Summary
awarding costs for service of subpoenas on two trial witnesses who never testified
Summary of this case from Berlinger v. Wells Fargo, N.A.Opinion
Case No. 5:97-cv-15-Oc-10c
May 4, 2001
ORDER
Following a seven week trial in this antitrust action, the jury reached a verdict on November 9, 2000 in favor of the Defendant and judgment was entered accordingly (Doc. 790). The case comes before the Court for the consideration of several post-trial motions, including the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial (Doc. 800), the Plaintiff's motion to strike certain costs sought in the Defendant's bill of costs (Doc. 801), and the Defendant's motion for recovery of selected attorneys' fees and costs (Doc. 807). These motions are ripe for consideration and the Court will address each in turn.
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial
The Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a new trial and states the following as grounds: (1) the Court erroneously directed a verdict for the Defendant on the issue of market power; (2) the Court erroneously denied the Plaintiff's motion in limine and oral objections at trial relating to certain issues; (3) the Court refused to give a jury instruction regarding discovery not provided to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; and (4) the Court excluded termination evidence. In response, the Defendant contends that none of the grounds asserted by the Plaintiff provide a basis for granting a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). The Court agrees. Each of these issues was thoroughly considered during the progress of the litigation, and at trial, and the Court adheres to its previous rulings and explanations.
With regard to the market power issue, see Transcript (Doc. 785 at 4-6); with regard to the Plaintiff's motion in limine and objections, see Order of September 25, 2001 (Doc. 696); with regard to a jury instruction regarding discovery not provided to the Plaintiff by the Defendant, see Transcript (Doc. 785 at 6-11); and with regard to the exclusion of termination evidence, see the Pretrial Order (Doc. 627) and Transcript of Pretrial conference (Doc. 659 at 8-17).
Upon due consideration, the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 800) is due to be Denied.
Plaintiff's Objection and Motion to Strike Certain Costs Sought In Defendant's Bill of Costs
On November 24, 2000, the Defendant filed its Bill of Costs and supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 798). On November 27, 2000, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the Clerk taxed the Bill of Costs in the amount of $226,503.56. (Doc. 801). In response, the Plaintiff filed the following specific objections to the Clerk's taxation of costs.
1. Service of Process Fees
The Plaintiff first objects to the taxation of service of subpoenas upon two individuals who never testified at trial — Irvin Philpot III and Roger Maris, Jr. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has offered no explanation as to why service or attempted service of subpoenas was made on these individuals. The Plaintiff further contends that assessed service or attempted service fees for these individuals are not recoverable.
In response, the Defendant argues that there is no such limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In regard to Irvin Philpot III, the Defendant explains that he was on the Plaintiff's own witness list and the Defendant "took measures to insure that it could call Mr. Philpot to testify live before the jury if the need arose." (Doc. 808 at 2). The Defendant also adds that, on more than one occasion, Plaintiff's counsel informed the Defendant that the Plaintiff would be calling Roger Maris, Jr. as part of the Plaintiff's case-in-chief. The Defendant further explains that, because Roger Maris, Jr. is a resident of Gainesville, Florida, there was a reasonable expectation that he would be within the jurisdiction and amenable to service of process. When the Defendant attempted to serve him, however, he was not at home and had apparently gone on vacation. (Doc. 808 at 3).
It is well settled that a court may only tax costs as authorized by statute. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 explicitly provides for the taxation of the costs of "fees of the clerk and marshal," which include the cost of service up to the statutory amount charged by United States Marshals. Upon review, the Plaintiff has offered no support for its position that service fees pertaining to Mr. Philpot and Mr. Maris are not taxable. Upon due consideration, and particularly in light of the fact that both of those witnesses were on the Plaintiff's own witness list, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's objections to the taxation of service fees for witnesses not called to testify are due to be overruled.
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons. Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2499, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987).
E.E.O.C. v. W O. Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000).
