Opinion
E050729 Super.Ct.No. RIC500152
09-12-2011
GERARD STE. MARIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent.
Gerard Ste. Marie, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Bruce G. Fordon, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff and appellant Gerard Ste. Marie (plaintiff) appeals a judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Riverside Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) on plaintiff's complaint seeking to invalidate LAFCO's approval of the proposed
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerard Ste. Marie, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Bruce G. Fordon, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Gerard Ste. Marie (plaintiff) appeals a judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Riverside Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) on plaintiff's complaint seeking to invalidate LAFCO's approval of the proposed
incorporation of the City of Wildomar. He contends that there is insufficient evidence that in approving the incorporation, LAFCO actually considered the extent to which the proposed incorporation would affect the city and county in achieving their respective fair shares of the region's housing needs, as mandated by Government Code section 56668, subdivision (l). (All statutory citations herein refer to the Government Code.)
We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence that LAFCO did consider that factor, and we affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000 (§ 56000 et seq.; hereafter the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Act), incorporation of a new city must be approved by the local agency formation commission for the county in which the proposed city is located. (§§ 56301, 56325.) In 2005, LAFCO began considering an application to incorporate a new city, Wildomar. LAFCO conducted hearings and compiled documentation as required by the applicable statutes, and ultimately approved the application. Voters approved the proposed incorporation in February 2008, and the City of Wildomar was incorporated effective July 1, 2008.
Plaintiff is a resident of Wildomar who opposes incorporation. On May 27, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint for "reverse validation" of LAFCO's approval of the incorporation. The complaint contended, in five causes of action, that LAFCO had in various ways abused its discretion in approving the incorporation, and sought an order declaring the approval void. Plaintiff later dismissed all but the first cause of action.
"An action to determine the validity of any change of organization, reorganization, or sphere of influence determination completed pursuant to this division shall be brought pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 860) of Title 10 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (§ 56103.)
Following a court trial based on the administrative record and the arguments of the parties, the trial court entered judgment for LAFCO. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
The judgment is entitled "Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandate."
LEGAL ANALYSIS
THE RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT LAFCO
CONSIDERED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE INCORPORATION WILL
AFFECT THE CITY AND THE COUNTY IN ACHIEVING THEIR
RESPECTIVE FAIR SHARES OF REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS
A decision concerning a petition for incorporation is reviewed pursuant to section 56107. That statute provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a determination by a commission on grounds of noncompliance with this division, any inquiry shall extend only to whether there was fraud or a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Prejudicial abuse of discretion is established if the court finds that the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record." (§ 56107, subd. (c).) This standard of review applies both in the trial court and on appeal. Appellate review is independent of the trial court's determination. (County of Los Angeles v. Glendora Redevelopment Project (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 817, 835.)
Section 56668 requires that in reviewing a proposal to incorporate a new city, a local agency formation commission must consider, among other factors, "The extent to which the proposal will affect a city or cities and the county in achieving their respective fair shares of the regional housing needs as determined by the appropriate council of governments consistent with Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580) of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7." (§ 56668, subd. (l).) Plaintiff contends that we must find a prejudicial abuse of discretion because there is no substantial evidence that LAFCO considered the extent to which the incorporation will affect Riverside County in achieving its fair share of the regional housing needs.
Before we discuss the evidence in the record which supports the inference that LAFCO did consider the housing allocation factor, we first address plaintiff's contention that the record must contain "a statement of basis to allow judicial review of the substantiality of the evidence." We disagree. Section 56668 does not require express findings with respect to the factors it lists, and section 56107 states the applicable standard of review. We must "'"give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Davidson v. County of San Diego (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 639, 648.) While an explanation of the commission's consideration of any of the section 56668 factors which apply—especially those which are particularly important to a given decision—does facilitate judicial review, the Legislature has not required it, but has instead mandated that courts uphold LAFCO decisions unless the decision "is not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record." (§ 56107, subd. (c).) Accordingly, the absence of a "statement of basis" with respect to section 56668 factors does not permit a reviewing court to invalidate LAFCO's resolution of the proposal as long as the record contains substantial evidence which supports the inference that the commission did consider the appropriate factors.
McBail & Co. v. Solano County Local Agency Formation Com. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1223 (McBail), on which plaintiff relies, does not hold that the absence of an express "statement of basis" with respect to section 56668 factors can invalidate a commission's resolution. Rather, the court held that the administrative record must "adequately reflect the reason and basis" for the commission's decision, i.e., to grant or deny the petition. (McBail, at p. 1230.) It reversed the commission's decision in that case because it failed to demonstrate a rational relationship between the reasons for its denial of an annexation petition and the purposes of the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg act (then known as the Cortese-Knox Act; see McBail, at p. 1225). Here, plaintiff does not assert that there is no rational basis for LAFCO's decision to approve the incorporation; rather, he contends only that LAFCO failed to consider a single section 56668 factor, as evidenced by its failure to discuss it.
