Opinion by Bell, C.J. In Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990), this Court considered, in the context of a prosecution for welfare perjury, the appropriate limitations period for misdemeanor prosecutions, and, in particular, those involving "penitentiary misdemeanors." When that case was decided, the general statute of limitations for misdemeanors was contained in Md. Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), §§ 5-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

" We stated that "[i]t is the specific statutory authorization of imprisonment in the penitentiary (even as an alternative to other forms of punishment), and not the punishment actually imposed, which determined whether the unlimited period or the one year period of the statute should be applicable." Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 611, 579 A.2d 265, 268 (1990). To see an example of the required language, see Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), Article 27, § 8(b)(2), which states that "[a] person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary . . . ."

The direct sanction for perjury is prosecution as a criminal offense. Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 435. By Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1991, Art. 27, § 439 was amended to make perjury punishable by imprisonment in the jail "or penitentiary." Uncodified § 2 of Ch. 371 provides that "there is no statute of limitations for a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, notwithstanding any holding or dictum to the contrary in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990)." Whether Janet — and Mark — should be prosecuted is a matter committed to the discretion of the State's Attorney for Frederick County.

Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 690(b). For an excellent exposition of the history of this provision, see Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 612-18, 579 A.2d 265, 268-71 (1990). It is clear from this language that the sentencing judge had no authority to designate the institution in which Parker would serve his sentence, particularly when the desired institution falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government, an independent, co-equal sovereign.

But § 2 of the chapter provided that there is no statute of limitations for a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, notwithstanding any holding or dictum to the contrary in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990). Ch. 371 amended Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.) § 5-106(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to provide:

Skopp argued the misdemeanor charges against Moore should be dismissed because Maryland Code, § 5-106 of the Courts &Judicial Proceedings Article stated misdemeanors were subject to a one-year statute of limitations from the date the offense was committed, which in this case was 2001. Skopp also directed the trial court to In Re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51 (2000), and Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605 (1990). The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the prosecutor that the statute of limitations began to run when Moore's identity was discovered in 2007; therefore Moore was charged within the one-year time limit.

Thus, had the conspiracy counts been charged after the effective date of that section, there would be no question as to their viability. See also Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990). Seizing upon the dismissal and noting that co-conspirator testimony had been introduced in connection with the dismissed charges, appellant moved for mistrial. He argued that the co-conspirator testimony was inadmissible as a result of the dismissal.