Opinion
D070602
10-18-2017
JASMINE CIRUJEDA MASTACHE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PATRICK HERMAN, Defendant and Respondent.
Jasmine Cirujeda Mastache, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Patrick Herman, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00037551-CU-OR-CTL) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard E. L. Strauss, Judge. Affirmed. Jasmine Cirujeda Mastache, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Patrick Herman, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
Jasmine Cirujeda Mastache and Patrick Herman were previously married. While a dispute concerning the division of their marital residence was pending in family court, Mastache brought a separate civil action against Herman to quiet title to the residence. Mastache asserted in her civil suit that Herman had quitclaimed the residence to her, and therefore, it was no longer community property that was capable of being divided. She sought a civil judgment declaring her the sole "owner in fee simple" of the residence.
The superior court granted Herman's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on its lack of jurisdiction to consider the dispute. Judicially-noticed matters plainly showed that Mastache's quiet title action involved the same dispute pending in family court. A number of appellate opinions "all stand for the central idea that family law cases should not be allowed to spill over into civil law," regardless of how the family law matter may be alternatively characterized. (Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22, 25 (Neal).) The superior court did not err, and we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Family Court Proceedings
During their marriage, Mastache and Herman acquired a condominium located in El Cajon, California. They divorced in 2002, but the condominium remained jointly held as community property. The parties agreed that the family court, in case number ED053089, retained jurisdiction to execute the parties' marital dissolution judgment and enter further orders to sell or divide the marital residence.
In 2014, Herman filed a request for an order in family court, seeking to obtain sole title to the condominium. He had been continuously paying the mortgage loans, monthly homeowners' association dues, and property taxes, and he wished to sell the property and be relieved of the financial obligations. While his request for an order was pending, the parties arrived at an agreement: if Mastache could refinance the property in her name, Herman would deed the property to her. To this end, she opened an escrow, and he deposited a quitclaim deed with the escrow company, to be recorded only if she could get the property refinanced. Mastache's refinancing attempts failed; as a result, Herman retrieved the deed from the escrow company and destroyed it.
In January 2015, the family court, which was aware of the parties' history, ordered a sale of the condominium and reserved jurisdiction over the division of the proceeds (the January 2015 order). In 2015 and 2016, the court went on to hold multiple hearings regarding the disposition of the condominium, including whether to enforce or set aside the January 2015 order based on the 2014 escrow events. Mastache's attempts to challenge the family court's January 2015 order are the subject of another appeal. (Herman v. Mastache (July 25, 2017, D070374) [nonpub. opn.].)
Civil Court Proceedings
In November 2015, Mastache initiated a case in superior court by filing a verified complaint to quiet title. She recounted the facts regarding Herman's deposit of a quitclaim deed in escrow as part of her refinancing efforts and that her "refinance fell out of escrow," which caused him to destroy the deed. She sought to obtain another copy of the deed.
Herman filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, based in part on the court's lack of jurisdiction to consider the dispute. He also filed a request for judicial notice of relevant family court orders from case number ED053089.
In a document entitled "Declaration of Jasmine Cirujeda in Support of Motion to Acquire Quiet Title and Motion to Compel Recovery of Destroyed Quitclaim Deed by Defendant Patrick Herman," Mastache asserted that the El Cajon condominium was her sole and separate property due to the 2014 escrow events and that Herman had been improperly "trying to sell" the property. She argued that the family court lacked jurisdiction to divide her separate property.
The superior court granted Herman's request for judicial notice and motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating that "this dispute is within the jurisdiction and is currently pending before the [f]amily [c]ourt. As such, this court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of this dispute."
Mastache, in propria persona, filed a timely appeal. On appeal, Mastache filed a motion to consolidate this "quiet title case" with her "family court case." She attached a notice of related case to her motion, which indicated the two cases involved the same parties and claims to the same property, arose from the same or substantially identical transactions, and would require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges. We denied her motion to consolidate due in part to the separate appellate records and different legal issues on appeal.
DISCUSSION
"It is now well established that where two tribunals of this state have concurrent jurisdiction over the same parties and subject matter, the tribunal which first acquires jurisdiction of the parties is entitled to retain it exclusively. The other must respect the priority of the first and must desist from further proceedings so long as the matter is pending before the first." (Mungia v. Superior Court (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 280, 283.)
"After a family law court acquires jurisdiction to divide community property in a dissolution action, no other department of a superior court may make an order adversely affecting that division." (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961 (Askew) [concluding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear husband's civil action where wife's dissolution action was filed first].)
"If the family law court concludes that the properties are community in character, it then will have jurisdiction to include them in the division of the community estate and that will end the matter." (Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) Even if the family law court concludes that a property is separate in character, it "has jurisdiction 'at the request of either party, to divide the separate property interests' of the parties held in joint tenancy." (Ibid., quoting Family Code section 2650.) If a spouse has any basis for claiming that some property within the marital estate is his or her separate property, there is "no good reason" why that spouse cannot litigate the claim in the family law court. (Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 962; see also Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1452-1453 (Glade) [family court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not a spouse's allegations are true with respect to characterization of property and whether it belongs in the marital estate].)
"Almost all events in family law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant wants to be creative with various causes of action. It is therefore incumbent on courts to examine the substance of claims, not just their nominal headings." (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Reframed civil actions are improper even when they are filed after final judgments in the family law proceedings have been entered, rather than during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings. (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 396-397 [summarizing cases].)
Applying the foregoing principles, the superior court correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mastache's civil suit, which was based in its entirety on events that had been, or were in the process of being, litigated in family court. Mastache was admittedly attempting to obtain in her civil suit what she had been unable to obtain in family court, namely, sole title to the condominium. She is barred from attempting to obtain title to the marital residence through a separate civil action. On Herman's duly filed motion, of which Mastache had notice and an adequate opportunity to respond, the superior court properly entered judgment for Herman.
Mastache argues that Herman's depositing the quitclaim deed with an escrow company in 2014 somehow deprived the family court of jurisdiction to hear their dispute. She cites no legal authority for this proposition, and we are aware of none. The family court, having gained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of their marital dissolution, maintained jurisdiction to determine whether the marital residence was properly characterized as community property. (Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 962 ["Obviously, the actual division of community property is affected by the characterization of specific assets, so the issue of characterization also reposes in the family law court."].) Moreover, the parties' marital termination agreement contemplated future orders by the family court with regard to their marital residence, and a civil court's quieting title to the residence could adversely affect the family court's orders. (In re Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1483-1484 [civil court sale order would interfere with family law department's reserved jurisdiction to value and dispose of family residence].) Mastache has not established any reversible error by the superior court.
Mastache apparently misunderstands the nature of an escrow. Herman's depositing the quitclaim deed with the escrow company, subject to a condition, did not grant her the property until she strictly complied with the condition. (Civil Code, § 1057 ["A grant may be deposited by the grantor with a third person, to be delivered on performance of a condition, and, on delivery by the depositary, it will take effect. While in the possession of the third person, and subject to condition, it is called an escrow."].) Mastache admits she did not comply with the condition requiring her to refinance the property. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Herman.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. NARES, J.