2. Pretrial and Discovery Hearing Transcripts
The Plaintiff next objects to the taxation of the costs of transcripts of pretrial and discovery hearings conducted by the Magistrate Judge. The Plaintiff argues that the cost of such transcripts was not a necessary expense because most of the rulings made during the hearings were reduced to written orders. The Plaintiff contends: "[b]ecause the parties had the written orders to rely on, there was no need for the hearing transcripts." (Doc. 804 at 4). Consequently, the Plaintiff requests that costs for pretrial and discovery hearing transcripts in the amount of $1,883.50 be stricken from the Bill of Costs.
The Defendant argues that such transcripts were reasonably necessary to maintain an accurate record of the Court's rulings on motions and discovery matters. The Defendant also points out that the Court's Orders often referred to the record, such as in the Pretrial Order (Doc. 627) or the Court's Order of June 7, 2000 (Doc. 610), where the Court granted the Defendant's motion "to the extent stated by the Court on the record at the June 7, 2000 hearing." Thus, the Defendant argues that the transcript was often the only complete record of the Court's decisions on certain issues.
Upon due consideration, the Court agrees with the Defendant that the transcripts of pretrial and discovery hearings were reasonably necessary. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's objection to the costs of those transcripts is due to be Overruled.
3. Costs of All Depositions, Trial Transcripts, and Expedited Transcripts
Next, the Plaintiff objects to the taxation of fifteen (15) depositions which it argues were taken solely for discovery purposes and were not used as evidence or to impeach witnesses during trial. The depositions of the following individuals are in dispute: Patricia Maris, Bart Maris, Irvin Philpot, Michael Maris, Burt Maris, Roger Maris, Jr., Brad Maris, Randy Maris, Richard Maris, David Denslow, John Kramer, Stanley Smith, Richard Schaeffer, Vincent Ventimiglia, William Shepherd. The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendant cannot recover costs for certain expedited transcripts, trial transcripts, and for the cost of both transcribing and videotaping the same depositions.
In response, the Defendant argues that the fifteen (15) disputed depositions were reasonably necessary at the time they were taken. Indeed, when determining whether a particular deposition is reasonably necessary, the Court must look to the facts known at the time the deposition was taken. To this end, the Defendant states that all of the deponents at issue had been identified by the Plaintiff as persons having knowledge of the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint at the time the depositions were taken.
Desisto Coll., Inc. v. Howey-in-the-Hills. 718 F. Supp. 906, 912 (M.D.Fla. 1989).
Upon review, the Court agrees that the costs of the fifteen (15) disputed depositions were properly taxed. A deposition taken within the proper bounds of discovery is normally deemed to be necessary for use in the case. The Plaintiff's objections to the taxation of the costs of such depositions are therefore due to be overruled.
Helms v. Walmart Stores. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1568, 1571 (ND.Ga. 1992).
In objecting to the cost of videotaping depositions, the Plaintiff overlooks the following ruling of the Eleventh Circuit in Morrison v. Reichhold Chems., Inc.
[W]hen a party notices a deposition to be recorded . . . by both stenographic and nonstenographic means, and no objection is raised at that time . . . it is appropriate under § 1920 to award the cost of conducting the deposition in the manner noticed.
97 F.3d 460, 464-65 (11th Cir. 1996).
The Defendant maintains that it noticed all of its depositions to be recorded by stenographic and videographic means, and that "Plaintiff never objected to the videotaping of the depositions and should not be heard to do so at this late date." The Court agrees and finds that the Plaintiff's objections to the taxation of costs for videotaping depositions are due to be overruled.
With respect to the costs for expedited transcripts and trial transcripts, the Defendant argues that both were not only necessary, but essential to the trial of the case. According to the Defendant, such transcripts were necessary to the preparation of a defense, including witness examination, jury instructions, and closing arguments. The Defendant further contends that the transcripts were necessary to preserve oral rulings made by the Court and were indispensable because of the length and complexity of the case. The Court agrees that this was a lengthy and complex trial, and objections to the taxation of costs for expedited transcripts and trial transcripts are due to be overruled.
