Opinion
02 Civ. 9030 (RCC) (AJP)
May 30, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
To the Honorable Richard C. Casey, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Jose Martinez's habeas petition should be denied as untimely under the AEDPA's one year statute of limitations.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 30, 1992, Martinez pleaded guilty in Supreme Court, New York County, to manslaughter, weapons possession and criminal sale of a controlled substance, and on September 18, 1992, was sentenced pursuant to his plea agreement to an aggregate sentence of ten to thirty years imprisonment. (Dkt. No. 2: Pet. ¶¶ 1-7; see also 5/28/03 Affidavit of A.D.A. Jennifer Chung ¶ 11.)
While Martinez's habeas petition claims that no appeal was taken because his appeal was "abandon[ed] by counsel" (Pet. ¶¶ 9-10), in fact an appeal was filed and the First Department affirmed his conviction without opinion on March 16, 1995. People v. Martinez, 213 A.D.2d 1086, 623 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1st Dep't 1995). The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on June 23, 1995. People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 738, 631 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1995).
On or about August 13, 2001, Martinez brought a C.P.L. § 440 motion alleging that improper information was in the presentence report. (5/28/03 Chung Aff. ¶ 15 Ex. B: Martinez C.P.L. § 440 Motion Papers; Dkt. No. 2: Pet. Ex. A: same.) The court denied the motion on or about September 17, 2001 (5/28/03 Chung Aff. Ex. C; Pet. Ex. B) and denied Martinez's reargument motion on February 22, 2002 (5/28/03 Chung Aff. Ex. E; Pet. Ex. F).
On or about March 8, 2002, Martinez filed his federal habeas corpus petition, alleging a single claim: that he was "deprived of his right to counsel at sentencing, and the sentencing court relied on inaccurate pre-sentence report. . . ." (Pet. ¶ 13.)
The sentencing minutes in fact show that defense counsel was present (Pet. Ex. B: 9/18/92 Sentencing Transcript), so the Court construes the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel.
ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") instituted a one-year statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; . . . .
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).
The First Department affirmed Martinez's conviction on March 27, 1995. (See page 1 above.) Because Martinez's judgment became final before enactment of the AEDPA, he had until April 24, 1997 to timely file his habeas petition. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1999). He did not do so.
Martinez is not entitled to a toll of the AEDPA limitations period, since his C.P.L. § 440 motion was not filed until August 2001, over four years after expiration of his AEDPA time limitation. The Second Circuit has made clear that the state collateral attack toll of § 2244(d)(2) does not start the one-year limitation period to run anew. E.g., Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104 (2000); accord, e.g., Rosario v. Bennett, 01 Civ. 7142, 2002 WL 31852827 at *13 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2002) (Peck, M.J.) ( cases cited therein), report rec. adopted, 2003 WL 151988 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) (Berman, D.J.).
CONCLUSION
Martinez's habeas petition should be denied as barred by the AEDPA's statute of limitations. A certificate of appealability should not issue.
FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Richard C. Casey, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1950, and to my chambers, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1370. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Casey. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038, 113 S.Ct. 825 (1992); Small v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).