Mathis v. Anderson Cnty.

Full title: Grayson Mathis, Sr., Individually and as the Personal Representative of…

Court: United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Anderson Division

Date published: May 29, 2024

Civil Action 8:22-234-DCC-KFM (D.S.C. May. 29, 2024)

Opinion

Civil Action 8:22-234-DCC-KFM

05-29-2024

Grayson Mathis, Sr., Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Grayson Mathis, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Anderson County; Anderson County Sheriff's Office; Chad McBride, in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Anderson County Sheriff's Office; Bryce Jackson; City of Anderson; Joseph Chapman; Zach Lucas; Craig Gardner; William Busha; Chase Ginn; Cory Barrow; Daniel McCown; David McCuen; and Chief Jim Stewart, Defendants.

Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER AND REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the court on the City of Anderson, Joseph Chapman, Zach Lucas, Craig Gardner, William Busha, Chase Ginn, Cory Barrow, Daniel McCown, David McCuen, and Jim Stewart's (collectively “City defendants”) motion for summary judgment (doc. 79); Anderson County, Anderson County Sheriff's Office, Chad McBride, and Bryce Jackson's (collective “County defendants”) motion for summary judgment (doc. 80); the City defendants' motion to strike (doc. 119); and the County defendants' motion for joinder (doc. 120). The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Section 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On June 30, 2020, Officer Joseph Chapman (“Officer Chapman”) and Officer Zach Lucas (“Officer Lucas”) with the City of Anderson Police Department were on duty and patrolling within the Anderson, South Carolina City limits (doc. 79-2 at 1). Sergeant Craig Gardner (“Sergeant Gardner”) was the supervisor monitoring Officers Chapman and Lucas' dispatch over the radio (doc. 79-1 at 2). While on East Shockley Ferry Road, Officers Chapman and Lucas heard a vehicle spinning its tires behind them (docs. 79-2 at 1; 79-3, Chapman dep. 30:19-24). The officers observed a red sedan, which they later learned was driven by Grayson Mathis, Jr. (“Mr. Mathis”), exit a gas station and turn onto East Shockley Ferry Road without using a turn signal (docs. 79-2 at 1; 79-3, Chapman dep. 30:25-31:22; 93-2, Lucas dep. 56:20-57:6). The sedan was in a 35 mph zone, and the officers estimated that it began traveling at approximately 55-60 mph (doc. 79-2 at 1). The officers observed that as the sedan approached their patrol car from behind, the front of the sedan dipped down as the driver slammed on the brakes (id.). The sedan slowed down to a very low speed to the point of almost stopping in the roadway (id.). Officer Chapman also slowed down so that the sedan eventually passed him, and the officers were able to position themselves behind the sedan (id.). At that time, the officers identified the sedan as an Infiniti, and Officer Lucas ran the tag (id.). Central dispatch advised the officers that the license tag belonged to a Chevrolet Cruze, and the license plate was identified by the Anderson County Sheriff's Office as stolen (id.).

Officer Chapman then initiated a traffic stop and activated his blue lights (doc. 79-2 at 1). The sedan immediately accelerated and began to flee at a high rate of speed (id.). The officers activated their siren and pursued the sedan (id.). Officer Chapman's dash camera captured this pursuit (see doc. 94-3). As the pursuit began, Officer Chapman yelled out, “Yeah! Hell yeah! 10-0 boys!” (id. at 0:00:04-0:00:14). Once a pursuit begins, a supervisor is required to provide verbal approval for the continuation of the pursuit (doc. 94-4, Gardner dep. 33:15-18). It does not appear that Officers Chapman and Lucas received this approval from Sergeant Gardner, as Sergeant Gardner was away from his desk when the pursuit began (see id. at 70:12-20; doc. 94-3 at 0:00:01-0:10:43). However, Sergeant Gardner was back at his desk and assisted Officers Chapman and Lucas shortly after the pursuit started (doc. 94-4, Gardner dep. 70:12-20).

The officers' pursuit of Mr. Mathis lasted approximately ten minutes, and Mr. Mathis traversed about fourteen miles (doc. 94-3 at 0:00:01-0:10:43). During his flight, Mr. Mathis drove in the wrong lane multiple times, had to swerve into the correct lane to avoid an oncoming car, crossed double yellow lines, ran multiple red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road several times, ran stop signs, forced cars onto the shoulder, and attempted to evade the officers by making a u-turn and swerving in and out of multiple parking lots (id.). At one point, Mr. Mathis lost control of his vehicle and went off of the side of the road near a gas station parking lot (id.). Mr. Mathis then spun back around onto the road and sped off from Officers Chapman and Lucas again (id.). This pursuit occurred on mostly two-lane roads, and Mr. Mathis reached speeds of about 95 mph (id.). Officers Chapman and Lucas also engaged in similar driving to keep up with Mr. Mathis (id.). It is undisputed that Officers Chapman and Lucas violated the City of Anderson Police Department's policy multiple times during their pursuit of Mr. Mathis, including by driving on the wrong side of the road, failing to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, and losing visual sight of the suspect vehicle at least twice (see id.; docs. 93-2; 93-7).

City of Anderson Police Department Officers Chase Ginn (“Officer Ginn”) and William Busha (“Officer Busha”) attempted to join the pursuit (doc. 97-1, Busha dep. 15:215). Officer Busha testified that, in his opinion, he and Officer Ginn were never in position to be the secondary vehicle in the pursuit (id. at 15:16-18). Nevertheless, Officer Ginn took over communications as if he and Officer Busha were secondary (id. at 15:19-20). In a subsequent internal affairs investigation, Officer Busha felt that he and Officer Ginn were too far away to call the chase out (doc. 93-7 at 6). Officer Busha also stated that he thought that Officer Ginn said that they were secondary to make Sergeant Gardner not call off the chase and feel at ease based on two cars being involved (id.).

During the pursuit, Sergeant Gardner requested assistance from the Anderson County Sheriff's Office to utilize stop sticks (doc. 94-4, Gardner dep. 43:9-22). The City of Anderson Police Department's policy states that “Stop Sticks/spike strips will not be utilized by this agency” (doc. 93-3 at 13). No one at the City of Anderson Police Department is certified to use stop sticks, nor are its officers trained at the speeds at which stop sticks should be used (doc. 94-4, Gardner dep. 43:4-7). In response to Sergeant Gardner's request, Deputy Jaden Mordan attempted to set up stop sticks at Whitehall/187, and Deputy Bryce Jackson (“Deputy Jackson”) set up stop sticks at Dobbins Bridge Road (doc. 94-6 at 4). At the time of the incident in question, Deputy Jackson was still under his evaluation period with the Anderson County Sheriff's Office (doc. 94-5, Jackson dep. 11:718). Deputy Jackson testified that he had been informed on how to deploy stop sticks (id. at 16:16-15). However, Deputy Jackson had no practice throwing stop sticks nor had he ever used them prior to this incident (id. at 16:16-20). Deputy Jackson also had not reviewed the literature from the manufacturer of the stop sticks (id. at 16:21-24). The Anderson County Sheriff's Office's policy states that only deputies trained in the use and deployment of stop sticks in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations shall deploy such devices (doc. 98-2 at 8). Moreover, the manufacturer's literature provides that “[a]ny officer authorized to deploy STOP STICKS must be properly trained . . .” (doc. 80-8 at 7). After Deputy Jackson deployed the stop sticks, approximately two minutes elapsed before he encountered Mr. Mathis (doc. 94-6 at 4).

Seconds before Mr. Mathis approached the stop sticks, he was traveling 90 to 95 mph (id.). The defendants assert that Mr. Mathis swerved to avoid the stop sticks, did not hit the stop sticks, traveled off of the side of the road, and crashed (doc. 79-1 at 3). The plaintiff, however, asserts that Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks and crashed (doc. 90 at 1112). Contemporaneous with Mr. Mathis' crash, Officer Lucas can be heard on Officer Chapman's dash camera footage saying, “He hit them. He hit them. He hit them” (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:29-0:10:31). The recorded radio transmissions also reflect two officers radioing in, “Hit sticks” (doc. 94-6 at 4). Additionally, Deputy Jackson radioed in, “Good hit on the sticks” (doc. 28 at 0:2:25-0:2:30). After the crash, Deputy Jackson told Officer McCown that no one taught him how to throw stop sticks (doc. 97-6 at 0:06:22-0:06:30). Officer McCown responded, “Fuck it, it wouldn't have made a difference anyway” (id.).

