Opinion
No. 2022-02223 Index No. 502436/21
05-22-2024
Laniece Marshall, appellant, v. Virginia Manuel, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
Subin Associates, LLP (Kenneth J. Gorman, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant. Biolsi Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Steven Alexander Biolsi of counsel), for respondents.
Subin Associates, LLP (Kenneth J. Gorman, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Biolsi Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Steven Alexander Biolsi of counsel), for respondents.
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., DEBORAH A. DOWLING, HELEN VOUTSINAS, LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated March 15, 2022. The order granted the motion of the defendants Virginia Manuel and William Manuel for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In January 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and common-law negligence, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she closed her right pinky finger in the door of a vehicle while it was parked near premises owned by the defendants Virginia Manuel and William Manuel (hereinafter together the defendants). In her bill of particulars, the plaintiff alleged that her injury occurred in the course of her employment as a "[m]eter [i]nstaller" with nonparty Aclara Technologies, LLC. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated March 15, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against them. "'Section 200 of the Labor Law merely codified the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site work[ers] with a safe place to work'" (Giglio v Turner Constr. Co., 190 A.D.3d 829, 830, quoting Salgado v Rubin, 183 A.D.3d 617, 618 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "An implicit precondition to this duty to provide a safe place to work is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury to enable it to avoid or correct an unsafe condition" (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 317). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they did not have the authority to supervise or control either the plaintiff or the vehicle which eventuated her injury (see Morales v 50 N. First Partners, LLC, 208 A.D.3d 475, 479; Toltchelnikova v Community Recycling, LLC, 197 A.D.3d 677, 678), and that they did not otherwise have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the vehicle (see Morales v 50 N. First Partners, LLC, 208 A.D.3d at 478; Giglio v Turner Constr. Co., 190 A.D.3d at 830). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them. The defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by an elevation-related or gravity-related risk encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1) (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494; Gasques v State of New York, 59 A.D.3d 666, affd 15 N.Y.3d 869). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The plaintiff's contention that the defendants' motion should have been denied as premature is without merit. "'A party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant'" (Valencia v Glinski, 219 A.D.3d 541, 546, quoting MVB Collision, Inc. v Progressive Ins. Co., 129 A.D.3d 1040, 1041). "'The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion'" (Valencia v Glinski, 219 A.D.3d at 546, quoting U.S. Bank N.A. v Wiener, 171 A.D.3d 1241, 1242). Here, the plaintiff failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the defendants' control, and thus, she failed to demonstrate that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was premature.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., DOWLING, VOUTSINAS and LOVE, JJ., concur.