In another case, brought to recover taxes unlawfully assessed and collected, plaintiffs, who were not parties to a prior suit, were allowed to rely on the previous judgment to prevent the defendant from relitigating an issue that had been decided against it in the prior suit. Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819 (1947). The Whiting court noted that "[p]laintiffs in the instant suits are not the same persons who were plaintiffs in the Ross case, supra, but in contemplation of law they are the same since all plaintiffs in these suits sued in their capacity as taxpayers."

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by a court to compel a public officer to perform an act which the law specifically imposes as a duty. Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819 (1947). It proceeds upon the assumption that the applicant has an immediate and complete legal right to the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty arising out of an office.

Boyd v. Bell, supra, culminated a series of law suits arising out of the enlargement of a common school district the boundary of which had been coterminous with a high school district. See Ross v. School District No. 16 of Pima County, 60 Ariz. 9, 130 P.2d 914, and Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819. We held that A.R.S. §§ 15-402 and 15-403 (formerly §§ 54-403 and 54-404, Code of 1939) set forth the exclusive proceedings to be followed when either a common school district or a high school district desires to change or enlarge its boundaries.

Sections 12-2021, A.R.S. 1596, states that a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the "performance of an act which the law specifically imposes as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, * * *." Ordinarily it is invoked to compel the doing of a purely ministerial act. Peters v. Frye, 71 Ariz. 30, 223 P.2d 176; Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819. But it will always lie to require an administrative body to exercise its discretion which the law makes it its duty to perform, even though it cannot require it to be exercised in any particular manner. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. La Prade, 45 Ariz. 61, 40 P.2d 94. That is wholly within the function of the administrative body except that it may not abuse its discretion.

The mandamus statute, section 28-201, A.C.A. 1939, provides in effect that such mandate will issue only to compel the `performance of an act which the law specially imposes as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station'. Ordinarily this coercive remedy is invoked to compel the doing of a purely ministerial act; e.g., see Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819; State v. Board of Supervisors, 14 Ariz. 222, 127 P. 727; Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 178 P.2d 436, however within certain well-defined limitations the writ will also issue where there has been an abuse of discretion. We quote from Collins v. Krucker, 56 Ariz. 6, 104 P.2d 176, 179: `The general rule is that if the action of a public officer is discretionary that discretion may not be controlled by mandamus.

The mandamus statute, section 28-201, A.C.A. 1939, provides in effect that such mandate will issue only to compel the "performance of an act which the law specially imposes as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station". Ordinarily this coercive remedy is invoked to compel the doing of a purely ministerial act; e.g., see Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819; State v. Board of Supervisors, 14 Ariz. 222, 127 P. 727; Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 178 P.2d 436, however within certain well-defined limitations the writ will also issue where there has been an abuse of discretion. We quote from Collins v. Krucker, 56 Ariz. 6, 104 P.2d 176, 179: "The general rule is that if the action of a public officer is discretionary that discretion may not be controlled by mandamus.

at judgment and order an appeal was taken to this court in the case of Ross v. School District No. 16, 60 Ariz. 9, 130 P.2d 914, hereinafter referred to as the Ross case, and we held that the questioned proceedings were valid as it related to the enlargement of Common School District No. 10 but were invalid as it related to High School District No. 4. The effect of said decision was to enlarge Common School District No. 10 to include a portion of Common School District No. 16 and the approximately 57,500 acres of unorganized territory adjacent thereto and to deny to High School District No. 4 an enlargement of its boundaries so that, if changed, it would be coterminus with Common School District No. 10 as enlarged. No further attempts were ever made by anyone under any of the provisions of the statute to enlarge High School District No. 4 until the present proceedings were instituted. Other phases of the case have been before this court in other causes of action including the case of Martin v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819. The Whiting case, supra, brought in June, 1946, and decided by us in June 1947, was a taxpayer's action in mandamus to compel the supervisors to issue a warrant to him covering a judgment for taxes paid by him, and others similarly situated, under protest and to compel the superintendent and the supervisors to fix the boundaries of High School District No. 4 as it existed prior to June 17, 1941, in compliance with the decision of this court in the Ross case, supra.

PER CURIAM. The facts and principles of law applicable to this appeal are set forth and discussed in the case of Martin et al. (Board of Supervisors) v. Whiting, 65 Ariz. 391, 181 P.2d 819, decided this date. For the reasons set forth therein the judgment appealed from in the present case is affirmed.

As the Arizona Supreme Court explained in Martin v. Whiting, a case concerning the boundaries of a school district, once an annexation is held void, it has "the effect of establishing that nothing had ever been done to change the boundaries of the High School District." 65 Ariz. 391, 394, 181 P.2d 819, 821 (1947). ¶ 17 Notwithstanding such authority, the City maintains that the trial court's finding of a period of jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack by Taxpayer.