In his subsequent deposition, Deputy Jackson rescinded the statement that he made on the radio, testifying that Mr. Mathis did not actually hit the stop sticks (doc. 1131, Jackson dep. 50:7-24). Deputy Jackson testified that he knew that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks because the stop sticks had not been deformed or punctured (id.). Deputy Jackson confirmed that when a vehicle runs over stop sticks, the stop sticks activate, causing them to open up and send quills into the tires (id. at 50:24-51:4). When asked why he radioed in that Mr. Mathis hit the sticks, Deputy Jackson testified as follows:

From my vantage point I couldn't see like exactly whether his tires had made contact with the sticks, but what I did see was him swerve off the right side of the road, which is achieving I guess within my mind it was more probable that he had hit the sticks, and that was the easiest thing to relay to dispatch then. He may have hit them, he may not have, but he went off the side of the road.

(Id. at 51:25-52:7).

Corporal Kristopher Bratcher (“Corporal Bratcher”) of the South Carolina Highway Patrol testified in his deposition that the South Carolina Highway Patrol inspected the stop sticks and they were not damaged (doc. 112-2, Bratcher dep. 11:14-12:3). Moreover, Corporal Bratcher testified that the South Carolina Highway Patrol did not find any evidence that Mr. Mathis hit the stop sticks (id. at 12:4-8; doc. 79-16, Bratcher dep. 37:19-38:1). Additionally, Corporal Bratcher testified that it appeared that Mr. Mathis drove off of the road to try to avoid the stop sticks and lost control of his vehicle (doc. 80-6, Bratcher dep. 20:14-21). The defendants submit a report from their expert, John Ryan (“Mr. Ryan”), in which Mr. Ryan states that the stop sticks remained intact, which makes it clear that Mr. Mathis did not hit them (doc. 79-6, Ryan expert report ¶ 111). Moreover, the defendants assert that the intact stop sticks have been retained by the Anderson County Sheriff's Office but the plaintiff's counsel never requested or accepted any invitation to inspect the stop sticks (doc. 112 at 2). In response, the plaintiff contends that the stop sticks were never photographed or identified by their serial number (docs. 117 at 2; 97-6; 98-1). Additionally, the plaintiff asserts that a chain of custody was not created and the stop sticks were not entered into evidence until one year after the incident (docs. 117 at 2; 98-1).

The plaintiff also submits a preliminary report from his expert, Geoffrey Alpert (“Dr. Alpert”), in which Dr. Alpert stated that Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks (doc. 117-3 at 5). However, Dr. Alpert subsequently testified in his deposition multiple times that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks (doc. 112-1, Alpert dep. 137:17-20, 142:5-17). Dr. Alpert also testified in his deposition as follows:

[M]ost of the information I read is he avoided it. There was one comment I thought I saw from someone else saying he - - that he hit them, but everything I saw, and particularly from the county deputy who put them out there, . . . he kept saying he avoided it, . . . and all the audios that I heard he - - he didn't hit the stop sticks.

(Doc. 117-2, Alpert dep. 49:24-50:21). Further, Dr. Alpert confirmed that if a tire or vehicle had run over the stop sticks, the stop sticks would be damaged in some way and there would be some deployment of quills (doc. 113-2, Alpert dep. 98:10-15).

Regardless of whether Mr. Mathis hit the stop sticks, it is undisputed that he traveled off of the side of the road (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:20-0:10:40). At that time, Brenda Wilson was walking out to check her mailbox, and she was struck by Mr. Mathis' sedan and killed instantly (doc. 90 at 12). Mr. Mathis' sedan then struck a tree, a guy wire, and a truck with a trailer that was parked in a yard, which is where Mr. Mathis' sedan ultimately stopped (id.). Both Mr. Mathis' sedan and the truck caught on fire (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:10:40).

City of Anderson Police Department Officers Cory Barrow (“Officer Barrow”) and Daniel McCown (“Officer McCown”) also responded to Dobbins Bridge Road (doc. 974, Barrow dep. 11:8-10). Officer Barrow testified that he and Officer McCown were not running CODE 3 with lights and sirens to get to Dobbins Bridge Road (id. at 11:11-13). However, Inspector Randall Human (“Inspector Human”), the head of the City of Anderson Police Department's Internal Affairs Unit, observed Officers Barrow and McCown in Officer Chapman's dash cam video arriving on scene with lights and moving at a fast pace (doc. 93-7 at 7-8; see doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:11:05). Within seconds of the sedan catching on fire, Officer Busha, Officer Ginn, Officer Barrow, Officer McCown, Officer Chapman, Officer Lucas, and Deputy Jackson were on the scene (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:11:05).

When Officer Chapman stopped his vehicle after Mr. Mathis crashed, a very large fire was emanating from Mr. Mathis' sedan (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:10:40). Further, within seconds of Mr. Mathis' crash, several officers ran towards Mr. Mathis (id. at 0:10:440:11:01). Officer Chapman immediately radioed, “[W]e have a fire, a very large fire, large fire” (id. at 0:10:40-0:10:45). Further, Officer Chapman radioed for “EMS Priority 1" (id. at 0:11:19-0:11:22). Officer Ginn's body camera footage reflects that Officer Ginn approached Mr. Mathis' sedan, ran back to the road where Officer Busha was standing, and said, “Not good, they in there screaming” (doc. 98-4 at 0:00:10-0:00:13). Officer Ginn then yelled, “Grab the fire extinguisher! Fire extinguisher” (id. at 0:00:13-0:00:16). However, the videos appear to reflect that none of the officers retrieved their fire extinguishers (see id.). Officer Ginn's body camera footage also shows Officer Barrow running to a nearby resident and stating, “Hey, we need a water hose, you got one?” (id. at 0:00:37-0:00-45). Officer Barrow later testified in his deposition that he attempted to put out the flames (doc. 97-4, Barrow dep. 14:1-2).

Numerous officers testified that when they arrived on scene, they could not approach Mr. Mathis' vehicle due to the extreme heat from the size of the fire (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:4-25; 79-19, Ginn dep. 29:17-30:7; 79-20, Human dep. 74:15-21; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:3-2; 79-23, Stewart dep. 77:2-8). The officers also testified that Mr. Mathis' sedan was fully engulfed in flames when they arrived, there was nothing that they could do to assist Mr. Mathis, and any attempt to aid Mr. Mathis would have been futile (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 809, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:4-25; Ginn dep. 29:17-30:7; 79-20, Human dep. 74:15-21; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:3-2; 79-23, Stewart dep. 77:2-8). The officers only had hand-held, portable fire extinguishers, and the size of the flames rendered these fire extinguishers useless (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25). Mr. Mathis also had ammunition in his sedan, which was exploding (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:4-25; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:32). The fire department radioed that the fire was fully involved at 19:13:33, which was six minutes after Officer Ginn radioed, “START FIRE” (doc. 94-6 at 5). However, the fire department was not at the scene until about six minutes after the crash occurred (see doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:17:15). The Coroner's report listed the following as the cause and manner of Mr. Mathis' death: multiple traumatic injuries, blunt force trauma/burns, and motor vehicle crash (doc. 79-13 at 1). The Coroner also found methamphetamine in Mr. Mathis' system (id. at 2).

Inspector Human testified in his deposition that the underlying offenses that gave rise to the pursuit did not involve a need for an immediate response to alleviate an impending threat to the safety of persons (doc. 94-2, Human dep. 51:12-16).¹ Inspector Human also testified that there were multiple instances in which he would have terminated the pursuit (id. at 24:16-21). Further, Dr. Alpert testified that the pursuit lasted too long and at speeds that were too dangerous (doc. 111-3 at 136). Dr. Alpert also stated in his preliminary report that the pursuit violated the City of Anderson Police Department's policy and that Sergeant Gardner should have terminated the pursuit shortly after it began (doc. 117-3 at 9). In contrast, Mr. Ryan stated in his expert report that the decision to stop, pursue, and continue the pursuit of Mr. Mathis was consistent with generally accepted policies, practices, training, and industry standards; any reasonable and well-trained officer would conclude that Mr. Mathis was driving in an outrageous and reckless manner that posed a danger to the public prior to law enforcement contact; and Officer Chapman's actions were authorized by the law (doc. 79-6, Ryan expert report ¶¶ 95, 101, 109).

1 The undersigned notes that, on multiple occasions, the plaintiff cites to pages in deposition transcripts that were not provided in the record. Moreover, the plaintiff also cites to pages in deposition transcripts that do not support the contention that the plaintiff makes. As a result, the undersigned has not considered those statements herein.

There is evidence in the record that officers turned off their body cameras while on the scene of Mr. Mathis' crash, in violation of the City of Anderson Police Department's policy (docs. 90 at 13-16; 93-7 at 7). Additionally, Officer Lucas' camera was lost (docs. 90 at 13-16; 93-7 at 7). Moreover, the plaintiff highlights issues with how the internal affairs investigation was conducted based on the City of Anderson Police Department turning over the in-car videos and photos to defense counsel and this evidence not being properly logged or having a chain of custody (doc. 90 at 16). Further, the plaintiff alleges that the City of Anderson Police Department has a long history of allowing police pursuits in violation of their policy (id. at 17-18).

