Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 19-0063
10-31-2019
MARGARET F., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.F., Appellees.
COUNSEL Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix By Thomas A. Vierling Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Cathleen E. Fuller Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD531226
The Honorable Karen L. O'Connor, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Cathleen E. Fuller
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined. MORSE, Judge:
¶1 Margaret F. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental relationship with her child, M.F. Because Mother has shown no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mother and Frank J. are the natural parents of M.F., born September 2011. In August 2017, Mother left M.F. in the care of her boyfriend ("Boyfriend") while she was in the hospital. The Department of Child Safety ("DCS") found M.F. unsupervised in the hospital parking lot. Boyfriend was nearby, unconscious, and apparently under the influence of substances. M.F. also disclosed that Boyfriend had often been violent towards him and Mother in the past. Later, Mother obtained an order of protection against Boyfriend, but continued to allow him to have contact with M.F. Additionally, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines in October 2017. Consequently, DCS took custody of M.F. in October, and in December, the juvenile court found him dependent and set a case plan of family reunification.
The juvenile court terminated Frank J.'s parental rights, and he is not a party to this appeal. --------
¶3 The reunification plan required Mother to demonstrate long-term sobriety, stable housing and income, and successfully complete her goals in individual counseling and the parent-aide service. To assist her in achieving these goals, DCS referred Mother for substance abuse testing and treatment and a parent aide with visitation. Mother also self-referred for counseling that had a domestic violence component.
¶4 Through January 2018, Mother's participation in drug testing was mostly consistent and she tested negative, though she submitted two diluted tests and missed some tests. In early February 2018, Mother submitted a negative drug test, but thereafter stopped participating in testing altogether. Additionally, her participation in substance abuse treatment was inconsistent. Mother participated in counseling, the parent-aide service, and visits. However, Mother did not participate in substance abuse treatment after November 2018, stopped participating in counseling after July 2018, and closed out unsuccessfully from the parent-aide service that same month because she failed to meet some program objectives.
¶5 In August 2018, the juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS moved to terminate Mother's parental rights under substance abuse and nine-month out-of-home placement grounds. The juvenile court held a contested hearing in March 2019 and issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights on the grounds alleged. Mother timely appealed the ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 On appeal, Mother challenges only the juvenile court's finding that severance was in M.F.'s best interests. Specifically, Mother argues the court "did not adequately consider [her] rehabilitative or reunification efforts, and her bond with [M.F.]."
¶7 We will not reverse the juvenile court's termination order "unless no reasonable evidence supports its factual findings." Jennifer S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 16 (App. 2016). The juvenile court sits as the trier of fact, and this Court views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's decision. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).
¶8 Terminating a parent-child relationship is in a child's best interests if he will benefit from the termination or will be harmed if the relationship continues. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016); Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Relevant factors in this determination include whether: (1) the current placement is meeting the child's needs, (2) an adoption plan is in place, and (3) the child is adoptable. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3-4, ¶ 12. Courts "must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including the child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018). "[T]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests." Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016).
¶9 Moreover, "[i]n a best interests inquiry, . . . we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 (2005); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15 (2016) ("'In most cases, the presence of a statutory ground will have a negative effect on the children [,]' which supports a best-interests finding.") (citation omitted). Once a juvenile court finds that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to the child's interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285, 287, ¶¶ 31, 37. Thus, in considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent's "diluted" interest "against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life." Id. at 286, ¶ 35. Of foremost concern in that regard is "protect[ing] a child's interest in stability and security." Id. at ¶ 34 (citing Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 101 (1994)).
¶10 Although Mother contends that the juvenile court did not adequately consider her participation in services and her bond with M.F., the court's findings show otherwise. The court found:
Since October 2017, Mother was given the opportunity to demonstrate that she could maintain long-term sobriety in order to parent the child. She has not done so. Mother continues to lack insight into the importance of sobriety. Further, Mother has not successfully completed services to show that she can parent without putting the child at risk. The child has been involved in the foster care system for 1 ½ years. While there is no dispute that Mother loves her child, the child has the right to a safe, permanent and drug-free home where all of his needs are met. Mother is not able to provide the child such a home. The child should not have to wait indefinitely for Mother to demonstrate her ability to parent. The child is currently in an adoptive home. All his needs are being met. The child is adoptable. The current placement is the least restrictive placement.
¶11 Reasonable evidence in the record supports the court's findings, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 282, ¶¶ 4, 12 (App. 2002).
CONCLUSION
¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to M.F.