McBail predates the enactment of section 56668 and discusses, instead, former section 56841, the predecessor of section 56668. (See Stats. 2000, ch. 761, §§ 99, 161.)
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We now turn to the application of section 56107, subdivision (c) to this case.
In examining the administrative record, we resolve all doubts in favor of the administrative findings and accept all reasonable inferences supporting the administrative findings. (County of Los Angeles v. Glendora Redevelopment Project, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Here, although the evidence on this point in the record is minimal, in light of the statutory scheme which governs the allocation of housing burdens among counties and the cities within them, we conclude that the record is sufficient to permit the rational inference that LAFCO considered the housing issue as required by section 56668, subdivision (l).
In Article 10.6 of the Government Code (§§ 65580-65589.9), the Legislature set forth a comprehensive scheme to assure, to the greatest extent possible, that cities and counties will provide "decent housing and a suitable living environment for every Californian" and for every economic level. (§ 65580, subds. (a), (b).) The Legislature recognized that attaining this goal requires the cooperation of all levels of government. (§ 65580, subds. (c)-(e).) To achieve its stated goal, the Legislature provided means for determining and meeting regional housing needs, and created councils of local governments and subregional entities charged with determining housing needs and allocating them among the counties and cities within their purview. (§§ 65583- 65584.2.)
Section 65584.07 mandates that if a new city is incorporated after a final allocation has been made, "a portion of the county's allocation shall be transferred to the new city." (§ 65584.07, subd. (c).) The record indicates that LAFCO was aware of this provision and considered whether Wildomar, following incorporation, would be able to provide its fair share of regional housing needs.
First, in a letter to LAFCO, an analyst in Riverside County's executive office discussed housing forecast data developed by the planning department (presumably the county's planning department) and approved by the WRCOG executive committee. WRCOG, or Western Riverside Council of Governments, is a subregional council of governments in Western Riverside County which represents the interests of its constituent communities to "regional agencies including the Southern California Association of Governments." (See <http://www.wrcog.cog.ca.us/contentl wrcogatwork.asp> (as of September 7, 2011).) The Southern California Association of Governments is the entity which is responsible for determining the housing allocation within its region, which includes Riverside County. (§ 65584.08; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 17031, subd. (b)(5); see also, generally, City of Irvine v. Southern California Assn. of Governments (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 506, 511.) Regional housing needs are among the issues WRCOG addresses. (<http://www.wrcog.cog.ca.us/contentl wrcogatwork.asp> (as of June 22, 2011).) In the resolution approving the incorporation, LAFCO imposed the condition that Wildomar join WRCOG as soon as possible.
Second, in the section entitled "Community Development," LAFCO's public hearing draft of its comprehensive fiscal analysis refers to Wildomar as a "developing area, with significant room to grow." The report of LAFCO's executive officer states that "[o]ver the past two decades Wildomar has been transitioning from a predominantly rural residential area to a more mixed use suburban community. Wildomar comprises a wide variety of residential uses ranging from very large lot estates, single-family tracts, senior communities and The Farm, a large mobile home subdivision community." It goes on to state that the county's general plan calls for "continued urbanization of the area," and anticipates that Wildomar will adopt the county's general plan as its initial general plan.
Every city and county is required to develop and adopt a general plan (§ 65300) which must include "[a] housing element as provided in Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580)." (§ 65302, subd. (c).) Further, "In order to 'assure that counties and cities recognize their responsibilities in contributing to the attainment of the state housing goal' ([§ 65580], § 65581, subd. (a)), the Legislature requires that local jurisdictions in their land use planning 'identify adequate sites for housing . . . and . . . make adequate provision for the existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the community' (id., § 65583), including 'the locality's share of the regional housing need' (id., § 65583, subd. (a)(1))." (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 382-383.) We "must presume that LAFCO considered the criteria as required by [statute]." (City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 381, 394.) Applying that presumption and indulging every reasonable inference from the record, as mandated under substantial evidence review (County of Los Angeles v. Glendora Redevelopment Project, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 835), we conclude that the references to the availability of room for growth and to the diversity in housing already in existence in Wildomar and to the anticipation that Wildomar would adopt the county's general plan and would participate in WRCOG are sufficient to permit the inference that LAFCO was aware of its duty to consider the effect of incorporation on the ability of the county and the new city to achieve their respective fair shares in providing for regional housing needs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Riverside County Local Agency Formation Commission.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKinster
J.
We concur:
Hollenhorst
Acting P.J.
King
J.