Within a few months prior to the pursuit in question, Mr. Mathis had fled from law enforcement on three occasions (docs. 79-10; 79-11; 79-12). On February 8, 2020, Mr. Mathis was driving a motorcycle when he refused to stop for a City of Anderson Police Department patrol vehicle after it activated its blue lights and sirens (doc. 79-10 at 2). Mr. Mathis' motorcycle reached speeds of 90 mph, and he was unsteady on the motorcycle and swaying (id.). The officers were able to run the tag on the motorcycle, and it was returned as belonging to Mr. Mathis (id.). The City of Anderson Police Department officers ultimately terminated the pursuit (id.). Shortly thereafter, on February 21, 2020, the same officers involved in the February 8th pursuit observed Mr. Mathis driving a motorcycle (doc. 79-11 at 2). As reflected in the incident report, these officers knew that Mr. Mathis had a suspended driver's license with at least two prior convictions for Driving Under Suspension and two active warrants from the incident on February 8, 2020 (id.). Mr. Mathis again “took off” from the officers, and the officers did not pursue Mr. Mathis at that time (id.). On April 21,2020, City of Anderson Police Department officers attempted a traffic stop of Mr. Mathis (doc. 79-12 at 3). Mr. Mathis was driving a silver Toyota truck that was incorrectly displaying a license tag (id.). Mr. Mathis again fled from the officers, reaching speeds of 90 mph (id.). Mr. Mathis subsequently struck another vehicle, which rendered his truck inoperable (id.). Mr. Mathis then exited the truck and fled on foot (id.). Officers found Mr. Mathis hiding in overgrown bushes and detained him (id. at 3-4). Officers found marijuana on Mr. Mathis' person, as well as a gun, methamphetamine, a black digital scale, and a glass pipe with a bowl in the truck (id.).

Grayson Mathis, Sr. (“the plaintiff”), individually and as the personal representative of Mr. Mathis' estate, filed a complaint in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas on December 13, 2021 (doc. 1-1). The matter was removed to federal court on January 26, 2022, pursuant to federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1). On April 21, 2023, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging the following nine claims: Fourth Amendment violations against Officers Chapman, Officer Lucas, Sergeant Gardner, and Deputy Jackson pursuant to Section 1983; Fourteenth Amendment violations against Officer Chapman, Officer Lucas, Sergeant Gardner, and Deputy Jackson pursuant to Section 1983; Fourteenth Amendment violations against Officer Chapman, Officer Barrow, Officer McCown, Officer Lucas, Officer Ginn, Officer Busha, and Deputy Jackson pursuant to Section 1983; policy/custom violations pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) against the City of Anderson; policy/custom violations and tacit authorization pursuant to Monell against the City of Anderson; failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline pursuant to Monell against the City of Anderson, David McCuen (“City Manager McCuen”), and Jim Stewart (“Chief Stewart”); gross negligence/negligence against the City of Anderson, the Anderson County Sheriff's Office, and Chad McBride (“Sheriff McBride”) pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; wrongful death against all of the defendants; and survival action against all of the defendants (doc. 53).

On October 2, 2023, the City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 79). The County defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment on the same date (doc. 80). The plaintiff filed responses on November 7, 2023 (docs. 90; 91; see doc. 109), and the defendants filed replies on November 14, 2023 (docs. 112; 113). On November 21, 2023, the plaintiff filed sur-replies (docs. 117; 118). Further, on November 27, 2023, the City defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's sur-reply (doc. 119), and the County defendants filed a motion for joinder in the motion to strike (doc. 120). The plaintiff filed a response to the motion to strike on December 11, 2023 (doc. 122). Accordingly, these matters are now ripe for review.

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike and Motion for Joinder

The City defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's sur-reply to their motion for summary judgment, and the County defendants filed a motion to join the City defendants' motion to strike (docs. 119; 120). As an initial matter, the undersigned grants the County defendants' motion for joinder.

In their motion to strike, the defendants assert that the plaintiff's sur-replies should be stricken because the plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to file sur-replies, did not consult with the court or opposing counsel prior to filing sur-replies, and, in the sur-replies, did not respond to any issue that was raised for the first time in the defendants' response briefs (doc. 119 at 2). The plaintiff, however, argues that he filed sur-replies based on the defendants raising new arguments and introducing new evidence in their response briefs (doc. 122 at 1-4). The undersigned has reviewed the briefs and agrees with the plaintiff, as the plaintiff used his sur-replies to respond to arguments and evidence raised for the first time in the defendants' response briefs. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike is denied, and the undersigned has considered the plaintiff's sur-replies herein.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

C. Fourth Amendment Violation

In his first cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner, acting in concert with Deputy Jackson, used excessive force in violation of Mr. Mathis' Fourth Amendment rights through the deployment of stop sticks (docs. 53 ¶ 156; 91 at 5-8). The plaintiff further alleges that Officers Chapman and Lucas initiated an improper pursuit and intentionally pushed the pursuit to extreme speeds with the knowledge that the Anderson County Sheriff's Office had set up stop sticks (doc. 53 ¶¶ 52-54, 56, 61, 152).² Moreover, the plaintiff contends that Sergeant Gardner failed to properly approve, supervise, and terminate the pursuit (id. ¶¶ 72, 76, 84).

2 The defendants initially argue that the plaintiff's allegations regarding Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner violating Mr. Mathis' Fourth Amendment rights by pushing the pursuit to extreme speeds are without merit because the mere pursuit of a fleeing suspect does not constitute a seizure (doc. 79-1 at 9-10). To the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that he is entitled to relief under the Fourth Amendment solely based on Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner pursuing Mr. Mathis, the undersigned agrees. The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that a police pursuit in an attempt to seize a person does not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); see also Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (“[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, any such claim should be dismissed.

For his Fourth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show that Mr. Mathis was seized and that this seizure was constitutionally unreasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The defendants argue that they did not seize Mr. Mathis within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because Mr. Mathis never hit the stop sticks but rather swerved around them, lost control, and crashed (docs. 79-1 at 9; 112 at 2, 14). The plaintiff, however, argues that Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks, crashed, and was therefore seized by the defendants (doc. 90 at 18-20). The parties do not dispute that if Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks, he was seized (see docs. 79-1; 90; 112; 117; 80; 91; 113; 118). See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 (noting that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when “[there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied" and finding that law enforcement using a road block, which actually stopped a fleeing suspect, was a seizure) (emphasis in original).

The undersigned has reviewed the video evidence submitted by the parties and notes that, due to the distance involved, it is impossible to tell from the footage whether Mr. Mathis actually hit the stop sticks. The plaintiff argues that Officer Chapman's dash camera footage shows Mr. Mathis' vehicle immediately turning counterclockwise, which is consistent with rapid tire deflation (doc. 91 at 5). However, the plaintiff has not shown that this type of vehicle movement is definitive of hitting stop sticks.

As set out above, Officer Chapman's dash camera footage reflects that, contemporaneous with Mr. Mathis' crash, Officer Lucas stated, “He hit them. He hit them. He hit them” (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:29-31). Additionally, Deputy Jackson said on the radio, “Good hit on the sticks” (doc. 28 at 0:2:25-30). The recorded radio transmissions also reflect two instances of officers radioing in, “Hit sticks” (doc. 94-6 at 4). In his subsequent deposition, Deputy Jackson rescinded the statement he made on the radio, testifying that Mr. Mathis did not actually hit the stop sticks (doc. 113-1, Jackson dep. 50:7-24). Deputy Jackson testified that he knew that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks because the stop sticks had not been deformed or punctured (id.). Deputy Jackson confirmed that when a vehicle runs over stop sticks, the stop sticks activate, causing them to open up and send quills into the tires (id. at 50:24-51:4). When asked why he radioed in that Mr. Mathis hit the sticks, Deputy Jackson explained that he could not see if the tires had made contact with the stop sticks from his vantage point (id. at 51:25-52:7). Further, it was easier for him to relay to dispatch that the stop sticks were hit (id.). There are also photos of the roadway in the record (doc. 111-2). There are pieces of debris in some of these photos, which the plaintiff notes are pieces of tire (id.).

As noted above, Dr. Alpert stated in his preliminary report that Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks (doc. 117-3 at 5). However, Dr. Alpert subsequently testified in his deposition multiple times that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks (doc. 112-1, Alpert dep. 137:17-20, 142:5-17). Dr. Alpert also testified in his deposition as follows:

[M]ost of the information I read is he avoided it. There was one comment I thought I saw from someone else saying he - - that he hit them, but everything I saw, and particularly from the county deputy who put them out there, . . . he kept saying he

avoided it, . . . and all the audios that I heard he - - he didn't hit the stop sticks.

