We consider the authorities relied on by the Fund in support of its position as inapplicable to this appeal. In Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct.App. 1988), worker was not allowed to receive benefits from both employer and the Fund for the same eight-week period following the injury, because the workers' compensation statute specifically mandated that employer be liable for benefits during that eight-week period. On the other hand, this appeal involves no such clear statutory mandate denying a worker the benefits of a favorable settlement.
Post-judgment interest, as provided for in Section 56-8-4, has traditionally been applied to workers' compensation cases decided at the district court level. See Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct.App. 1988); Lopez v. Smith's Management Corp. These cases, however, were decided before the current Workmen's Compensation Act became effective on July 1, 1987. See NMSA 1978, Β§ 52-5-1 (Repl.Pamp.
When a fund structured similarly to the PCF claimed immunity from interest under Section 56-8-4(D), this Court rejected its claim. In Mares v. Valencia County Sherriff's Department, 1988-NMCA-003, ΒΆ 35, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123, this Court held that interest was recoverable under Section 56-8-4(D) against the Subsequent Injury Fund in workers' compensation cases in New Mexico. The Mares Court was tasked with determining "whether the [Subsequent Injury] Fund [was] an entity of the state which [was] exempt from payment of post[-]judgment interest" under Section 56-8-4(D).
{39} The district court, acting as the fact-finder in this case, is entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses and assign weight to their testimony accordingly. See, e.g. , New Mexicans for Free Enter. , 2006βNMCAβ007, ΒΆ 71 (stating that "[i]t is well established that where there is conflicting evidence, the trial court, as fact[-]finder, resolves all disparities in the testimony and determines the weight and credibility to be accorded to the witnesses" (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Mares v. Valencia Cty. Sheriff's Dep't , 1988βNMCAβ003, ΒΆ 8, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (acknowledging that appellate courts do not second-guess a fact-finder's determination where it is supported by substantial evidence).The district court concluded that FFFP's actions violated the obligations set forth under 16.61.19.8(A) NMAC and the Simmons' purchase agreement to act with honesty and to disclose any adverse material facts.
Thus, Employer asserts, interest did not commence upon the filing of the order, but commences on each payment as it would have been otherwise due. See Mares v. Valencia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 1988βNMCAβ003, ΒΆ 35, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (β[A]ny award of post[-]judgment interest ... does not commence to run upon unaccrued compensation benefits until the time fixed for its payment.β). We disagree.
Thus, Employer asserts, interest did not commence upon the filing of the order, but commences on each payment as it would have been otherwise due. See Mares v. Valencia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 1988-NMCA-003, ΒΆ 35, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 ("[A]ny award of post[-]judgment interest . . . does not commence to run upon unaccrued compensation benefits until the time fixed for its payment."). We disagree.
As fact-finder, the district court was entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses, Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010βNMCAβ013, ΒΆ 35, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 115, and, on appeal, we will not second-guess its judgment as to credibility. See Mares v. Valencia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 747, 749 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Ct.App.1988) (stating that an appellate court will not second-guess the fact-finder if the determination is supported by substantial evidence). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court's determination was supported by substantial evidence.
As fact-finder, the district court was entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses, Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, ΒΆ 35, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 115, and, on appeal, we will not second-guess its judgment as to credibility. See Mares v. Valencia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 747, 749 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that an appellate court will not second-guess the fact-finder if the determination is supported by substantial evidence). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court's determination was supported by substantial evidence.
As a result, the district court found that, while generally credible, Plaintiff's expert "was misinformed and had an interest in marketing the more expensive pump." Plaintiff has not addressed or otherwise challenged this finding, and this Court will not second-guess the district court's judgment as to the credibility of this expert witness. Mares v. Valencia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 747, 749 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Ct. App. 1988). Plaintiff also does not address or otherwise rebut the district court's findings that Plaintiff never attempted to use or test the pump installed by Defendant, and that Plaintiff, after discussing the different pump options with Defendant, made an informed decision regarding the pump purchased by Defendant.
It is well established that when the courts below adjudicate matters of fact, we review the issues under a substantial-evidence standard, which accords great deference to the findings made by them. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 89-90, 428 P.2d 625, 628-29 (1967); Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 747, 749 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Ct.App. 1988). Thus, in this case, we cannot say the trial court was wrong in its findings concerning the historical facts.