Martinez v. Garden

Full title: JOE MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. DR. RICHARD GARDEN et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

Date published: Dec 31, 2004

Case No. 2:03-CV-230 DB (D. Utah Dec. 31, 2004)

Opinion

Case No. 2:03-CV-230 DB.

December 31, 2004

ORDER

DEE BENSON, Chief Judge, District

Plaintiff, Joe Martinez, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003), and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b). See 28 id. § 1915(b). Plaintiff's complaint is now before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.See 28 id. §§ 1915-1915A.

ANALYSIS a. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court shall dismiss any claims in a complaint filed in forma pauperis if they are frivolous, malicious or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). "Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend." Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).

When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint the Court "presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. at 1110. However, "[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not relieve [him] of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." Id. Because no special legal training is necessary to recount the facts surrounding an alleged injury, even a pro se plaintiff must provide such facts in order to state a valid claim. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). While Plaintiff need not describe every fact in specific detail, "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

b. Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff's sole cause of action alleges that prison medical staff denied him adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff states that he "has suffered from a cyst on his left testicle and epidiymitis [sic] on his right testicle since June, 2002." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff states that his "right testicle is swollen and the left testicle is in constant pain." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 9.) While Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have "refused to provide adequate medical treatment for [his] serious medical condition," he also states that Defendants "claim there is nothing they can do for [his] condition because he has missed medical appointments." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 9.)

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), the Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. "Deliberate indifference involves both an objective and a subjective component." Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). The objective component is met if the deprivation is "sufficiently serious."Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). A medical need is sufficiently serious "if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).

The subjective component is met only if a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Allegations of mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, or "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care," Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1996), are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, "a mere difference of opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Johnson v. Stephan, 6 F.3d 691, 692 (10th Cir. 1993).

Regarding the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard, Plaintiff states that on June 28, 2002, he "was evaluated by Dr. Lai at the University Medical Center and informed that he would need surgery if [his] symptoms did not resolve in a month." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that his symptoms persisted until the filing of this complaint. Although the Complaint does not clearly describe Dr. Lai's diagnosis or treatment recommendations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Estelle standard.

The Court now turns to the subjective prong of the Estelle standard which requires Plaintiff to alleges sufficient facts showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff's only factual allegation regarding deliberate indifference is the alleged statement by Defendants that "there is nothing they can do for [Plaintiff] because he has missed medical appointments." Plaintiff asserts that this statement shows deliberate indifference because "[he] has not been informed of the medical appointments" and "[he] is not free to make medical appointments and attend medical appointments on his own accord." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 10.)

The alleged statement by Defendants does not satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement. In fact, it tends to undermine Plaintiff's claim by showing that Defendants have attempted to provide him treatment by arranging medical appointments for him. Plaintiff's admission that he was seen by a specialist at the University Medical Center also supports the conclusion that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's condition. Even if Plaintiff missed his medical appointments due to inadvertence or negligence on Defendants part, such negligence does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy the second prong of the Estelle standard.

CONCLUSION

The facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint show that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical condition, thus, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. This does not appear to be case where Plaintiff's "factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him." Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126-27 (10th Cir. 1990). Instead, it is obvious that Plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and the Court concludes that it would be futile to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West 2003).