(Doc. 117-2, Alpert dep. 49:24-50:21). Further, Dr. Alpert confirmed that if a tire or vehicle had run over the stop sticks, the stop sticks would be damaged in some way and there would be some deployment of quills (doc. 113-2, Alpert dep. 98:10-15).

Corporal Bratcher testified in his deposition that the South Carolina Highway Patrol inspected the stop sticks and they were not damaged (doc. 112-2, Bratcher dep. 11:14-12:3). Moreover, Corporal Bratcher testified that the South Carolina Highway Patrol did not find any evidence that Mr. Mathis hit the stop sticks (id. at 12:4-8; doc. 79-16, Bratcher dep. 37:19-38:1). Additionally, Corporal Bratcher testified that it appeared that Mr. Mathis drove off of the road to try to avoid the stop sticks and lost control (doc. 80-6, Bratcher dep. 20:14-21).

Defense expert Mr. Ryan also stated in his report that the stop sticks remained intact, which made it clear that Mr. Mathis did not hit them (doc. 79-6, Ryan expert report ¶ 111). Moreover, the defendants submit that the intact stop sticks have been retained by the Anderson County Sheriff's Office but the plaintiff's counsel never requested or accepted any invitation to inspect the stop sticks (doc. 112 at 2). In response, the plaintiff takes issue with the chain of custody, the timeline of when the stop sticks were entered into evidence, and the lack of a photograph and serial number for the stop sticks (docs. 117 at 2; 97-6; 98-1).

In light of the record before the court, the undersigned concludes that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Mr. Mathis hit the stop sticks. Although there is significant evidence indicating that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks, there is also evidence, albeit thin, that Mr. Mathis did hit them. Notably, there is evidence of multiple contemporaneous statements from officers that Mr. Mathis hit the stop sticks, at least two of which came from officers who were very close to the incident in question - Deputy Jackson and Officer Lucas. Moreover, Deputy Jackson's subsequent rescission of his statement made on the radio is insufficient for the court to conclude that Mr. Mathis did not hit the stop sticks, as this type of contradictory statement and credibility determination is best reserved for a jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge”).

However, the Fourth Amendment analysis does not end there. As set out above, the plaintiff must also show that even if Mr. Mathis struck the stop sticks and was seized, the defendants' use of the stop sticks was constitutionally unreasonable. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. "The Fourth Amendment bars police officers from using excessive force to effectuate a seizure." Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 884 (4th Cir. 2016). "Courts evaluate a claim of excessive force based on an 'objective reasonableness' standard." Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 399). "Courts are to carefully balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. at 884-85 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)) (“the Garner factors”). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that, among these Garner factors, the second - whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others - is “the most important.” Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 531 (4th Cir. 2024).

“[T]he reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. "An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional." Id. “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. Additionally, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 397; see Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (“In questioning the split-second decisions of police officers, we must avoid hindsight bias and try to place ourselves in the heat of the moment.”). Ultimately, "the question of whether the officer's actions were reasonable is a question of pure law." Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022); see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8. (2007).

The parties disagree as to whether the court should apply a specific deadly force test in addressing the objective reasonableness of the defendants' actions³ (docs. 80-1 at 9-11; 91 at 10). Regarding the use of deadly force, both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held that it is constitutionally reasonable to use such force "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others." Garner, 409 U.S. at 3; see Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233.⁴ The plaintiff argues that this deadly force language controls here, but the defendants contend that simply relying on the specific deadly force language would be inappropriate (docs. 80-1 at 9-11; 91 at 10). Although this deadly force language is binding precedent and the Fourth Circuit has characterized it as a “more specific test” to be applied when deadly force is used, Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233, the Fourth Circuit has applied this test in the context of the broader Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. See, e.g., Aleman v. City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court has also cautioned that “[a]lthough an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end, we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.' Whether or not [an officer's] actions constituted application of deadly force, all that matters is whether [his] actions were reasonable." See Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. Accordingly, the undersigned has addressed this deadly force law as a part of the broader Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness analysis below.

3 The undersigned notes that the use of the stop sticks, under the circumstances presented here, could constitute deadly force. The literature from the stop sticks' manufacturer provides as follows:

STOP STICK is designed for a controlled release of air from the target vehicle's tires, usually within 20-30 seconds. However, under some circumstances tire deflation can increase the possibility that a driver may lose control of the vehicle and crash, resulting in SERIOUS or FATAL INJURIES.

(Doc. 80-8 at 9) (emphasis in original). This literature also discusses deploying stop sticks at high speeds, providing as follows:

To reduce the risk of serious or fatal injuries resulting from

a vehicle crash

Use EXTREME CAUTION when:

• Pursuits reach EXCESSIVE SPEEDS; suspects have an increased risk of losing control of the vehicle if tires are deflated while driving at above normal highway speeds.

(Id. at 10) (emphasis in original). Moreover, there is evidence that Mr. Mathis encountered the stop sticks while traveling at nearly 91 mph (doc. 118-3 at 5). In addition, Major Nicole Carson (“Major Carson”), testifying as the City of Anderson Police Department's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, stated in her deposition that the City of Anderson Police Department's policy provides that tire deflation devices could, under certain circumstances, constitute the use of deadly force (doc. 100-1, Carson dep.174:22-25).

4 The Fourth Circuit also stated that courts “must focus on the moment that deadly force was used, not the whole episode." Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233. "And the justification for deadly force can fall away in seconds." Id.

1. Deputy Jackson

The plaintiff alleges that Deputy Jackson's deployment of the stop sticks constitutes excessive force in violation of Mr. Mathis' Fourth Amendment rights (docs. 53 ¶ 156; 91 at 5-8). However, the undersigned finds that Deputy Jackson's use of the stop sticks was constitutionally reasonable and that no reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Jackson did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Mathis posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officers and others.

Officer Chapman's dash camera footage reflects Mr. Mathis speeding away from Officers Chapman and Lucas, Mr. Mathis' dangerous driving during the pursuit, Officer Chapman and Officer Lucas' actions during the pursuit, Deputy Jackson's use of the stop sticks, and Mr. Mathis' crash (doc. 94-3 at 0:00:01-0:10:43). Over the course of this approximately fourteen-mile pursuit that lasted about ten minutes, Mr. Mathis drove in the wrong lane multiple times, swerved into the correct lane to avoid an oncoming car, crossed double yellow lines, ran multiple red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road several times, ran stop signs, forced cars onto the shoulder, and attempted to evade the officers by making a u-turn and swerving in and out of multiple parking lots (id.). At one point, Mr. Mathis lost control of his vehicle and went off the side of the road near a gas station parking lot (id.). Mr. Mathis then spun back around onto the road and sped off from the officers again (id.). This pursuit occurred on mostly two-lane roads, and Mr. Mathis reached speeds of about 95 mph (id.).

The Supreme Court's ruling on the reasonableness of force used in Scott, 550 U.S. 372, is particularly relevant here. In that case, a deputy clocked the respondent's vehicle traveling 73 mph in a 55 mph zone. 550 U.S. at 374. The deputy activated his blue lights, and the respondent sped away. Id. The deputy then pursued the respondent. Id. The pursuit occurred mostly on two-lane roads and at speeds exceeding 85 mph. Id. at 374-75. Other deputies joined the pursuit, including Deputy Scott. Id. at 375. At one point during the pursuit, the respondent pulled into a parking lot in a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles. Id. The respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Deputy Scott's vehicle, exiting the parking lot, and once again speeding down a two-lane road. Id. Video evidence reflected that during this pursuit, the respondent swerved around more than a dozen cars, crossed a double-yellow line, forced cars in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit, ran multiple red lights, and drove in an improper lane. Id. at 379. All the while, police were forced to engage in the same dangerous maneuvers to keep up with the respondent. Id. Six minutes and nearly ten miles into the pursuit, Deputy Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of the respondent's vehicle. Id. at 375. As a result, the respondent lost control of his vehicle, crashed, and was rendered a quadriplegic. Id. The respondent filed a lawsuit, alleging, in relevant part, that Deputy Scott violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force when effectuating the seizure. Id. at 375-76.

The Supreme Court determined that Deputy Scott's actions were constitutionally reasonable and that no reasonable jury could conclude that the pursuit, which the respondent initiated, did not pose a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386. In making this decision, the Supreme Court balanced the risk of bodily harm that Deputy Scott's actions posed to the respondent in light of the threat to the public that Deputy Scott was trying to eliminate. Id. at 383. The Supreme Court noted that it was clear that both Deputy Scott's actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to the respondent and the respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to pedestrians, other civilian motorists, and the officers involved in the pursuit. Id. at 384. The Supreme Court then stated as follows:

So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a single person? We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that [Deputy] Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had [Deputy] Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for [Deputy] Scott to take the action that he did.

