Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Marin County Super. Ct. No. CV065098
Ruvolo, P. J.
The statutory deadline for filing a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is extended by section 1094.6, subdivision (d) (section 1094.6(d)) to 90 days from the petitioner’s receipt of the administrative record, if the petitioner files a written request for preparation of the record (record request) within 10 days after the administrative decision becomes final. This appeal raises the issue whether, in order for this extension to apply, the record request must merely be mailed to the agency within the 10-day period, or must actually be received by it during that time. We hold that a record request under section 1094.6(d) is not filed unless and until the agency actually receives it. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition as untimely.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Appellant Charles “Rocky” Martin formerly served as a sergeant with the Marin County Sheriff’s Office. His employment was terminated on April 19, 2004, on the basis of time sheet fraud. He pursued the administrative remedies available to him to appeal his termination, but in a decision served by mail on September 20, 2005, the Marin County Board of Supervisors upheld his termination.
The background facts set forth in this paragraph, which are not disputed, are taken from the verified petition for writ of mandate filed in the trial court.
Martin’s counsel received the decision on September 26, 2005. On September 30, 2005, a staff person in Martin’s counsel’s office mailed a record request, accompanied by a declaration of service by mail, to the Assistant Clerk of the Marin County Board of Supervisors (Clerk), and to the attorney for respondent County of Marin (the County). The Clerk never received the record request, however.
The declaration filed by the Clerk stated not only that no document from Martin’s counsel was filed between September 20 and September 30, 2005, but also that the record request “was never . . . received by [the Clerk’s] office.” (Italics added.) Thus, the trial court’s implied finding that the County did not receive the record request until a second copy of it was sent in June 2006 is supported by substantial evidence.
On June 27, 2006, Martin’s counsel wrote to the Clerk, and to the attorney for the County, to inquire about the status of the record. The Clerk responded that no record request had been received, and took the position that the record request was untimely. Nonetheless, the Clerk ultimately prepared the record, and provided a portion of it to Martin’s counsel in late October 2006, and the rest in May 2007. On November 22, 2006, Martin filed a verified petition for writ of mandate (petition) in the Marin County Superior Court against the County.
On May 24, 2007, at a case management conference, the trial court set a briefing schedule under which the County’s response to the petition was due on July 25, 2007. On July 25, 2007, the County filed its response, and served it by regular mail on Martin’s counsel.
Martin did not receive the County’s response until July 27, 2007, and subsequently filed a motion to strike the County’s response papers on the ground that they had not been timely served. Martin also filed a reply memorandum, on August 7, 2007. After a hearing held on October 3, 2007, the trial court denied Martin’s motion to strike the County’s response, and, on the merits, denied Martin’s petition for writ of mandate as untimely filed. This timely appeal ensued.
Martin did not designate the motion to strike for inclusion in the record on appeal, nor is its filing reflected in the register of actions included with the clerk’s transcript. The record does include the County’s opposition to the motion, however, as well as the trial court’s order denying it, so we will assume it was in fact filed.
II. Discussion
A. Denial of Motion to Strike County’s Opposition to Petition
Martin contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike the County’s opposition to his petition, because the opposition was not properly served on him. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 19, 23; Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 612.)
The opposition was timely deposited in the mail on July 25, 2007, but did not arrive at Martin’s counsel’s office until two days later. When the delay was brought to the attention of the County’s counsel, she offered to stipulate that Martin would have an additional day to file his reply. Martin did not accept this offer, and instead filed his reply papers on August 7, 2007—a day before they were due under the trial court’s case management order.
Unlike statutes of limitations, deadlines for filing and serving responsive pleadings are not jurisdictional, and may be extended by the opposing party, or by the trial court in its discretion. (See generally Amacorp Ind. Leasing Co. v. Robert C. Young Associates, Inc. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 724, 729; Buck v. Morrossis (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 461, 464-465.) Accordingly, in order to warrant any relief on the basis of a party’s failure to meet such a deadline, the opposing party may be required to show that the delay has resulted in prejudice. (See Amacorp Ind. Leasing Co. v. Robert C. Young Associates, Inc., supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at pp. 729-730.) In the present case, Martin was able to file his reply papers a day early despite his late receipt of the County’s opposition, and has not pointed to any specific prejudice from the delay. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the county’s opposition papers.