4. Travel Expenses for Witnesses
The fourth category of costs to which the Plaintiff objects are certain travel expenses of witnesses. The Plaintiff objects to the expenses of three out of state witnesses — August Busch III, John Dobbs, and Robert Hallam — and argues that the Defendant could have used the videotaped depositions of these witnesses. The Defendant responds, however, that the live testimony of these three witnesses was crucial to elicit relevant facts in support of a defense tailored to the evidence presented by the Plaintiff during its case in chief. The Defendant argues that the testimony of August Busch III was essential, as he was the only person remaining at Anheuser-Busch with first-hand knowledge of the circumstances relating to the initial decision to prohibit public ownership. The Defendant offers similar explanations as to why the live testimony of Robert Hallam and John Dobbs was necessary.
Indeed, taxation of witness fees is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3), but the amount is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. A witness is allowed actual travel expenses or, if traveling by privately owned vehicle, a travel allowance for mileage (which the parties agree is $0.88 per mile) pursuant to § 1821(c). This amount, however, is generally limited by the 100-mile rule which states that travel expenses are limited to a distance of 100-miles absent "special circumstances." In determining whether special or exceptional circumstances exist, the court should consider the relevance and necessity of the witnesses testimony, the existence of court approval before incurrence of the travel expenses, and whether the movant seeking costs could have obtained similar testimony from witnesses residing closer. To be considered "necessary and material," testimony must not be redundant or cumulative.
Cronin v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 663, 664-65 (11th Cir. 1993).
Goodwall Construction Co. v. Beers Construction Co.,, 824 F. Supp. 1044, 1067 (N.D.Ga. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Turning to the travel expenses of August Busch, III, who traveled by private aircraft from St. Louis, Missouri to Ocala, Florida to testify at trial, the Defendant claimed and the Clerk taxed $1,235.52, which represents the mileage allowance multiplied by the round trip distance ($0.88 X 1,404 miles). As the Plaintiff correctly points out, however, this amount should be limited by the 100 mile rule absent special circumstances. The Defendant claims that special circumstances exist because Busch's testimony was crucial to the defense. The Court agrees. The testimony of August Busch, III was both relevant and necessary, and apparently could not have been obtained from any other individual. Moreover, his testimony — or at least key portions of it — was not redundant or cumulative of testimony from other witnesses. For these reasons, the Plaintiff's objections to the travel expenses of August Busch, III are due to be overruled.
The Clerk has also taxed $1,398.32 in travel expenses for Robert Hallam, who traveled by private aircraft from Dallas, Texas to Ocala, Florida to testify at trial ($0.88 X 1,589 miles roundtrip). The Plaintiff argues that his mileage should be limited to 100 miles each way because there were not exceptional circumstances for his testimony. in response, the Defendant contends that "Mr. Hallam's testimony that the purchase of Ben E. Keith stock by Harold Simmons was attempted greenmail was necessary to refute Plaintiff's erroneous suggestion made at trial that Simmons' greenmail efforts somehow demonstrated a public company's legitimate interest in entering beer distribution." (Doc. 808 at 12). The Court agrees that Mr. Hallam's testimony was material and was necessary to the extent that it served to rebut evidence offered by the Plaintiff. Particularly due to the rebuttal nature of the testimony, the Court finds that special circumstances existed and the 100-mile rule should not apply. Consequently, the Plaintiff's objections are due to be overruled.
Travel expenses for trial witness John Dobbs were also taxed by the Clerk in the amount of $930.16, which represents the travel allowance for roundtrip mileage in a private aircraft from Memphis, Tennessee to Ocala, Florida (1,057 miles X $0.88). The Defendant argues that "Mr. Dobbs provided persuasive testimony regarding his efforts to purchase Maris Distributing and Maris Distributing's abject failure to negotiate." With regard to this testimony, the Court finds that the Defendant has not met is burden of demonstrating that special circumstances existed. Although this testimony was relevant and material, it cannot be said that it was necessary to the defense. Absent prior Court approval of the expenses, the Court finds that exceptional circumstances did not exist with regard to the testimony of Mr. Dobbs. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to have the travel expenses of John Dobbs limited by the 100-mile rule to an allowance for a total mileage of 200 miles roundtrip. Thus, the witness fees taxed by the Clerk should be reduced by $754.16.