Id. Justice Stevens dissented, noting that in his view, a jury should have been allowed to evaluate whether Deputy Scott's actions were constitutionally reasonable, “particularly when less drastic measures - in this case, the use of stop sticks or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker - could have avoided such a tragic result.” Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added).

Here, as in Scott, the undersigned concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Deputy Jackson did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Mathis posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officers, pedestrians, and other motorists. Mr. Mathis engaged in highly dangerous driving maneuvers, driving in the wrong lanes, swerving around vehicles, forcing other vehicles onto the shoulder, running red lights and stop signs, and driving over 90 mph on two-lane roads near residences. Balancing the risk that the stop sticks posed to Mr. Mathis while he was traveling at a high rate of speed against the countervailing governmental interest of ensuring public safety, the undersigned concludes that Deputy Jackson's actions were constitutionally reasonable - particularly when considering the number of lives at risk and the endangered individuals' relative culpability.

The plaintiff argues that the first factor set forth in Garner, the severity of the crime at issue, weighs in his favor, as reckless driving and displaying a stolen license plate are non-violent crimes that did not justify the initiation of the pursuit, the continuation of the pursuit, or the use of stop sticks (doc. 91 at 13-15). In support of this argument, the plaintiff points to testimony from Inspector Human, who stated that the underlying offenses that gave rise to the pursuit did not involve a need for an immediate response to alleviate an impending threat to the safety of persons (doc. 94-2, Human dep. 51:12-16). Inspector Human also testified that there were multiple instances in which he would have terminated the pursuit (id. at 24:16-21). Further, Dr. Alpert testified that the pursuit lasted too long and at speeds that were too dangerous (doc. 111-3 at 136). Dr. Alpert also stated in his preliminary report that the pursuit violated the City of Anderson Police Department's policy and that Sergeant Gardner should have terminated the pursuit shortly after it began (doc. 117-3 at 9). However, the plaintiff over simplifies the crime at issue, as Mr. Mathis subsequently fled from Officers Chapman and Lucas and engaged in driving that was highly and imminently dangerous to the officers and the public, as discussed at length above. Further, in Scott, the Supreme Court addressed a similar argument as the one made by the plaintiff here - that both the respondent and the innocent public could have been protected if police were to have ceased the pursuit. 550 U.S. at 385-86. The Supreme Court explained as follows:

[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people's lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly doesn't impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

Id. The undersigned finds that Scott forecloses the plaintiff's argument here. Additionally, the second (most important) factor and third factor, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, clearly weigh in favor of Deputy Jackson.

The plaintiff also argues that Deputy Jackson's lack of training and deployment of the stop sticks when Mr. Mathis was traveling at a high rate of speed made his actions constitutionally unreasonable (doc. 91 at 11). As set out above, Deputy Jackson was still under his evaluation period with the Anderson County Sheriff's Office during the time in question (doc. 94-5, Jackson dep. 11:7-18). Deputy Jackson testified that he had been informed on how to deploy stop sticks (id. at 16:16-15). However, Deputy Jackson had no practice throwing stop sticks nor had he ever used them prior to this incident (id. at 16:16-20). Deputy Jackson also had not reviewed the literature from the manufacturer of the stop sticks (id. at 16:21-24). Further, Deputy Jackson verbalized to Officer McCown at the scene that no one had taught him how to throw stop sticks (doc. 97-6 at 0:06:220:06:30). The plaintiff also argues that Deputy Jackson's vehicle blocked the roadway and that Deputy Jackson set up the stop sticks in a manner that would not allow Mr. Mathis to avoid them (doc. 91 at 15). However, the undersigned finds that Deputy Jackson's amount of training and the manner in which he deployed the stop sticks does not have bearing on the issue here: whether Deputy Jackson had probable cause to believe that Mr. Mathis posed a threat of serious physical harm to others.

Further, the plaintiff argues that Deputy Jackson's use of the stop sticks was unconstitutional because there were multiple policy violations throughout the pursuit (doc. 91 at 11-14). However, it is well-settled that local policy does not establish the contours of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, such a policy violation, without more, does not equate to a violation of the Constitution. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998) (noting that an officer did not violate the Constitution “[r]egardless [of] whether [the officer's] behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or the balance struck in law enforcement's own codes of sound practice”).

It is also worth mentioning that Deputy Jackson clearly tempered his use of force. Deputy Jackson could have utilized force with a much greater likelihood of causing death or serious bodily harm to Mr. Mathis, such as firing a gun, intentionally instigating a crash by hitting Mr. Mathis' vehicle with his patrol vehicle, or even setting up a roadblock. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (noting that a relevant consideration is whether any effort was made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force); Scott, 550 U.S. at 383-86 (finding that a deputy hitting a suspect's vehicle with his patrol vehicle was reasonable when the fleeing suspect posed a substantial risk of harm to officers and others); Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471,477-80 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that some of the officers' gunshots at a fleeing suspect were not excessive force in violation of the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights). As noted by the defendants, if Deputy Jackson would have been constitutionally justified in pushing his bumper into Mr. Mathis' vehicle (like Deputy Scott did), there is no successful argument that Deputy Jackson was not constitutionally justified in deploying stop sticks.

The undersigned recognizes that the loss of life, regardless of the circumstances, is tragic. However, Deputy Jackson reasonably believed that Mr. Mathis posed a danger to the public and the officers through his dangerous, high-speed flight and no reasonable jury could conclude that he employed excessive force in violation of Mr. Mathis' constitutional rights. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the County defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.

2. Officer Chapman, Officer Lucas, and Sergeant Gardner

The plaintiff also alleges that Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner used excessive force in violation of Mr. Mathis' Fourth Amendment rights by pushing the pursuit to extreme speeds and acting in concert with Deputy Jackson to deploy the stop sticks (doc. 53 ¶¶ 152-62). However, because the undersigned has concluded that Deputy Jackson's use of the stop sticks was not excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the undersigned further finds that the actions of Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner in requesting the Anderson County Sheriff's Office to deploy the stop sticks also were not excessive.

Moreover, there is no evidence that these defendants took any action to push the pursuit to extreme speeds. Rather, the record reflects that Mr. Mathis engaged in a high-speed flight and these defendants simply reacted to keep up with him in light of his behavior. Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner did not take any action to induce or encourage Mr. Mathis' high speeds; they simply did not call off the chase. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834-83 (noting, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, that the officers “had done nothing to cause [the driver's] high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse his flouting of the commonly understood police authority to control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck speed”). Further, in regards to the plaintiff's arguments that Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner committed violations of the City of Anderson Police Department's policy through the initiation and continuation of this pursuit, the undersigned has discussed above that local policy violations, without more, do not constitute constitutional violations. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the City defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Violation ⁵

5 The City defendants argue that the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by the Parratt-Hudson doctrine (doc. 79-1 at 12). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). However, because the Parratt-Hudson doctrine's applicability is limited to procedural due process claims and the plaintiff has brought substantive due process claims, the City defendants' argument is without merit. See Dean for and on behalf of Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 420 (4th Cir. 2020).

1. Pursuit and Use of Stop Sticks

In his second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that Officers Chapman and Lucas, Sergeant Gardner, and Deputy Jackson violated Mr. Mathis' Fourteenth Amendment rights through their pursuit of Mr. Mathis and use of stop sticks (docs. 53 ¶¶ 152-54, 157, 165; 91 at 21). As an initial matter, the defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because it is a Fourth Amendment seizure claim and not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim (doc. 80-1 at 12).

In both his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the plaintiff alleges that Officers Chapman and Lucas drove at extreme rates of speed when pursuing Mr. Mathis in violation of the Constitution, the City of Anderson Police Department's policy, the Anderson County Sheriff's Office's policy, and South Carolina law (doc. 53 ¶¶ 152-54, 157, 165). Moreover, in both claims, the plaintiff alleges that Deputy Jackson's use of the stop sticks under these circumstances was unconstitutional and in violation of the City of Anderson Police Department's policy, the Anderson County Sheriff's Office's policy, and South Carolina law (doc. 91 at 21). The plaintiff also alleges that Sergeant Gardner, working with Officers Chapman and Lucas and Deputy Jackson, violated the City of Anderson Police Department's policy, the Anderson County Sheriff's Office's policy, and South Carolina law (doc. 53 ¶¶ 157,165).

It appears that the plaintiff is alleging that a substantive violation of Mr. Mathis' Fourth Amendment rights is also a violation of Mr. Mathis' Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has made clear that "[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing those claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) ("[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”). "The Due Process Clause does not constitute a catch-all provision that provides a remedy whenever a state actor causes harm." Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012). Moreover, “[c]laims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of . . . [a] seizure of a free citizen are most properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Attempted seizures, however, as opposed to effectuated seizures, are beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment and are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process analysis. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 n.7.

