Opinion
24A-GU-1391
11-26-2024
Guardianship: Lynn Marshall, Appellant v. Jessica Lenore Marshall n/k/a Jessica Lenore Welch, Appellee
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jacob A. Ahler The Law Office of Riley and Ahler, P.C. Rensselaer, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Lake Circuit Court The Honorable Marissa J. McDermott, Judge The Honorable Jewell Harris, Jr., Probate Commissioner Trial Court Cause No. 45C01-1809-GU-193
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jacob A. Ahler
The Law Office of Riley and Ahler, P.C.
Rensselaer, Indiana
Bailey and Foley Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2018, Lynn Marshall and Jessica Welch (f/k/a Jessica Marshall) were named co-permanent guardians of their adult son, J.M., who suffers from autism and was (and remains) unable to care for himself or his financial affairs. Since their appointment as co-permanent guardians, Marshall and Welch have failed to work together as co-guardians and each has unsuccessfully petitioned to have the other removed as co-guardian. At some point, J.M. began receiving social-security benefits, which Marshall, as J.M.'s representative payee, had placed in a bank account to which Welch does not have access. Welch petitioned for an accounting of J.M.'s social security benefits, arguing that the benefits were guardianship assets. Following a hearing, the probate court ordered Marshall to provide an accounting of the funds. The probate court denied Marshall's subsequent motion to reconsider, reiterating that it was not ordering the payment of, but rather only an accounting of, the funds. Marshall contends on appeal that the probate court did not have authority to order an accounting of the social-security benefits. We disagree and therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On September 4, 2018, Marshall and Welch filed a petition, requesting to be named permanent co-guardians of J.M. In their petition, Marshall and Welch alleged that J.M. was "unable to maintain and care for his financial affairs and person because he is autistic." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. They alleged that J.M. owned personal property valued at $100.00 and received no income, although they anticipated "applying for SSI in the near future." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11.
[¶3] Marshall and Welch were married and lived together at the time they were appointed co-guardians but have subsequently divorced. Since divorcing, Marshall and Welch have each accused the other of misusing or failing to accurately account for guardianship funds and have attempted to have the other removed as co-guardian.
[¶4] On January 5, 2024, Welch requested that Marshall be found in contempt for failing to provide her with an accounting of all guardianship assets, including J.M.'s social-security benefits. The probate court conducted a hearing on Welch's motion on March 26, 2024, after which it ordered the following:
1. The Court finds that the attempt by [Marshall] to make distinctions between Social Security income and other guardianship assets is without merit. All of the assets of the Protected Person .. shall be considered guardianship assets and shall be reflected in the guardianship accountings;
2. The Court hereby Orders [Marshall] to file with the Court, an Accounting of all guardianship assets, regardless of their
origin, along with copies of all bank statements dating back to November 2022; copies of which shall be provided to [Welch].
3. Said Accounting shall be filed with the Court, and provided to [Welch] on, or before, May 27, 2024.
Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 134. Marshall moved to reconsider, arguing that the probate court did not have the authority to require him to provide an accounting of J.M.'s social-security benefits. On May 13, 2024, the probate court denied Marshall's motion, reiterating that it had only ordered Marshall to provide an accounting of the funds and was "not 'directing' the payment of Social Security Benefits[,]" stating that "[t]o the extent the social security benefits are an asset of the protected person, the social security benefits need to be accounted for in the manner prescribed by Indiana law and as ordered by this Court." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Initially, we note that Welch has not filed an appellee's brief.
When an appellee has not filed an answer brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf. Fifth Third Bank v. PNC Bank, 885 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Rather, we may reverse the trial court if the appellant presents a case of prima facie error. Id. Prima facie error means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. If an appellant does not meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010).
[¶6] Marshall contends that the probate court abused its discretion in ordering him to provide an accounting of the social-security benefits, claiming that the probate court did not have the authority to do so.
We review the trial court's order in guardianship proceedings for an abuse of discretion, with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. In re Guardianship of I.R., 77 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). See Ind. Code § 29-3-2-4 ("All findings, orders, or other proceedings under this article shall be in the discretion of the court unless otherwise provided in this article.").... In conducting our review, we consider the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom in favor of the judgment and will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. [In re I.R., 77 N.E.3d at 813]. While substantial deference is given to the trial court's findings, we review conclusions of law de novo. [Matter of Guardianship of A.Y.H., 139 N.E.3d 1050, 1052 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019)].Matter of Guardianship of A.E.R., 184 N.E.3d 629, 638-39 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022).
