"[T]he conditional order was self-executing and [plaintiffs'] failure to produce [requested] items on or before the date certain rendered it absolute" ( Wilson v Galicia Contr. Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827, 830 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "To avoid the adverse impact of the conditional order of preclusion, the plaintiff[s were] required to demonstrate an excusable default and a meritorious cause of action" ( Gilmore v Garvey, 31 AD3d 381, 382; see Martin v Salvage, 238 AD2d 959). Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs demonstrated that their default was excusable, we conclude that they failed to demonstrate that they have a meritorious cause of action inasmuch as they failed to establish that they each sustained a serious injury ( see Rasmussen v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 294 AD2d 862; see generally Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 235). Because the preclusion order is in effect, plaintiffs now are precluded from presenting evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, i.e., that they sustained a serious injury, and thus defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint ( see Colder v Cofta, 49 AD3d 484, 485; Rahman v MacDonald, 17 AD3d 438; see also Koski v Ryder Truck, 244 AD2d 872, 873).