As discussed above, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants effectuated an unreasonable seizure of Mr. Mathis in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, the undersigned found that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Mr. Mathis was seized. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed, as this claim is covered by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Schreiner v. City of Gresham, 681 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1276 (D. Or. 2010) (“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a jury could conclude that Officer Silva used excessive force in executing his seizure of plaintiff. . . . Because this court finds that all aspects of plaintiff's excessive force claim fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim is dismissed pursuant to the more-specific provision rule."). However, out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned has addressed the merits of this Fourteenth Amendment claim herein.

a. Officer Chapman, Officer Lucas, and Sergeant Gardner

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no State may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. "To prove a violation of substantive-due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's behavior was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Wash. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "To be conscience shocking, a defendant's behavior must lack any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, . . . [and] only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense" Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-65 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (noting that the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials “from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Although the measure of what is conscience shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does poin[t] the way." Washington, 58 F.4th at 177 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "And to that end, the Supreme Court has described a culpability spectrum along which behavior may support a substantive due process claim." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "On one end of the spectrum is conduct intended to injure [that is] in some way unjustifiable by any governmental interest." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Such conduct most likely rises to the conscience-shocking level." Id. "On the other end is negligently inflicted harm [which] is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process conduct." Id. at 177-78 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "But conduct falling in between those two poles - deliberate indifference conduct which is more than negligence but less than intentional harm - presents a closer call." Id. at 178. "Deliberate indifference is an intermediate level of culpability that can, if proven, also establish a due process violation." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Ultimately, the applicable standard of culpability for a substantive-due-process claim - either intent to harm or deliberate indifference - depends on an exact analysis of [the] context and circumstances of the case." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the parties disagree as to whether the intent to harm or deliberate indifference standard applies (docs. 79-1 at 11-13; 80-1 at 13; 90 at 20-23; 91 at 18-21). The Supreme Court's analysis regarding the appropriate culpability standard in Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, is enlightening on this issue. In that case, Officers Stapp and Smith saw a motorcycle approaching at a high speed. Id. at 836. The motorcycle was driven by an 18-year-old male, who had a 16-year-old male passenger. Id. Officer Stapp turned on his overhead rotating lights, yelled to the boys to stop, and moved his patrol car close to Officer Smith's patrol car in an attempt to pen in the motorcycle. Id. The driver of the motorcycle maneuvered between the patrol cars and sped off. Id. at 836-37 Officer Smith immediately switched on his emergency lights and siren and pursued the motorcycle. Id. at 837. For 75 seconds and over the course of 1.3 miles in a residential neighborhood, the motorcycle wove in and out of oncoming traffic, forcing two cars and a bicycle to swerve off of the road. Id. The motorcycle and patrol car reached speeds up to 100 mph, with Officer Smith following at a distance as short as 100 feet. Id. At that speed, Officer Smith's patrol car would have required 650 feet to stop. Id. The driver of the motorcycle attempted a sharp turn, and the motorcycle tipped over. Id. Officer Smith slammed on his brakes but ultimately hit the passenger on the motorcycle. Id. The passenger died at the scene. Id.

Like the instant case, the parties in Lewis disagreed as to whether the deliberate indifference or intent to harm standard applied. 523 U.S. at 845-54. The Supreme Court explained that “[a]s the very term deliberate indifference implies, th[at] standard is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical . . . ." Id. at 851 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, courts use the deliberate indifference standard when addressing a prisoner's claim based on the denial of adequate medical care. Id. at 849-52. But, when examining a prisoner's claim that arose not from normal custody but from the response to a prison riot, courts apply the intent to harm standard due to the fact that the officials' decisions were “made in haste” and “under pressure.” Id. at 852-53. The Supreme Court then discussed the standard for a high-speed chase as follows:

[T]he police on an occasion calling for fast action have obligations that tend to tug against each other. Their duty is to restore and maintain lawful order, while not exacerbating disorder more than necessary to do their jobs. They are supposed to act decisively and to show restraint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance. A police officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to all those within stopping range, be they suspects, their passengers, other drivers, or bystanders.

To recognize a substantive due process violation in these circumstances when only midlevel fault has been shown would be to forget that liability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations. When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful

purpose to spark the shock that implicates the large concerns of the governors and the governed. Just as a purpose to cause harm is needed for Eighth Amendment liability in a riot case, so it ought to be needed for due process liability in a pursuit case.

Accordingly, we hold that high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983.

Id. at 853-54 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, because there was a high-speed chase and Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner were faced with unforeseen circumstances that demanded their instant judgment, the undersigned finds that the intent to harm standard applies. The plaintiff argues that, despite Lewis, the deliberate indifference standard should apply because of the length of the pursuit. The plaintiff submits that Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner had time to deliberate their actions. However, the undersigned finds that the fact that the pursuit in Lewis was shorter than the pursuit here is insufficient to warrant a departure from the intent to harm standard given the totality of the circumstances and the fact that these defendants were forced to make decisions with competing obligations in haste and under pressure. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to point to any case law in which a court applied the deliberate indifference standard in the context of a high-speed chase.

The undersigned also finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner intended to harm Mr. Mathis in some way unjustifiable by any governmental interest. Again, the Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Lewis is helpful here:

[Officer] Smith was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which the police were not to blame. They had done nothing to cause [the driver's] high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse his flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement authority to control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck speed forcing other drivers out of their

travel lanes. [The driver's] outrageous behavior was practically instantaneous, and so was [Officer] Smith's instinctive response. While prudence would have repressed the reaction, the officer's instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to induce [the driver's] lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill. Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement considerations, and while [Officer] Smith exaggerated their demands, there is no reason to believe that they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.

Regardless whether [Officer] Smith's behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or the balance struck in law enforcement's own codes of sound practice, it does not shock the conscience, and petitioners are not called upon to answer for it under § 1983.

Id. at 855.

Similarly, here, Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner were faced with Mr. Mathis speeding off from them and driving extremely recklessly to evade the law. They did not induce Mr. Mathis' behavior and were forced to make hurried decisions about how to respond, weighing complex and competing obligations about enforcing the law, detaining Mr. Mathis, and the danger to Mr. Mathis, themselves, and the public. Although Officer Chapman's excited exclamation⁶ at the beginning of the pursuit was inappropriate, there is simply no evidence in the record that he, Officer Lucas, or Sergeant Gardner intended to harm Mr. Mathis. Moreover, the undersigned finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that they did. Therefore, even if Mr. Mathis was not seized and his Fourteenth Amendment claim proceeded on the merits, the undersigned would still recommend that the district court grant the City defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim against Officers Chapman and Lucas and Sergeant Gardner.

6 As set out above, Officer Chapman yelled out, “Yeah! Hell yeah! 10-0 boys!” (doc. 94-3 at 0:00:04-0:00:14).

b. Deputy Jackson

The appropriate culpability standard to apply to Deputy Jackson is a closer call. Although there was a high-speed chase, Deputy Jackson was not in a vehicle pursuing Mr. Mathis. Rather, Deputy Jackson deployed the stop sticks, and, after he deployed them, about two minutes elapsed before he encountered Mr. Mathis. In setting the culpability standard for high-speed chases in Lewis, the Supreme Court did not draw a distinction between officers actually pursuing the fleeing suspect and officers setting up stop sticks or road blocks down the road. Moreover, the parties have not pointed to, and the undersigned is unaware of, any binding case law dealing with this issue.

Although involving vastly different facts, the plaintiff cites to Dean, 976 F.3d 407, in support of his argument. Briefly, in that case, an officer was speeding to respond to an emergency. Id. at 411-12. The officer was subsequently informed that the incident was no longer an emergency but that he should still respond to assist. Id. at 412. The officer cut back to a non-emergency response, which requires officers to abide by all traffic laws. Id. Approximately two minutes after the cancellation of the emergency response, the officer lost control of his vehicle and struck another motorist. Id. This motorist sustained severe injuries. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that deliberate indifference was the appropriate standard by which to measure this officer's conduct. Id. at 414-17. The Fourth Circuit explained that “time to reflect on [one's] actions is a factor in determining whether deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard,” and this officer was not responding to an emergency, and he had two minutes to slow his vehicle before the accident occurred. Id.

Unlike Dean, where the emergency had ceased, Deputy Jackson was still very much facing an emergent high-speed chase at the time in question, and this chase was dangerous and fluid in nature, and involved a suspect traveling over 90 mph. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the intent to harm standard is appropriate for assessing Deputy Jackson's conduct. Moreover, the undersigned finds that there is no evidence that Deputy Jackson intended to injure Mr. Mathis in some way unjustifiable by any governmental interest. Deputy Jackson deployed stop sticks in an attempt to terminate Mr. Mathis' dangerous flight. At that time, Mr. Mathis posed a grave danger to the officers, pedestrians, and other motorists. Moreover, as discussed above, Deputy Jackson tempered his use of force by using stop sticks, as opposed to firing a weapon or intentionally instigating a crash by hitting Mr. Mathis' vehicle with his patrol vehicle.

