See Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. at 45; Summum, 130 F.3d at 914. See alsoMason v. Wolf, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162 (D. Colo. 2005) ("At the time the regulation was devised, the First Amendment law was clearly established. The cases required a narrowly tailored regulation enforcing a significant government interest if a governmental entity was to restrict free speech in a designated public area.

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Absent a showing that Long or Wynn had final policymaking authority, plaintiff has failed to show that they bear personal liability for the College's allegedly unconstitutional policy of giving officials unbridled discretion to grant or deny requests for access. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution"); Mason v. Wolf, 356 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1162 (D. Colo. 2005) (individual who devised the regulation that was applied to plaintiff was "personally and centrally involved" in the violation); Kanelos v. County of Mohave, 893 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1009 (D. Az. 2012) (official could be liable because "he drafted and enacted" the unlawful policy). Accordingly, the court will grant the motion to dismiss the claims against Long and Wynn in their personal capacities.

At the time of Galibois's demonstration on Election Day in 2004, it was clearly established that even a content-neutral restriction on the manner of presenting a political message in a public forum would violate the First Amendment if it were not narrowly tailored to address a substantial government interest.See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-18; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2004); Swift, 284 F.3d at 210; Mason v. Wolf 356 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162 (D. Colo. 2005) (holding that by 2002 law was clearly established to require narrowly tailored restriction enforcing a significant government interest to avoid First Amendment prohibition). As long as the clearly established law gives notice that the alleged conduct is unlawful, prior cases need not present identical factual circumstances. Jennings, 479 F.3d at 143.

Respondent and his counsel, having procured this testimony to be admitted against appellant's objection, are now estopped to say that it was not considered or had no weight upon the decision of the motion. In Mason v. Wolf, 40 Cal. 246, 249, the court said: "We think this evidence inadmissible, and none the less so because the case was tried by the court without a jury." "If the court admits incompetent evidence against objection, no other inference can be drawn than that the evidence is considered entitled to some weight in the determination of the issue of fact which is being tried.