The difference between the amount taxed by the Clerk for travel expenses of John Dobbs ($930.16) and the amount allowed (200 miles roundtrip X $0.88 = $176.00) is $754.16.
The Plaintiff has also objected to the travel expenses for Anheuser-Busch expert Roger Blair's travel to San Francisco for a deposition. The Plaintiff argues that Dr. Blair resides in Gainesville, Florida and the Plaintiff was prepared to take the deposition in Gainesville. As the Defendant explains, however, Dr. Blair was on assignment at the University of Hawaii at the time of the deposition and the Plaintiff benefitted from the San Francisco deposition location because it would have been more expensive to conduct the deposition in Hawaii. The Court agrees with the Defendant's justification and the Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
The travel expenses of Neil Peters are also in dispute. The Plaintiff argues that Mr. Peters was not on the Defendant's witness list and the cost of his travel should not be taxed as there are no exceptional circumstances as to why he was called to testify. The Defendant contends, however, that the testimony of Mr. Peters unexpectedly became necessary at trial in order to refute testimony presented by the Plaintiff. The Court agrees that the evidence was material and relevant to the issue of anti-competitive effects and was necessary to refute unanticipated evidence to the contrary presented by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that special circumstances existed in regard to the testimony of Mr. Peters and the Plaintiff's objections to the travel expenses of Mr. Peters shall be overruled.
Lastly, the Plaintiff objects to the Clerk's taxation of $2,386.00 for the cost of two round-trip airline tickets for its expert witness, Mr. Matthews to attend trial. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is not entitled to recover these expenses, as Mr. Matthews did not testify at trial. The Court agrees and finds that $2,386.00 should be deducted from the taxation of costs.
Generally, no witness fee may be taxed as costs for a person who travels to the courthouse but does not testify at trial. Green Construction Co. v. Kansas Power Light Co., 153 F.R.D. 670 (D.Kan. 1994).
5. Copying Costs
As the final grounds of its motion, the Plaintiff objects to the taxation of the following copy-related costs: (1) the cost of copying documents obtained in discovery; (2) the cost of copying trial exhibits; and (3) cost of copying motions and pleadings filed by the Plaintiff.Under § 1920(4), the Clerk may tax as costs "fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case." Charges for extra copies and for documents prepared for convenience, preparation, research, or for the records of counsel are not taxable.
Goodwall Construction Co. v. Beers, 824 F. Supp. 1044, 1065 (N.D.Ga. 1992).
Taking these principles into account, the Court will first turn to the Plaintiff's objections to the copy costs for documents obtained in discovery. As the Plaintiff explains, "throughout the course of this case, whenever either party produced documents to the other party, theproducing party incurred the expense of making copies." Thus, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is not entitled to copy costs for documents produced by the Plaintiff, for which the Plaintiff has already paid. (Doc. 804 at 10). In response, the Defendant argues that "[s]ignificantly, Anheuser-Busch incurred total copying costs in this action in excess of $190,000, but sought recovery of $47,126.24 as taxable costs." The Defendant further argues that "Anheuser-Busch has already exercised considerable discretion in the copying costs sought in their initial bill of costs." (Doc. 808 at 14). While this assessment may very well be accurate, the Defendant has nonetheless failed to explain how all of the claimed costs were for copies "necessarily obtained for use in the case," particularly in light of the fact that during discovery, the producing party incurred the expense of making copies. The Defendant is not entitled to recovery for the cost of documents produced by the Plaintiff during discovery, as they were already provided with one copy by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff produced approximately 13,158 pages of documents and, in his affidavit (Doc. 799), Carmine Zarlenga states that the Defendant sought costs for one copy of all such documents at $0.16 per page. Accordingly, the Bill of Costs should be reduced by $2,105.28 ($0.16 X 13,158).