The plaintiff submits the same arguments about Deputy Jackson's behavior regarding his Fourteenth Amendment claim as he did with his Fourth Amendment claim -that Deputy Jackson did not have appropriate training and violated local policies (doc. 91 at 20-21). However, as discussed above, the undersigned finds that these arguments are without merit and do not reflect that Deputy Jackson intended to harm Mr. Mathis in a way unjustifiable by any governmental interest.

Therefore, even if Mr. Mathis was not seized by the defendants and his claim was analyzed as a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, the undersigned would nevertheless recommend that the district court grant the County defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.⁷

7 Even if Deputy Jackson's conduct was measured under the deliberate indifference standard, the undersigned would still find that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for the same reasons set forth in the intent to harm analysis. “Deliberate indifference is a very high standard - a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2004). “An officer's actions demonstrate deliberate indifference where the evidence shows that the officer subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm and that his actions were inappropriate in light of the risk.” Dean, 976 F.3d at 416. Deputy Jackson deployed stop sticks when Mr. Mathis was engaged in highly dangerous driving and posed a substantial and imminent risk of harm to other officers, pedestrians, and motorists. Deputy Jackson's actions - in light of his lack of training - constitute, at most, negligence, and the undersigned finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that his actions shock the conscience under the deliberate indifference standard.

2. Failure to Render Aid

The plaintiff also alleges that Officers Chapman, Barrow, McCown, Lucas, Ginn, and Busha, and Deputy Jackson violated Mr. Mathis' Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to render aid to Mr. Mathis after his crash (doc. 53 ¶¶ 173-83). The defendants argue that they owed no duty to render aid to Mr. Mathis, but the plaintiff argues that there is a “common law duty to render aid” (docs. 79-1 at 12-13; 80-1 at 17-18; 90 at 23). The plaintiff has failed to point to any case law establishing this common law duty (see doc. 90).

The general rule is that there is no duty to render aid under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 836 (4th Cir. 2001). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment serves ‘as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.'" Id. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)). “Thus, the clause 'confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.'" Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196); see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border.").

Although not argued by the parties, there are certain exceptions to this general rule. Patten, 274 F.3d at 836. Relevant here, the Due Process Clause requires “the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons . . . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). "Th[is] exception[] to the general no-duty-to-act rule [is] rooted in the fact the state has custody over the person asserting the claims." Patten, 274 F.3d at 837. Stated differently, if there is no custodial relationship, there is no duty to act. Id. at 841. The Supreme Court has explained the rationale for this exception as follows:

[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by . . . the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf - through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty - which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (internal citations omitted).⁸

8 The plaintiff does not explicitly argue that the defendants are liable under the state-created danger doctrine, but the defendants raise this exception to the no-duty-to-act rule (doc. 80-1 at 15-16). “[T]he state-created doctrine is a narrow exception to the general rule that state actors are not liable for harm caused by third parties.” Graves v. Lioi, 930 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). “It applies only when the state affirmatively acts to create or increase the risk that resulted in the victim's injury.” Id. “Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the state actor created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly through affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission." Id. (emphasis added). Because the plaintiff has not alleged harm from a private, third party, the undersigned finds that this doctrine is inapplicable here.

The undersigned finds that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the duty to render aid under the Due Process Clause was triggered based on the defendants engaging in affirmative acts to restrain Mr. Mathis's personal liberty through the use of stop sticks. See, e.g., City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244-45 (addressing the duty to render aid under the Fourteenth Amendment when officers shot a fleeing suspect); Cheeks v. Belmar, 80 F.4th 872, 876-78 (8th Cir. 2023) (finding police put a suspect in custody by using a PIT maneuver⁹ on the suspect and therefore had an obligation to render aid under the Fourteenth Amendment); Polcyn v. Martin, C/A No. 6:03-2327-HFF, 2005 WL 2654259, at *6 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2005) ("Although tethered to the concept of custody, [this] exception does not appear to require full custodial arrest or institutionalization before it is triggered.").

9 “In a PIT maneuver, a police officer will use his or her vehicle to make intentional contact with the suspect's fleeing vehicle to force an end to the pursuit.” Cheeks, 80 F.4th at 875 n.4.

The Supreme Court has declined to define the standard for which to assess failure to render aid claims when an individual was injured while being apprehended by the police. See City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244-45; City of Canton, Oh. v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 397 (1989) (“This Court has not yet addressed the precise nature of the obligations that the Due Process Clause places upon the police to seek medical care for pretrial detainees who have been physically injured while being apprehended by the police.”); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”). Additionally, research revealed no answer to this question from the Fourth Circuit.

However, here, as in City of Revere, “[w]hatever the standard may be, [the defendants] fulfilled [their] constitutional obligation . . . .” 463 U.S. at 245 (finding that officers fulfilled their duty to render aid under the Fourteenth Amendment by seeing that the individual was promptly taken to a hospital that provided the treatment necessary for his injury). Even assuming that the lower culpability standard of deliberate indifference is appropriate under these circumstances, the undersigned finds that the defendants did not violate Mr. Mathis' Fourteenth Amendment rights. See McDaniel v. Jackson, C/A No. 2:18-cv-01939-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900171, at *7-8 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2019) (applying the deliberate indifference standard to a failure to render aid claim when an individual was injured while being apprehended by the police after a pursuit), R&R adopted by 2019 WL 6463788 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2019). As discussed above, “[deliberate indifference is a very high standard - a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302-03. “An officer's actions demonstrate deliberate indifference where the evidence shows that the officer subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm and that his actions were inappropriate in light of the risk.” Dean, 976 F.3d at 416. A defendant's subjective knowledge of the risk may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. (citations omitted). A plaintiff may also show subjective knowledge in a due process claim “from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The undersigned concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent in failing to render aid to Mr. Mathis. The plaintiff asserts that when the defendants arrived, a rear portion of Mr. Mathis' sedan was just beginning to burn (doc. 90 at 23). The plaintiff further asserts that the defendants simply watched as Mr. Mathis' car began to burn, and Mr. Mathis ultimately burned alive (Id.). However, the video footage in the record blatantly contradicts the plaintiff's characterization of the fire and the defendants' actions. See Witt v. W.V. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (“For when a video ‘quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by [the plaintiff] ... so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'”) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). Officer Chapman's dash camera footage shows that by the time Officer Chapman stopped his vehicle, there was a very large fire that was already several feet above Mr. Mathis' sedan (doc. 94-3 at 0:10:30-0:10:40). The footage also reflects that within seconds of Mr. Mathis' crash, several officers ran towards Mr. Mathis (id. at 0:10:44-0:11:01). Officer Chapman immediately radioed, “[W]e have a fire, a very large fire, large fire” (Id. at 0:10:40-0:10:45). Further, Officer Chapman radioed for “EMS Priority 1" (id. at 0:11:19-0:11:22). Officer Ginn's body camera footage shows that after Officer Ginn approached Mr. Mathis' vehicle, he ran over towards Officer Busha and stated, “[N]ot good, they in there screaming” (doc. 98-4 at 0:00:10-0:00:13). Officer Ginn then yelled, “Grab the fire extinguisher! Fire extinguisher” (Id. at 0:00:13-0:00:16). However, no officers grabbed their fire extinguishers (see id.). Officer Ginn also radioed, “EMS Priority 1" (Id.). Despite the plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, Officer Ginn's body camera footage reflects that at the time Officer Ginn responded, Mr. Mathis' sedan was unquestionably fully engulfed in flames (Id. at 0:00:07-0:00:47). Officer Ginn's body camera footage also reflects Officer Barrow running to a nearby resident and stating, “Hey, we need a water hose, you got one?” (Id. at 0:00:37-0:00-45). Officer Barrow later testified in his deposition that he retrieved a water hose and attempted to put out the fire (doc. 97-4 at 14:1-2).

There is also substantial testimony in the record that the officers could not approach Mr. Mathis' vehicle due to the extreme heat from the size of the fire (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:4-25; 79-19, Ginn dep. 29:17-30:7; 79-20, Human dep. 74:15-21; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:3-2; 79-23, Stewart dep. 77:2-8). The officers also testified that Mr. Mathis' sedan was fully engulfed in flames when they arrived, there was nothing that they could do to assist Mr. Mathis, and any attempt to aid Mr. Mathis would have been futile (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:4-25; Ginn dep. 29:17-30:7; 79-20, Human dep. 74:15-21; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:3-2; 79-23, Stewart dep. 77:2-8). The officers only had hand-held, portable fire extinguishers, and the size of the flames rendered these fire extinguishers useless (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25). This testimony is supported by the size of the fire depicted in the video footage (see docs. 94-3; 98-4). Mr. Mathis also had ammunition in his sedan, which was exploding (docs. 80-5, Jackson dep. 38:4-22; 80-9, McBride dep. 30:17-25; 79-18, Lucas dep. 72:425; 79-21, Barrow dep. 15:3-2).

