Matson v. Rusch

5 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. Wilson

    171 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1948)   Cited 1 times

    " A factual finding by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears to be clearly erroneous. Hearst Radio v. Good, 1937, 67 App.D.C. 250, 91 F.2d 555; Hazen v. Hawley, 66 App.D.C. 266, 86 F.2d 217, certiorari denied 1937, 299 U.S. 613, 57 S.Ct. 315, 81 L.Ed. 452; Hotel Lafayette v. Pickford, 1936, 66 App.D.C. 211, 85 F.2d 710, 711; Dear v. Guy, 64 App. D.C. 314, 78 F.2d 198, certiorari denied sub nom. Macrae v. Guy, 1935, 296 U.S. 585, 56 S.Ct. 96, 80 L.Ed. 414; Matson v. Rusch, 1932, 61 App.D.C. 184, 59 F.2d 360. The rule is no different in a suit seeking an injunction, Jameson v. Brown, 1940, 71 App. D.C. 254, 109 F.2d 830; Castleman v. Avignone, 1926, 56 App.D.C. 253, 12 F.2d 326. Our review of the record causes us to conclude that the District Court was fully justified in reaching its conclusion.

  2. Shellman v. Shellman

    95 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1938)   Cited 25 times

    We have only to determine therefore whether under the evidence this finding was clearly wrong. McLarren v. McLarren, 1916, 45 App.D.C. 237, 1 A.L.R. 1412; Matson v. Rusch, 1932, 61 App.D.C. 184, 59 F.2d 360; Garrity v. District of Columbia, 1936, 66 App.D.C. 256, 86 F.2d 207. We have read the record with care.

  3. Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank

    92 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1937)   Cited 38 times
    Concluding that "[i]t must be remembered also that practically all the clues are not known to any one employee of the bank, and that the facts known to any one employee are not sufficient to arouse suspicion."

    The findings of the chancellor on the subject of knowledge are in the Bank's favor. Under the rule settled in this jurisdiction, while we are not absolutely bound by a chancellor's findings of fact, we do not disturb them on appeal unless upon an examination of the evidence they are clearly wrong. Dear v. Guy, 64 App.D.C. 314, 78 F.2d 198, certiorari denied, sub nomine Macrae v. Guy, 296 U.S. 585, 56 S.Ct. 96, 80 L.Ed. 414; Pollock v. Jameson, 63 App. D.C. 152, 70 F.2d 756; Rhoderick v. Swartzell, 62 App.D.C. 180, 65 F.2d 813, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 677, 54 S.Ct. 100, 78 L.Ed. 584; Matson v. Rusch, 61 App.D.C. 184, 59 F.2d 360; Garrity v. District of Columbia, 66 App.D.C. 256, 86 F.2d 207; Hazen v. Hawley, 66 App.D.C. 266, 86 F.2d 217. See, also, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 41, 38 S.Ct. 473, 62 L.Ed. 968. We cannot, I think, say under the evidence that the chancellor's findings are clearly wrong.

  4. Hazen v. Hawley

    86 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1936)   Cited 11 times

    I. Did the trial court properly find that the classification of appellee's property in the "`B' restricted-area district", forbidding the erection of an apartment house, was arbitrary: Under the rule settled in this jurisdiction, while we are not absolutely bound by a chancellor's findings of fact, we do not disturb them on appeal unless upon an examination of the evidence they are clearly wrong. Dear v. Guy, 64 App.D.C. 314, 78 F.2d 198; Pollock v. Jameson, 63 App.D.C. 152, 70 F.2d 756; Rhoderick v. Swartzell, 62 App.D.C. 180, 65 F.2d 813, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 677, 54 S.Ct. 100, 78 L.Ed. 584; Matson v. Rusch, 61 App.D.C. 184, 59 F.2d 360. See, also, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 41, 38 S.Ct. 473, 62 L.Ed. 968. We have examined the record with care.

  5. Garrity v. District of Columbia

    86 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1936)   Cited 8 times
    In Garrity v. District of Columbia, No. 6365, 86 F.2d 207, decided this day, we uphold, inter alia, the contention of the Zoning Commission therein made that it had power in the same regulation which defined an area-district also to limit use.

    V. Did the trial court properly find that the Commission was not arbitrary in its denial, in 1931, of the appellant's petition for rezoning? Under the rule settled in this jurisdiction, while we are not absolutely bound by a chancellor's findings of fact, we do not disturb them on appeal unless upon an examination of the evidence they are clearly wrong. Dear v. Guy, 64 App.D.C. 314, 78 F.2d 198; Pollock v. Jameson, 63 App.D.C. 152, 70 F.2d 756. Rhoderick v. Swartzell, 62 App.D.C. 180, 65 F.2d 813, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 677, 54 S.Ct. 100, 78 L.Ed. 584; Matson v. Rusch, 61 App.D.C. 184, 59 F.2d 360. See, also, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 41, 38 S.Ct. 473, 62 L.Ed. 968. As appears from the statement of facts above, there was a conflict of evidence in the trial court on the question whether the continued inclusion of the plaintiff's property in the "`A' restricted-area district" bore any reasonable relation to the protection of the public health, the securing of the public safety and the protection of property in the District of Columbia. There was substantial evidence in support of the appellant's prayer for change of zoning, and substantial evidence in opposition. In view of this, and of the rule above stated, we are unable to say that the trial court must have found the action of the Commission arbitrary. Only if there is arbitrary action on its part can the courts intervene.