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Martinez v. City of Fort Worth, Texas

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 28, 2003
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2286-M (N.D. Tex. May. 28, 2003)

Summary

noting that even though Fort Worth and Dallas Divisions are not significantly far apart, transfer to Fort Worth Division was still warranted

Summary of this case from Davis v. City of Fort Worth

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2286-M

May 28, 2003


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue, filed on April 3, 2003 in the above-entitled action. Having considered Defendant's Motion, along with the Response and Reply filed thereto, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion should be GRANTED for the reasons stated below.

Background

Plaintiffs (collectively referred to herein as "Martinez") filed this suit in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas against the City of Fort Worth, Texas ("Fort Worth"), claiming racial discrimination. Fort Worth now asks this Court to transfer the case to the Fort Worth Division, asserting the Fort Worth Division is the more convenient forum. Although courts should normally defer to plaintiffs' choice of forum, Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit has held that "[t]he district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to order a transfer." Caidwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987). "Whether a case may be more conveniently prosecuted in one division versus another is a question left to analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a)." Says v. M/V David C. Devall, 161 F. Supp.2d 752, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) provides that: "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Section 1404(a), thus, imposes a two-part test.

First, the transferee district must be one where plaintiff could have originally brought the case. Eastman Med. Prod., Inc. v. E.R. Squibb Sons, Inc., 199 F. Supp.2d 590, 595 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (Lynn, J.). If venue is proper in one division of a district, then venue is proper in another division within that same district. Says, 161 F. Supp.2d at 753. Because Fort Worth seeks transfer only between divisions and not districts, and there being no dispute that the Northern District is a proper venue, the first prong is satisfied.

Second, the Court must decide if the transfer is in the interest of justice. Eastman, 199 F. Supp.2d at 595. The Court considers the following factors: (1) plaintiffs' choice of forum; (2) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses; (4) the accessibility and location of sources of proof; (5) the location of counsel; (6) the relative congestion of the courts' dockets; (7) the accessibility of the premises to jury view; (8) the relation of the community in which courts and the jurors are required to serve to the occurrence giving rise to the suit; and (9) the time, cost, and ease with which the trial can be conducted, and all other practical considerations relative to the trial and determination of the case. Lexington Servs. Assoc. v. 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd., 2001 WL 1545764, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2001) (Lynn, J.) (citing Cooper v. Pied Piper Mills, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-1309, 1998 WL 713270 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 1998) (Fitzwater, J.)).

Fort Worth principally asserts that the Fort Worth Division is a more convenient forum because: (1) the parties and the vast majority of witnesses reside in Fort Worth; (2) the relevant books, documents, and records are located in Fort Worth; (3) the location of the alleged discriminatory acts took place in Fort Worth; (4) the locus of almost all substantive discovery will be in Fort Worth; and (5)the counsel for Fort Worth is located there. Fort Worth further asks this Court to place the primary emphasis on the location of witnesses, documents, and events, while discounting Martinez's choice of forum as entitled to only "some" weight.

Martinez counters that the convenience factors, especially in light of the fact that travel from Fort Worth to Dallas is not like "traveling to the wilds of Alaska," do not outweigh the strong deference a Court should give to a plaintiffs' choice of forum. Additionally, Martinez argues that Dallas is also a more appropriate forum because the Dallas office of the EEOC initially investigated this matter and may play an important role in testimony and/or producing documents.

The Court disagrees with Martinez. Generally, the plaintiffs' choice of forum is due substantial deference. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co, 311 F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1962) vacated on other grounds, 376 U.S. 779 (1964)); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2002 WL 1575409, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2002) (Fish, J.); Lexington Servs, 2001 WL 1545764, at *4. However, where, as here, neither party resides in Dallas, and the location of the defendants, witnesses, and evidence, as well as the locus of operative facts, all point to a different venue, the plaintiffs' original choice of forum is entitled to little weight. Cooper, 1998 WL 713270, at *1; Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 1997 WL 102474, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 1997) (Fish, J.); BJI Indus., Inc. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 1997 WL 148035, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1997) (Fitzwater, J.); Greiner v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 645 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Tex. 1986); Coons v. Am. Horse Show Assoc., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 398, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Because the parties, the vast majority of witnesses, the relevant books, documents, and records, the location of the alleged discriminatory acts, and the locus of almost all operative facts and substantive discovery reside in or point to Fort Worth, the Court finds that the Fort Worth Division is the more appropriate forum. The Court has no reason to believe that the location of the EEOC office is material. Therefore, the Court finds that transfer is in the interest of justice and GRANTS the Defendant's Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Martinez v. City of Fort Worth, Texas

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 28, 2003
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2286-M (N.D. Tex. May. 28, 2003)

noting that even though Fort Worth and Dallas Divisions are not significantly far apart, transfer to Fort Worth Division was still warranted

Summary of this case from Davis v. City of Fort Worth
Case details for

Martinez v. City of Fort Worth, Texas

Case Details

Full title:STEPHEN MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: May 28, 2003

Citations

Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2286-M (N.D. Tex. May. 28, 2003)

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