The Plaintiff also objects to the Clerk's taxation of the costs for copying 30,802 documents produced by the Plaintiff's experts. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant did not copy all documents produced by the experts and that many of the documents had already been produced in litigation. The Defendant has not offered an explanation of why copies of these documents were necessarily obtained for use in the case, aside from simply arguing that "the request for an award of costs for one copy of the documents produced in discovery is vastly below the actual copying costs incurred." Notably, the Defendant does not dispute the Plaintiff's allegation that it did not actually copy all documents produced by certain experts and that many documents had already been produced. Absent a demonstration of why the documents produced by experts were "necessarily obtained for use in the case" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), the Court is obliged to sustain the Plaintiff's objections. Accordingly, the bill of costs shall be reduced by $4,928.32 (30,802 X $0.16).
The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant is not entitled to recovery copy costs for the Plaintiff's trial exhibits — or multiple copies of trial exhibits — because the Plaintiff provided the documents to the Defendant pursuant to the Order of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 609). The Defendant simply responds that the Plaintiff created the situation by identifying a large number of exhibits and it was "impractical for Anheuser-Busch to haul 4,000 exhibits to and from Court on every trial day." This very argument regarding practicality, however, belies the contention that the documents were "necessarily obtained." Practicality or convenience is not sufficient to meet the standard under § 1920(4) and the Plaintiff's objections regarding costs claimed for copying the Plaintiff's exhibits are therefore due to be sustained. The Bill of Costs will therefore be reduced by $19,184.48, which represents the Defendant's claimed cost of copying plaintiff's trial exhibits. (Doc. 799 at 17).
Finally, the Plaintiff objects to the taxation of copying costs for pleadings, motions, and memoranda filed by the Plaintiff with the Court, as well as multiple copies of its motions and pleadings used for its own counsel. Moreover, the Plaintiff correctly argues that the Defendant is not entitled to tax the copies of its motions and pleadings for itself and local counsel. The Plaintiff therefore requests that the costs be reduced accordingly by $7,506.40.
In response, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's complaint is "a problem of Plaintiff's own creation," due to the Plaintiff's "bombardment" of the Court and Anheuser-Busch with pleadings and motions totaling 11,195 pages in length. The Defendant maintains that it was necessary to make multiple copies of Plaintiff's motions and "dole" them out to multiple attorneys in order to respond within the time period contemplated by the rules. Once again, however, the Defendant's argument demonstrates that the multiple copies were, in fact, made for convenience rather than necessity as required by § 1920(4). Consequently, the Plaintiff's objections will be sustained and the costs reduced by $7,506.40.
Defendant's Motion Seeking Recovery of Selected Attorneys' Fees and Costs
The Court will now turn to the final matter for consideration — the Defendant's Motion Seeking Recovery of Selected Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. 807), to which the Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 812). In its motion, the Defendant seeks recovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 of a portion of its fees and costs incurred as a result of the Plaintiff's "litigation excess" in four areas: excessive discovery motions, excessive pretrial filings, Plaintiff's effort to create a false premise at trial, and repeated violations of confidentiality order. The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff "took every conceivable measure to make the litigation as lengthy, vexatious, and unwieldy as possible." (Doc. 807 at 1).
For example, the Defendant complains about the Plaintiff's filing more than fifty discovery motions, 90% of which it claims were denied in whole or part. The Defendant also seeks sanctions for the Plaintiff's excessive pretrial filings, such as its exhibit lists, witness lists, and deposition designations. The Defendant further argues that the Plaintiff's counsel should be sanctioned for their conduct in attempting to create a false premise at trial regarding the issue of whether Coors Brewing Company prohibits public ownership of its wholesalers. Finally, the Defendant seeks sanctions for repeated violations of the confidentiality order. The Defendant does not specify what amount of attorneys' fees are sought, but states that it will submit appropriate documentation upon request from the Court.
