., 55 NY2d 501, 505.)