Opinion
5:21-CV-00229-MTT-CHW
12-10-2021
DAVID MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles H. Weigle, United States Magistrate Judge
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Plaintiff David Martin has recast his complaint (ECF No. 7) and filed a “statement of claim” (ECF No. 8) in support of his Recast Complaint. The Recast Complaint is now the operative pleading in this case, and it is ripe for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e). For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a plaintiff who is proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Because it appears that Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time he filed this action, his claims are also subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The standards of review under these statutes are the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). The complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
II. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff's Claims
The claims in Plaintiff's Recast Complaint are based on his allegations that Defendants have forced other inmates to serve on work details at the Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) without compensation. Recast Compl. 7, ECF No. 6. According to Plaintiff, somewhere between April 5 and 9, 2021, inmates at the BSP engaged in a “sit down” to protest being required to work prison details without pay. Id. Plaintiff states that the inmates who participated in the protest were transferred, given disciplinary reports, or had their commissary privileges revoked when they refused to return to their details. Id. Plaintiff appears to contend that the inmates' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were punished, and he also apparently challenges the prison's policy of not paying inmates compensation for performing their work details. See id.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated BSP inmates' Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights by punishing them for participating in a “sit down” protest, Plaintiff does not have standing to raise such a claim. To have standing to sue a defendant, a “plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant” and must generally “assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties.” Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges that he “was not personally involved in the sit down by prisoners because he was in Iso/Seg in K-1-11 at that time (but not now).” Recast Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. He has thus failed to plead facts sufficient to show that he personally suffered an injury as a result of participating in the protest, and any claims related to that protest should be dismissed without prejudice.
In addition, Plaintiff is not permitted to “represent” other prisoners as counsel or raise claims on their behalf. See e.g., Massimo v. Henderson, 468 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of the portion of prisoner's complaint that sought relief on behalf of prisoner's fellow inmates); see also Wallace v. Smith, 145 Fed.Appx. 300, 302 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding it “plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action”)).
Plaintiff also appears to be claiming that the general policy that compels inmates to work at the prison without compensation violates his own constitutional rights. Such a claim can be construed as arising under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which generally prohibits “involuntary servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII. But it is well-established that in the Eleventh Circuit that “where a prisoner is incarcerated pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment and commitment order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and is forced to work pursuant to prison regulations or state statutes, the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude is not implicated.” Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Thus, even to the extent Plaintiff might have standing to raise a claim challenging the prison's work detail policy, he has failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted. Any Thirteenth Amendment claim that Plaintiff is attempting to raise should therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff also mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in his pleadings. Statement of Claim 5, ECF No. 8. “Section 1988 authorizes attorney's fees as part of a remedy for violations of civil rights statutes; it does not create an independent right of action.” Estes v. Tuscaloosa Cnty., Ala., 696 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a separate § 1988 claim, it should be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that “[e]qual protection must apply because other states are following federal law to pay the prisoners.” Statement of Claim 3, ECF No. 8. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To state an equal protection claim, a prisoner “must plausibly allege two elements: (1) that he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) that his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest, such as race, religion, or national origin.” Jackson v. Brewton, 595 Fed.Appx. 939, 943 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if Plaintiff could show that he is similarly situated to other prisoners who receive pay for working at a prison, he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that this more favorable treatment was based on any sort of constitutionally protected interest. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state an equal protection claim, and any such claim he intends to raise in this case should be dismissed. See id.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, Chief United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.