Summary
granting summary judgment for claims asserted against defendant employers under Section 296 where defendants "acted appropriately when confronted with [plaintiff's] complaints of sexual and religious harassment" and there was "no evidence that the defendants encouraged, condoned, or approved the alleged conduct."
Summary of this case from Romero ex rel. Doe v. City of New YorkOpinion
2001-05967
Argued March 11, 2002.
April 29, 2002.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for sexual and religious harassment, the defendants Triangle Services, Inc., Triangle Aviation Services, Inc., and Nazir Parvaiz appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated May 21, 2001, as denied the motion by Triangle Services, Inc., Nazir Parvaiz, and Vincent Siena for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296 insofar as asserted against them.
Rains Pogrebin, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Terence M. O'Neil and Mark N. Reinharz of counsel), for appellants.
Kuba, Mundy Associates, New York, N.Y. (Nicholas J. Mundy and Paulette DeTiberiis of counsel), for respondent.
Before: NANCY E. SMITH, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, LEO F. McGINITY, JJ.
ORDERED that the appeal by the defendant Triangle Aviation Services, Inc., is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that defendant is not aggrieved by the part of the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from by the defendants Triangle Services, Inc., and Nazir Parvaiz, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion which were for partial summary judgment dismissing the causes of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296 et seq. insofar as asserted against those appellants are granted.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendants Triangle Services Inc., and Nazir Parvaiz (hereinafter the defendants) acted appropriately when confronted with her complaints of sexual and religious harassment. There is no evidence that the defendants encouraged, condoned, or approved the alleged conduct (see Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 684, 687; Hendricks v. 333 Bayville Ave. Rest. Corp., 260 A.D.2d 545, 546). Further, the defendants established that they took appropriate remedial action, especially in light of the plaintiff's lack of cooperation in their attempts to investigate her complaints (see Hendricks v. 333 Bayville Ave. Rest. Corp., supra; Spoon v. American Agriculturalist, 120 A.D.2d 857). Additionally, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the temporary change in her duties was disadvantageous to her (see Pace v. Ogden Servs. Corp., 257 A.D.2d 101; cf. Matter of Electchester Hous. Project v. Rosa, 225 A.D.2d 772) or that the restriction on her entry into the warehouse was based on a "subjective retaliatory motive" (Matter of Pace Univ. v. New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 N.Y.2d 125, 128), the cause of action based on retaliatory action (see Executive Law § 296) should also have been dismissed.
SMITH, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, FRIEDMANN and McGINITY, JJ., concur.