We review the court's order granting summary judgment de novo. MarkWest Energy Partners, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. , 2016 COA 110, ¶ 11, 411 P.3d 1080. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Safeco is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that "[n]otice of loss is a condition precedent to trigger coverage under an insurance policy." (Doc. # 41, p. 7) (citing MarkWest Energy Partners, Ltd. V. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2016 COA 110). Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that amendment is futile when the proposed amendment would fail to establish adequate notice.

Additionally, under Colorado law, courts "construe insurance policies according to principles of contract interpretation." MarkWest Energy Partners, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2016 COA 110, ¶ 13 (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011)).

Under Colorado law, courts "construe insurance policies according to principles of contract interpretation." MarkWest Energy Partners, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2016 COA 110, ¶ 13 (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011)); see also Kipling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F.3d 1306, 1312-1313 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting the "apparently uniform practice of those courts following the Restatement to apply contract conflict-of-laws principles to claims for benefits under automobile-insurance contracts."). However, the substantive allegations of the Complaint do not raise an implication that Defendant breached its contractual obligations in bad faith.

But an insurer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delayed notice prejudiced its interests. See MarkWest Energy Partners, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 411 P.3d 1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2016); but see Craft v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 343 P.3d 951, 953 (Colo. 2015) (holding that the "notice-prejudice rule does not apply to a date-certain notice requirement in a claims-made insurance policy."). Here it is undisputed that Ms. Stoole did not notify MetLife of her potential UIM claim until approximately November 5, 2012 [#40-11], which was approximately 13 months after her traffic collision with Ms. Vo. The Parties, however, put forth no evidence as to when Ms. Stoole should have reasonably known about her UIM claim, see Clementi, 16 P.3d at 226; but even assuming that Ms. Stoole's 13-month delay was unreasonable, MetLife fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this delay prejudiced its interests.