B. Denial of Petition as Untimely Filed
Martin argues that his record request was timely filed because it was mailed within the statutory time period. This contention requires us to determine the meaning of the word “filed” in section 1094.6(d). Martin cites no authority construing the word “filed” in section 1094.6(d), or any other statute, but argues nonetheless that mailing the request within the 10-day period is sufficient, and that the record reflects his compliance with this requirement. The sole support advanced by Martin for this argument is an analogy to Government Code section 915.2, which provides that a claim under the Government Tort Claims Act that is “deposited in the United States [mail] in a sealed envelope, properly addressed, with postage paid” is “deemed to have been presented and received at the time of the deposit.”
Contrary to Martin’s contention, the 10-day period within which to request the record was not extended 5 days on account of the County’s decision having been served by mail. Section 1094.6, subdivision (b) provides that “[s]ubdivision (a) of [s]ection 1013 does not apply to extend the time, following deposit in the mail of the decision or findings, within which a petition shall be filed.” Nonetheless, if (as Martin contends) filing of a record request is complete upon mailing, his mailing of the record request on September 30 would have been timely. Moreover, although the County rebutted the presumption under Evidence Code section 641 that the record request was received, there is no evidence in the record indicating that it was not in fact mailed as stated in the declaration of service. Accordingly, we assume for the purposes of this opinion that the record request was timely mailed. We therefore must determine whether Martin is correct that timely mailing satisfies the requirement for filing a record request.
“When interpreting a statute our primary task is to determine the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] In doing so we turn first to the statutory language, since the words the Legislature chose are the best indicators of its intent. [Citation.]” (Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 826; People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146.) As our Supreme Court has noted: “ ‘If the [statutory] language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .’ ” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) In our view, the language of section 1094.6(d) is clear and unambiguous; it refers to “fil[ing] a request for the record,” not to “mailing” it, and not (as in Government Code section 915.2) to “presenting” it. As Black’s Law Dictionary defines it, to “file” means to “deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record . . . .” (Black’s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 660, col. 2, italics added.) Accordingly, the plain language of section 1094.6(d) requires that the record request actually be delivered to the agency within the deadline.
We note also that section 1094.6, subdivision (g) provides: “This section shall prevail over any conflicting provision in any otherwise applicable law relating to the subject matter, unless the conflicting provision is a state or federal law which provides a shorter statute of limitations, in which case the shorter statute of limitations shall apply.” This provision makes clear that the Legislature did not intend the provisions of the Government Code relating to the presentation of government tort claims to apply to the submission of record requests under section 1094.6(d).
Even if the term “filing” were unclear in some way, our conclusion would be the same. Other definitions and constructions of the term make clear that filing requires actual receipt by the entity with which a document is filed. For example, in another procedural context, it has been stated that “ ‘A paper is filed when it is delivered, at the place where it is to be filed, to the proper officer, and by him received to be kept on file.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Southwest Airlines v. Dowty-Rotol, Ltd. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 491, 493 [notice of appeal was timely filed even though delivered to wrong division of superior court clerk’s office].) The California Rules of Court state that “[u]nless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.20(a), italics added.) Indeed, when documents are filed electronically with a court, the Rules of Court provide that “[i]n the absence of the court’s confirmation of receipt and filing, there is no presumption that the court received and filed the document. The electronic filer is responsible for verifying that the court received and filed any document that the electronic filer submitted to the court electronically.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.259(a)(4).) All of these authorities support our conclusion that for a document to be filed with a court or other agency, the document must actually be received by that court or agency, not merely mailed to it.
Martin cites no authority to the contrary, and our research has disclosed none. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Martin’s record request was not timely filed, and that his petition was therefore untimely.
III. Disposition
The trial court’s order denying Martin’s petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. The County is awarded its costs on appeal.
We concur: Reardon, J., Sepulveda, J.