Opinion
C. A. 21-1464-TMC-PJG
03-30-2022
Andy David Martin II, Plaintiff, v. Captain Carter; Major Smith; Chaplain Terrance Smalls, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Andy David Martin, II, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 46.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Martin of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 48.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration after the court ordered additional briefing. (ECF Nos. 51, 54, 65, & 70.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that the defendants' motion should be granted.
Martin also filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 57.) The court observes that the Local Rules make no provision for sur-reply memoranda and Martin did not seek leave of the court to file a sur-reply. Accordingly, the sur-reply was not considered in the court's recommendation. However, consideration of the sur-reply would not have changed the court's recommendation.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. This case arises out of Martin's requests to be served a kosher diet during his separate detentions in the Charleston County Detention Center, which is run by the Charleston County Sheriff's Office. Martin grew up Roman Catholic but his family observed Jewish religious traditions, and Martin began converting to Judaism in 2018. In May, June, and July of 2018, Martin filed numerous grievances with Defendant Terrance Smalls, the detention center's chaplain, in which Martin requested that he be placed on a kosher diet to adhere to his belief in Judaism. (Grievance List, ECF No. 46-5 at 1-4.) Smalls responded to most of Martin's early grievances and indicated he would refer Martin to Defendant Anna Carter, the captain of programs. Starting in June, Martin's grievances indicated that though he had supposedly been referred to Carter and Smith, he had not spoken to them, and he was given no indication that his request for a kosher diet had been considered. Smalls again responded to these grievances by stating that he would refer Martin to Carter and Smith. By the end of June and through July, though Martin continued to file grievances noting the defendants' non-responsiveness to his request for a kosher diet, the only response to his grievances from staff indicated that the grievance was “closed because inmate was released/transferred.” (Grievance List, ECF No. 46-5 at 2-3.) Martin even noted that the detention center's grievance system incorrectly noted that the was released. Martin also complained that inmates who sought diets for other religions were not “questioned or tested or r[u]n through any trials to prove their faith” as Martin experienced. (Grievance List, ECF No. 46-5 at 3.) Martin was apparently released or transferred from the detention center thereafter, although the record does not reflect the date.
In one of the responses, Smalls said he would also refer Martin to Defendant Timothy Smith, a major, but Smith swears in an affidavit attached to the defendants' motion that he had no role in the kosher meal program. (Smith Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 46-3 at 1.)
At some point, Martin was again detained and in March 2021, Martin signed up to participate in Passover, which includes the service of a kosher meal. Smalls interviewed Martin about his inclusion in Passover and questioned Martin about his connection with the Jewish faith. Smalls did not allow Martin to participate. Martin filed a grievance in which Martin claimed that Smalls did not allow him to participate in Passover because his family is not Jewish. Martin also referenced his denial of kosher meals in 2018 at the detention center, claiming that his “right to freedom of religion was violated.” (ECF No. 46-5 at 1.) In response, Smalls wrote, “Thank you for your grievance!” (Id.)
Martin filed this lawsuit on May 17, 2021. In the court's order authorizing the issuance and service of process on July 14, 2021, the court construed the pro se Amended Complaint as asserting violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. (ECF No. 18.)
Martin was ultimately approved for a kosher diet in November 2021. Smalls sought the approval by email to an unknown person on an unknown date. Martin signed a Religious Diet Participation Agreement that states, “I will not purchase, possess, or consume any food items that are not permitted under my religious diet.” (ECF No. 46-7 at 3.) Martin's canteen purchase history shows that he bought non-kosher items prior to signing the agreement, though he also regularly purchased kosher items. (ECF No. 46-6 1-2.) In an affidavit attached to the defendants' motion, Smalls swears that, pursuant to detention center policy, Martin's requests for kosher meals in 2018 and 2021 were denied because he purchased non-kosher items at the canteen. (Smalls Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 46-4 at 1.) Carter and Smith swear that the decision to approve or deny kosher meal requests rests solely with the detention center's chief deputy. (Carter Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 46-2 at 1; Smith Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 46-3 at 1.)
The defendants provide a copy of the email exchange between Smalls and the person who approved the kosher diet, but the emails are substantially redacted, including the identity of the person who approved the diet and the dates of the emails. (ECF No. 46-7 at 1.)
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. The Defendants' Motion
1. Official Capacity Claims
The defendants argue that to the extent they are named in their official capacities as employees of the Charleston County Sheriff, the Sheriff is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In South Carolina, sheriffs are agents of the state rather than employees of the counties. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), affd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (table). As an agent of the State, the Sheriff is covered by the State of South Carolina's sovereign immunity from suit. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the Sheriff and his employees are not “persons” amenable to suit, and Martin's claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed.
Similarly, to the extent Martin seeks damages against the defendants in their official capacities pursuant to RLUIPA, the Sheriff is immune from claims for damages. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285-86 (2011); see also Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 133 (4th Cir. 2006).
However, Martin may name the defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Ex parte Young . . . permits a federal court to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.”). But, the defendants argue that Martin's claims for injunctive relief are moot. The court agrees. “The doctrine of mootness constitutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal court jurisdiction.” Porter v. Clarke, 852 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011)). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the out-come.” Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). Where the claimant receives the relief he sought to obtain through his claim, the change in factual circumstance renders the claim moot. See Simmons, 634 F.3d at 763 (citing Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002)). After Martin filed this case, a detention center official approved Martin for a kosher diet. (ECF No. 46-7 at 1-3.) Therefore, Martin has received the only equitable remedy he seeks in this lawsuit, and his claims for injunctive relief are now moot. Consequently, Martin's official capacity claims should be dismissed.
2. Individual Capacity Claims
The defendants argue that Martin cannot put forth any evidence that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. The court agrees.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks such relief, RLUIPA does not authorize a private right of action against the defendants in their individual capacities for damages. See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 570 (6th Cir. 2014).
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To hold an individual defendant personally liable for a constitutional tort, the plaintiff must show that the defendant personally caused the constitutional deprivation. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[Constitutional torts require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that Martin was originally denied participation in the kosher meal program because the detention center's policy forbade participation in the program for inmates who purchased non-kosher canteen items. (Smalls Aff. ¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 46-4.) The record contains no evidence that Smalls, Smith, or Carter had any involvement in creating that policy. Nor does the record contain any evidence that the defendants were responsible for making decisions based on that policy. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to prison officials because the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence that the officials had any personal involvement in establishing or enforcing a purportedly unconstitutional policy). Instead, Carter and Smith swear that the detention center's chief deputy was the only official who could approve or deny kosher meal requests, whereas Carter's only role was to investigate the requests. (Carter Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 46-2 at 1; Smith Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 46-3 at 1.) Martin has not put forth any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants caused the denial of Martin's participation in the kosher meal program. See Evans, 703 F.3d at 647; Wright, 766 F.2d at 850. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Martin's individual capacity claims.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion be granted, Martin's official capacity claims be dismissed, and summary judgment be granted to the defendants as to Martin's individual capacity claims.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).