[¶7] The probate court found that "[a]ll of the assets of the Protected Person, [J.M.], shall be considered guardianship assets and shall be reflected in the guardianship accountings." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 134. Marshall challenges this finding, claiming that the probate court erred in finding that J.M.'s social-security benefits qualified as guardianship assets. In denying Marshall's motion to reconsider, the probate court reiterated that it "is not 'directing' the payment of Social Security Benefits. To the extent [that] the social security benefits are an asset of the protected person, the social security benefits need to be accounted for in the manner prescribed by Indiana law." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142.
[¶8] The Indiana General Assembly has defined guardianship property as "the property of an incapacitated person or a minor for which a guardian is responsible." Ind. Code § 29-3-1-7. Further, Indiana courts have long considered social-security benefits to qualify as guardianship assets or property. See Matter of Guardianship of Brown, 436 N.E.2d 877, 881, 887 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982); see also In re Guardianship of Phillips, 926 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (including monthly social-security and pension payments when discussing guardianship assets). As such, we cannot say that the probate court abused its discretion in finding that J.M.'s social-security benefits qualified as guardianship assets.
[¶9] Marshall's main argument appears to be that the probate court did not have jurisdiction over the use/payment of J.M.'s social-security benefits, claiming that "[t]he actions of the representative payee are guided and directed by the [Social Security Administration]-not the probate court." Appellant's Br. pp. 11-12. Marshall claims that the probate court's order that he provide an accounting of the social-security benefits as guardianship assets violates the federal preemption doctrine. In support, Marshall cites to 42 USCA § 407(a) which provides that
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing
under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Marshall asserts that "it appears as though the probate court has attempted to leverage Marshall's position as a co-guardian against him in order to compel him to allow Welch joint access to the SSA funds." Appellant's Br. p. 12. The probate court's order, however, does no such thing, as it merely orders an accounting of the funds and does not grant Welch joint access to them.
[¶10] Marshall asserts that our decision in Randall v. Woodson, 212 N.E.3d 691 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), clarified on reh'g, trans. denied, supports his claim that the probate court's order violated federal preemption law. In Randall, the personal representative for the protected person's estate claimed that the representative payee for the protected person's social-security benefits had improperly transferred some of the protected person's benefits. 212 N.E.2d at 693. Citing the federal preemption doctrine, we concluded that federal law preempted the personal representative's state-law claims to the extent that the personal representative was seeking to recover SSA benefits from a representative payee. Id. at 695.
[¶11] Again, in this case, the probate court did not order Marshall to grant Welch control over or access to the funds. Notably, all it ordered was for Marshall to provide an accounting of the funds. The probate court's order did not infringe on any federal statute or regulation regarding the use of the funds. Thus, we conclude that our opinion in Randall is inapposite to the question of whether the probate court could order Marshall to provide an accounting of the funds.The probate court's order is consistent with Marshall's counsel's statements during the March 26, 2024 hearing, at which Marshall's counsel acknowledged during this hearing, that "Marshall has no issue providing the information. He just had the issue providing control and access." Tr. Vol. II p. 16. The probate court's order makes no mention of control or access to the funds but merely requires Marshall to provide an accounting, i.e., information, which, again, Marshall's counsel indicated he had "no issue providing." Tr. Vol. II p. 16.
Marshall asserts that since the probate court "would have no authority to enforce a remedy or effectuate any sort of relief if Marshall had misused" the social-security benefits, so "for no logical reason then should the probate court be able to order that he account for the same." Appellant's Br. pp. 13-14 (emphasis in original). We disagree and note that if the accounting were to suggest that some misuse or mismanagement of the funds had occurred, Welch could initiate separate proceedings and seek relief in the federal court.
[¶12] Marshall also argues that it is to the detriment of the guardianship estate to incur the administrative expenses of preparing accountings for the federal benefits when the probate court would ultimately have no authority to order or direct such funds or fashion any relief as to said funds even if there were questionable entries in said accounting.
Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis in original). We disagree and note that Marshall has not provided any argument or evidence indicating what such alleged administrative expenses might be.
[¶13] The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.