Opinion
No. 4:99CV5-D-B
June 30, 2000
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.
A. Factual Background
On January 5, 1996, the Plaintiff called the Leland Police Department and requested an officer be sent to her residence because she and her boyfriend had gotten into a fight and he refused to leave. Sergeant Billy Barber was dispatched to the Plaintiff's residence. Upon his arrival, he noticed the Plaintiff, who had consumed alcohol and was shouting, holding a butcher knife in her hand that she refused to put down. After ordering the Plaintiff to put down the knife, Barber pushed her onto a sofa and grabbed and twisted her arms behind her. Barber then arrested and handcuffed the Plaintiff, who complained that the handcuffs were too tight.
The Plaintiff was then taken to the police station where she was charged with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct and domestic violence. While at the station, the Plaintiff again complained that the handcuffs were too tight. She also told the officers that she had recently broken her wrist and was still under a doctor's care; Sergeant Barber was not aware of this fact at the time he arrested the Plaintiff.
Eventually, the domestic violence charge against the Plaintiff was dismissed, but she was convicted of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct; for these offenses, she was assessed a fine. Prior to the filing of the current lawsuit, the Plaintiff filed criminal charges against Barber for assault; he was found not guilty. She also filed a complaint with the Leland Police Department concerning Barber's conduct during her arrest; a subsequent investigation found no misconduct by Barber.
On January 5, 1999, the Plaintiff filed the current action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both the City of Leland and against Sergeant Billy Barber in his individual capacity, alleging that Barber used excessive force during her arrest. The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
While all legitimate factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
C. Discussion
The Plaintiff has sued both the city of Leland and numerous city officials in their official capacity, in addition to suing Sergeant Barber individually.
It is axiomatic that suing a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity itself as the defendant, and requires the plaintiff to make out Monell-type proof of an official policy or custom as the cause of the constitutional violation. The Plaintiff here, therefore, is in essence suing only two entities, the City of Leland and Sergeant Barber individually. As such, the court shall simultaneously address the claims against the City and the city officials in their official capacity.
1. The Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims and Claims against the City
The Plaintiff asserts that the City of Leland's lack of an established domestic violence policy, as well as inadequate training of the City's police officers regarding the handling of domestic disputes, renders the City liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Sergeant Barber's alleged violation of her constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has established two fundamental requirements for holding a city liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate training policies:
(1) that the city's enactment of an inadequate training policy (or failure to enact any policy whatsoever) reflected "deliberate indifference" to the constitutional rights of its citizens; and
(2) the city's inadequate training policy, or lack of any policy, was the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Fifth Circuit has further held that proof of a single violent incident ordinarily is insufficient to hold a municipality liable for inadequate training. Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798; Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1989). Rather, "to establish . . . municipal liability under section 1983," the plaintiff must demonstrate "at least a pattern of similar incidents in which the citizens were injured . . ." Rodriguez, 871 F.2d at 554-55.
The Plaintiff here has simply not offered sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment. In fact, the Plaintiff attempts to rely solely on her assertion, made without adequate evidentiary support, that "it could be argued that the lack or inadequacy of an established domestic violence policy as well as inadequate training on the City's existing practice and protocol in handling domestic disputes exhibited a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons, such as Plaintiff herein, with whom police officers come in contact." See Plaintiff's Memo Opposing Summary Judgment at 5. Such "mere allegations or denials" of this sort are insufficient to adequately oppose a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Instead, as previously noted, a party facing a summary judgment motion must "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The Plaintiff has failed to do so in this case. Moreover, the Plaintiff has offered no evidence whatsoever regarding a pattern of similar incidents, as required by the Fifth Circuit to hold a city liable for inadequate training. Rodriguez, 871 F.2d at 554-55.
Based on the above authorities and the submissions before the court, the court finds that dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against the City of Leland and against the official capacity defendants is appropriate; no genuine issue of material fact exists and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. The Plaintiff's Individual Claims against Sergeant Billy Barber
Public officials, including city police officers, are shielded from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); White v. Walker, 950 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1991).
In ruling on a defendant's claim of qualified immunity, the court first must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 230, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). Then, the court must determine whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable under settled law in the circumstances with which he was confronted. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); see Pfannstiel v. Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990) (If "reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.").
Assuming, arguendo, that the Plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the court finds that Sergeant Barber's actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. As such, Sergeant Barber is entitled to qualified immunity and the Plaintiff's claims against him shall be dismissed.
On the night of January 5, 1996, Sergeant Barber was indisputably faced with a potentially dangerous domestic violence situation in the Plaintiff's home. The Plaintiff, who had been drinking, was holding a butcher knife that she refused to put down after being ordered to do so by Sergeant Barber. Sergeant Barber's arresting the Plaintiff was clearly reasonable — the Plaintiff was eventually convicted of two of the three charges filed against her, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
The Plaintiff's primary argument that Barber behaved objectively unreasonably, however, revolves around the fact that Barber's conduct in arresting her allegedly exacerbated a wrist injury the Plaintiff had previously sustained. It is undisputed, however, that the Plaintiff did not alert Sergeant Barber to the fact that her wrist had recently been injured until after she had been handcuffed and transported to the police station; at the time of her arrest, she was not wearing a wrist brace and she merely told Barber that the handcuffs seemed to be too tight. An arrestee's complaining of tight handcuffs, however, does not render the arresting officer's conduct in handcuffing her objectively unreasonable. See Brumfield v. Jones, 849 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's assertions of discomfort during handcuffing are insufficient to establish or support an excessive force claim). As such, the court finds that Barber's actions in arresting the Plaintiff were objectively reasonable and he is entitled to a grant of qualified immunity.
D. Conclusion
In sum, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. The Defendants have shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of the Plaintiff's claims.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket entry 15) is GRANTED;
(2) the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED; and
(3) this case is CLOSED.
All memoranda, depositions, declarations and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.