The plaintiff argues that the defendants could have rendered aid because the fire department did not radio that the fire was fully involved until 19:13:33, which was six minutes after Officer Ginn radioed, “START FIRE” (doc. 94-6 at 5). However, as set out above, Officer Chapman's dash camera footage reflects that the fire department was not at the scene until about six minutes after the crash occurred (see doc. 94-3 at 0:10:300:17:15).

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated Mr. Mathis' Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to render aid. The videos in the record plainly evince that Mr. Mathis' sedan burst into flames immediately after the crash, resulting in an extremely large fire. Moreover, there was ammunition exploding in Mr. Mathis' sedan. These defendants ran towards Mr. Mathis after the crash and promptly radioed for “EMS Priority 1.” Further, Officer Barrow attempted to put out the flames with a hose. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.

E. Monell Claims

The plaintiff has also brought three claims pursuant to Monell, 436 U.S. 658 against the City of Anderson, City Manager McCuen, and Chief Stewart (doc. 53 ¶¶ 185252). “Monell permits suits against a municipality for a federal constitutional deprivation only when the municipality undertook the allegedly unconstitutional action pursuant to an official policy or custom.” Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty. Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 532-33 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An official policy or custom that gives rise to municipal liability can arise in four ways:

(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

Id. at 533 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Significantly here, Monell claims “require a predicate constitutional violation to proceed[,] [f]or supervisors and municipalities cannot be liable under § 1983 without some predicate constitutional injury at the hands of the individual [state] officer, at least in suits for damages.” Evans, 703 F.3d at 654 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the undersigned has recommended that the defendants' motions for summary judgment be granted on all of the plaintiff's predicate Section 1983 claims, the undersigned further recommends that the City defendants' motion be granted on the plaintiff's Monell claims. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (explaining that there can be no municipal liability absent an underlying constitutional injury at the hands of an individual official); Ryu v. Whitten, 684 Fed.Appx. 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[B]ecause there was no Fourth Amendment violation, . . . [the plaintiff's] Monell claim against Warren County fail[s]."); Peters v. Caplan, 672 Fed.Appx. 327, 328 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Peters has failed to allege a deprivation of constitutional right, so his [Monell] claim against the City must fail as well."); Evans, 703 F.3d at 654-55 (dismissing the plaintiffs' Monell claim because the court had also dismissed the plaintiffs predicate § 1983 claims); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Appellant's claims against Fairfax County also fail. As there are no underlying constitutional violations by any individual, there can be no municipal liability.").

F. Qualified Immunity

The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity (docs. 79-1 at 18-19; 80-1 at 19-22). Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id.

To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine whether a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). As discussed above, the undersigned has concluded that no reasonable jury could find that a constitutional violation occurred. Therefore, because the defendants did not violate Mr. Mathis' constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

G. State Law Claims

The plaintiff has also brought a gross negligence/negligence claim against the City of Anderson, the Anderson County Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff McBride pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; a wrongful death claim pursuant to South Carolina Code Annotated § 15-51-10, and a survival action pursuant to South Carolina Code Annotated § 15-5-90 (doc. 53 ¶¶ 254-76).

As set out above, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted on all of the plaintiff's federal causes of action. The court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims is premised on supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). “[T]rial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished,” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir.1995) (citation omitted), and the Fourth Circuit has identified several factors for a court to consider when making this determination: (1) “convenience and fairness to the parties,” (2) “the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy,” (3) “comity,” and (4) “considerations of judicial economy.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the undersigned finds that the balance of the applicable factors supports declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Although considerations of judicial economy weigh against declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as this case was not recently filed, considerations of convenience, comity, and the non-existence of any underlying issues of federal policy strongly favor such a result. Regarding the interests of convenience and comity, the Fourth Circuit “evince[s] a strong preference that state law issues be left to state courts . . .,” Arrington v. City of Raleigh, No. 09-1207, 2010 WL 750085, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2010), and “South Carolina has a strong interest in deciding the state law issues that remain.” Niemitalo, Inc. v. Greenville Cnty., C. A. No. 6:20-cv-1432-HMH, 2020 WL 2745696, at *2 (D.S.C. May 27, 2020).

In his negligence/gross negligence claim, the plaintiff alleges as follows:

The Defendants departed from the duties and care required by law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies and were reckless, grossly negligent, and negligent per se by violating the duties owed to the Plaintiff as follows:

a. In failing to properly hire and retain the involved/investigating officers;

b. In failing to properly train the involved/investigating officers;

c. In failing to properly supervise the involved/investigating officers;

d. In retaining the arresting/investigating officers when the Defendants knew or should have known that the arresting officers were ill-trained, not competent for their duties, and did not have the requisite experience with which to investigate and handle their duties;

e. In failing to properly monitor the investigating/involved officers;

f. In failing to enforce its own codes, regulations, training manuals, and procedures;

g. In failing to comply with law enforcement standards;

h. The failure to put in place adequate policies and procedures to follow to prevent conduct such as exhibited in this case from taking place;

i. The failure to protect the Plaintiff from the above-referenced individuals;

j. The failure to enforce policies prohibiting mistreatment of citizens;

k. In failing to use discretion before, during, and after the police chase and consider other methods available to apprehend suspects;

l. The failure to have and/or implement special policies regarding the treatment of citizens wrongfully detained;

m. In engaging in a high-speed chase with the Plaintiff;

n. In failing to ensure the safety of the Plaintiff;

o. In failing to render aid;

p. The failure to properly train, monitor, and supervise employees;

q. In failing to use less lethal forms of force in order to effectuate arrest;

r. In failing to act as a reasonably prudent person or entity would under the circumstances; and

s. For creating an unreasonably unsafe environment that allowed and caused the harm complained of herein.

t. In such other ways as will be proven at trial.

(Doc. 53 ¶ 258).

It is apparent from the plaintiff's allegations that his negligence/gross negligence claim significantly implicates local law enforcement policies. Moreover, a decision on this claim would involve an analysis of the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of these local policies, state tort law, and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Courts within this district routinely decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims implicating local concerns. See Mazyck v. City of North Charleston, C/A No. 2:23-cv-02602-DCN, 2023 WL 6795418, at *8 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2023) (“Rather, this dispute presents a local matter, which the principle of comity obligates be resolved in state court. Hence, that is where this case will go.”); Holmes v. Town of Clover, C/A No. 0:17-cv-03194-JMC, 2019 WL 4267515, at *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2019) (“‘It is a common practice of the judges in this district to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over local matters if the federal claims over which the court has original jurisdiction are dismissed.'” (quoting Miller v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., C/A No. 17-cv-0840 (KBJ), 2018 WL 4762261, at *15 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2018))); Funderburk v. S.C. Elect. & Gas Co., C/A No. 3:15-cv-04660-JMC, 2019 WL 3504232, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 1,2019) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the cases involved a local dispute between a county and its citizens).

Notably, the defendants have raised the defense of comparative negligence, and, from this court's research, it does not appear that the South Carolina appellate courts have addressed comparative negligence in the context of a high speed chase by law enforcement. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Because the South Carolina appellate courts have not addressed comparative negligence in this context, the undersigned finds that a decision from those courts would result in a “surer-footed reading of the applicable law.”

Fairness interests also favor declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction due to the parties' ties to Anderson County, South Carolina (docs. 53 ¶¶ 2-27) As discussed herein, the underlying behavior occurred in Anderson, South Carolina between individuals living and working in Anderson County.

The plaintiff's wrongful death and survival action also entirely hinge on state law, implicating South Carolina Code Annotated §§ 15-51-10 and 15-5-90. Should these claims proceed to trial, the undersigned finds that it would be more appropriate for this trial to occur in a state court. See Scannell v. S.C. Dep't of Social Servs., C/A No. 2:20-cv-4288-BHH-MGB, 2024 WL 911490, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2024).

In sum, after carefully balancing the applicable factors, the undersigned finds that the plaintiff's claims present quintessential state law questions best reserved for a state court to decide. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state law claims and remand those claims to the state court.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the County defendants' motion for joinder (doc. 120) is granted, and the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's sur-replies (doc. 119) is denied.

In addition, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the district court grant both the County defendants and City defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Monell claims (docs. 79; 80), and

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state law claims and remand those claims to the state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND SO RECOMMENDED.

The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).