In response, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is not entitled to any of the requested attorneys fees or costs and the motion should be denied. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's own style of "hypertechnical and overbroad objections" to discovery requests necessitated the Plaintiff's filing of discovery motions and that it had a good faith basis for each and every motion filed. In regard to its pretrial filings, the Plaintiff essentially contends that it complied with the Court's rulings, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules and any confusion resulted from good faith disputes. In regard to the Defendant's allegation that the Plaintiff attempted to create a false premise at trial regarding public ownership of Coors distributorships, the Plaintiff maintains that, although the disputed testimony was incorrect in relation to a specific time period, "it was [the witness'] testimony and Maris did not create it." The Plaintiff correctly points out that the Defendant had every opportunity to cross-examine and impeach the witness. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that it did not violate the confidentiality order.
The Court is authorized to impose certain sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In regard to discovery motions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(B) provides:
If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the moving party or the attorney filing the motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The Court is also empowered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to award excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred where an attorney "so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." Upon due consideration, however, the Court finds that neither sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4)(B) nor under § 1927 are warranted in this case.
As the Plaintiff argues, "Anheuser-Busch is simply complaining about the reality of litigation." (Doc. 812 at 11). Indeed, the pretrial litigation and trial of this case has much in common with that in Zink Communications v. Elliot, where the court denied the Plaintiff's post-trial motion for sanctions and described the case as one in which "two experienced senior litigators surrounded by the usual support troops went after each other hammer and tongs from the first day of the litigation to the last." The court explained:
11 F.R.D. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Haight, J.).
Id. at 408.
As every judge knows, there are trials and then there are trials. There are cases where counsel for the parties, without sacrificing their respective clients' interests in any way, cooperate with each other in a manner which insures prompt resolution of the issues with minimum judicial intervention. Then there are cases where, from the very beginning, counsel seem to renounce cooperation and even courtesy as a matter of principle and hurl at each other all the weapons in the experienced litigators arsenal. The conduct of this sort of litigation gives rise to metaphors drawn from the battlefield ("blitzkrieg", "scorched earth") and from sport ("hardball"). The judge is constantly required to intervene, adjudicate and direct.
Id. at 407.
The instant case, like the case in Zink Communication, falls unquestionably within the second category. To borrow the language of theZink Communication court, the issue presented by the Defendant's motion is "whether at the end of the trial, the captains and kings having departed, leaving the field to the litter-bearers and chaplains, one party is entitled to sanctions from the other."
Id.
Sanctions are not warranted simply because a party's arguments were eventually rejected or certain motions were ultimately denied. Rule 37(a)(4)(B) sanctions require a determination of whether the discovery motion was "substantially justified." Meanwhile, § 1927 sanctions require a showing that a party or counsel acted "unreasonably and vexatiously" — in other words a showing of subjective bad faith.
Id.
Upon careful consideration, the Court is not inclined to extend this extended litigation any further. Consequently, the Defendant's Motion Seeking Recovery of Selected Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. 807) is due to be Denied in all respects.
Conclusion
Accordingly, upon due consideration, it is ordered that:
(1) the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 800) is DENIED;
(2) the Plaintiff's Objection and Motion to Strike Certain Costs Sought in Defendant's Bill of Costs (Doc. 804) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth in this Order. The Bill of Costs taxed by the Clerk is hereby reduced to the sum of $189,638.92, for which execution may issue;
(3) the Defendant's Motion Seeking Recovery of Selected Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. 807) is DENIED; and
(4) the Defendant's Motion to Maintain Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Wholesaler Family Consolidation Guide Under Seal (Doc. 795) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #719 shall be placed under seal. Previously filed copies of the document shall remain under seal in accordance with the Order of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 577).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE and ORDERED