Opinion
44644.
DECIDED OCTOBER 1, 1987.
Medical malpractice; constitutional question. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Langford.
Jones Ludwick, Taylor W. Jones, Timothy R. Brennan, William Boyd Lyons, for appellant.
Smith, Gambrell, Russell Martin, David A. Handley, William A. Brown, for appellee.
The trial court granted summary judgment in a medical malpractice action to the physician on the basis that the action was barred by the statute of limitation in effect at the time the action was filed. The patient challenged that statute as applied to his claim under the reasoning enunciated in Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56 ( 316 S.E.2d 155) (1984). The holding in that case is applicable here. Thus, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed.
The General Assembly subsequently has adopted the reasoning as displayed in much of Shessel v. Stroup, supra, and in a related case, Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 ( 298 S.E.2d 484) (1983). See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a), as amended in 1985.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.