Matador Drilling Co., Inc. v. Post

45 Citing cases

  1. Schweiger v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank

    Civil No. SA-17-CV-00660-OLG (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017)

    "Substantial performance means performance of the essential elements of a contract, provided that the defects in performance do not prevent the parties from accomplishing the purpose of the contract." Matador Drilling Co., Inc. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1981). The doctrine of substantial performance applies to various types of contracts, including settlement agreements.

  2. U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Life Insurance

    112 F. Supp. 3d 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)   Cited 38 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an expert "is permitted to rely on facts, opinions, and data not of the expert's own making—including analyses performed or findings made by another expert in the case—even if those facts, opinions, and data are otherwise inadmissible"

    In any event, the preliminary and allegedly incomplete nature of the reports goes to weight, not admissibility. Matter of Beery, 680 F.2d 705, 718 (10th Cir.1982); Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1199 (5th Cir.1981); DL v. D.C., 820 F.Supp.2d 27, 30 (D.D.C.2011).As for authorship, “[I]t is irrelevant” for purposes of Rule 803(6) “that the face of the [document] does not identify the document's author.”

  3. R B Falcon Corp. v. American Exploration Co.

    154 F. Supp. 2d 969 (S.D. Tex. 2001)   Cited 8 times

    The burden is on the party claiming force majeure to demonstrate that an act of God occurred or that the event was beyond the control of the party. See Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1198 (5th Cir. 1981); Sun Operating, 984 S.W.2d at 289. The contract provides, in relevant part:

  4. Miller Exploration Company v. Energy Drilling Company

    Civil Action No. 99-0802 SECTION "A" (W.D. La. Jan. 3, 2001)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that an expert affidavit listing the expert's qualifications, reciting materials the expert reviewed, and then stating findings in a conclusory fashion was not acceptable Rule 56(e) evidence

    Force majeure typically appears as a defense offered by a party who fails to perform a contract because an act of God or other uncontrollable event prevents performance. See Matador Drilling Co., Inc. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1981); Saden v. Kirby, 660 So.2d 423, 428 (La. 1995). In the current matter, however, paragraph 10 allows Energy to claim daily payments at the force majeure rate "during repair and/or demobilization if applicable," should the drilling rig or associated equipment be damaged in the way described above.

  5. Argos Resources v. May Petroleum

    693 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 11 times

    We conclude, rather, that the most relevant authorities indicate that time is not necessarily of the essence in an oilfield operating agreement. See Matador Drilling Co., Inc. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1981); cf., Williams v. Shamrock Oil Gas Co., 128 Tex. 146, 152-55, 95 S.W.2d 1292, 1295-96 (1936) (in drilling contract, time not necessarily of the essence with respect to all provisions and all parties). The fact that the contract states a date for performance does not, of itself, mean that time is of the essence. Laredo Hides Co., Inc. v. H H Meat Products Co., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Ordinarily, time is not of the essence of a contract.

  6. United States v. Smith

    804 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2015)   Cited 51 times
    Finding first factor satisfied where intent was a significant and disputed issue at trial

    This court has thus repeatedly recognized that a challenge to the accuracy or completeness of a record goes to its weight, not its admissibility. See, e.g., United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528–29 (5th Cir.1985); Matador Drilling Co., Inc. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1199 (5th Cir.1981); Crompton–Richmond Co., Inc. Factors v. Briggs, 560 F.2d 1195, 1202 n. 12 (5th Cir.1977). Because Defendant essentially challenges the accuracy of the city ledger, his argument goes only to its weight, and he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the ledger under Rule 803(6).

  7. Foradori v. Harris

    523 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2008)   Cited 267 times
    Holding that state law determines whether a motion for a new trial should be granted in a diversity action

    Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004); see also Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 841 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Having determined that an award is excessive, this court may either order a new trial on damages or may give the plaintiff the option of avoiding a new trial by agreeing to a remittitur of the excessive portion of the award").See 11 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2815 nn. 2-3 (2008) (citing Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 9 S.Ct. 696, 33 L.Ed. 110 (1889)); DeCenteno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc., 798 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1986); Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1198 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211, 118 S.Ct. 1210, 140 L.Ed.2d 336 (1998) (finding that a "Court of Appeals' writ of mandamus, requiring the District Court to enter judgment for a lesser amount than that determined by the jury without allowing petitioner the option of a new trial, cannot be squared with the Seventh Amendment.") (citing Kennon, 131 U.S. at 29-30, 9 S.Ct. 696); Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., 510 F.3d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Seventh Amendment "precludes an appellate court from replacing an award of compensatory damages with one of the court's own choosing"); Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayaguez, 467 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (reversing a district court's reduction of compensatory damages without offering the plaintiff a choice of a new trial as legal error); Sloan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The Seventh Amendment requires that a plaintiff be given the option of a new trial in lieu

  8. National Union Fire v. Care Flight Ambulance

    18 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1994)   Cited 37 times
    Examining conversion claim under Texas law to determine whether the conduct alleged as a breach of contract also constituted a separate tort

    This court reviews matters of contract interpretation de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1993); Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1981). II.

  9. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises

    7 F.3d 1203 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 257 times
    Granting summary judgment to movant who relied on a conclusory affidavit

    Our standard of review for contract interpretation is de novo. See Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1981). III. [15] DISCUSSION

  10. Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, Inc.

    933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991)   Cited 137 times
    Holding that party opposing the admission of the report has the burden of proving the report's untrustworthiness

    The court must allow the jury to make credibility decisions and to decide what weight to afford a report's findings. The magistrate's complaints are similar to the ones addressed in Matador Drilling Co. v. Post, 662 F.2d 1190, 1199 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case we noted that the appellant's "general complaint that the reports are incomplete and inaccurate are matters going to the weight of this evidence and not its admissibility.