Opinion
Civil Action No. CV201-114
October 1, 2002
ORDER
Defendant, Joyce A. Mann ("Ms. Mann"), brought this action against Defendant, Morningstar Baptist Treatment Services, Inc. ("Morningstar"), under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion will be GRANTED. FACTS
Ms. Mann was employed on the night shift at a youth housing and treatment facility operated by Morningstar. Her job was to put the children to bed and check on them at fifteen minute intervals throughout the night. While the children were in bed, she would clean the house and do laundry. In the morning, she awakened the children and served them breakfast.
Ms. Mann wanted to transfer to the day shift, but Mornirigstar chose not to promote her to one of the more responsible day shift positions. In June of 2000, Ms. Mann applied for a day shift position titled "Behavioral Specialist," which required either a four year college degree or equivalent work experience. Both people that Morningstar chose if or the position were significantly younger than Ms. Mann, and neither of them had a college degree. Morningstar contends, however, that they had significantly more relevant work experience, including experience on the day shift at Morningstar's facility. According to Morningstar, Ms. Mann's night shift experience would not have prepared her adequately for a position on the day shift, where there was much more interaction with the children.
After hearing that Morningstar was not going to promote her, Ms. Mann suggested to her supervisor that the reason she was not selected for promotion was her age. According to Ms. Mann, her supervisor laughed at the suggestion but did not deny it. Ms. Mann also alleges that on a number of other unrelated occasions her supervisor and other employees of Morningstar referred to her as an "old lady."
Morningstar eventually terminated Ms. Mann for sleeping on the job. Ms. Mann contends that she was not actually sleeping, but admits that she was lying down. Morningstar has a strict policy against sleeping on the job. Ms. Mann contends that the policy is not always enforced by termination, but has not identified any similarly situated employee who was caught sleeping by a supervisor and was not terminated. According to Morningstar, the same supervisor who caught Ms. Mann sleeping also caught a much younger employee sleeping that same night, and this younger employee was also terminated.
Ms. Mann first corresponded with the EEOC regarding her complaint of discrimination on October 16, 2000. She filed a purported "Perfected Charge" on February 5, 2001.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Morningstar is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court will draw any plausible inferences from the evidence presented in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996). The relevant substantive law determines which issues are material to the case. Anderson v. Liberty lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)
II. TIMELINESS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE
ADEA claimants must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of an allegedly discriminatory adverse employment action. If they fail to file within the 180 day window, their claim is time-barred with the EEOC, and the district court will dismiss any subsequent civil complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (d)(1);Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1100 (11th Cir. 1996).
ADEA claimants may, however, file a "perfected charge" that will relate back to the date of their initial correspondence with the agency, so long as the original correspondence was in writing, identified the defendant, and provided a general statement of the facts alleged. Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1242. (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not produced such a document. However, the charge that she ultimately filed with the EEOC does recite that it is a "perfected charge" relating back to her "initial correspondence" with the agency on October 16, 2000. This is sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to the timeliness of two allegedly discriminatory adverse employment actions that happened less than 180 days prior to this initial correspondence, i.e., the denial of a promotion in June of 2000 and her termination in July of the same year.
Ms. Mann has made additional allegations of failure to promote that would have happened more than 180 days prior to her initial correspondence with the EEOC. Because the Court intends to grant summary judgment as to all timely presented claims, it is not necessary to consider the possibility that these previous alleged incidents of discrimination were part of a continuing violation of Plaintiff's rights. Sonnier v. Computer Programs Systems, Inc., 168 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1335 (S.D.Ala. 2001)
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Failure to Promote
In actions for failure to promote under the ADEA, as in other employment discrimination actions, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If she has no direct evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus, she nonetheless can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she was a member of the protected class, that she was minimally qualified for the promotion, and that the position was filled by someone who was sufficiently younger than she that age discrimination would be plausible as a determinative factor. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 310-12, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). To make her prima facie case, Plaintiff need not show that she was better qualified than the person who ultimately received the promotion. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809, 120 S.Ct. 39, 145 L.Ed.2d 36 (1999)
Once a defendant responds to the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its failure to promote the plaintiff, however, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason for not promoting her is a pretext. To survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must show, in addition to her prima facie case, "sufficient" evidence impeaching or contradicting Defendant' s asserted reason for not promoting her. Ultimately, Plaintiff must be able to prove at trial that improper age discrimination played a "determinative" role in Defendant's decision not to promote her. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
Here, Plaintiff's only direct evidence that age discrimination played any role in Defendant's failure to promote Plaintiff is Plaintiff's own testimony that on one occasion she herself suggested that her age had something to do with why she was not promoted, and her supervisor laughed at the suggestion without explicitly denying it. This incident is, at best, suggestive of the possibility that age may have been a motivating factor in the decision whether to promote Plaintiff. It is not the sort of direct and blatant evidence of discrimination required to sustain an ADEA claim. See Earley v. Champion Intern. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1990); Tidwell-Williams v. Northwest Georgia Health System, Inc., 1998 WL 1674745 (N.D.Ga. 1998).
Plaintiff also has not met her burden to show discriminatory failure to promote by indirect evidence. She is a member of the protected class, and she was passed over for promotion in favor of a person or persons significantly younger than she. However, she has not shown that she was qualified for the position. Even when an employer has sometimes allowed relevant work experience to substitute for education, the burden is still on the plaintiff to produce evidence, as part of her prima facie case, that she met the minimum qualifications for the position.
Finally, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence tending to show that Defendant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason f or not promoting her — namely, that the other applicants were more qualified — was a pretext for a concealed discriminatory motive. Again, the burden is on Plaintiff to make this showing. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 2000)
B. Discriminatory Discharge
Ms. Mann claims that she ultimately was terminated because of her age. Morningstar, on the other hand, claims that Ms. Mann was terminated for violating a work rule. To make a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must show that she belongs to the protected class, that she was qualified for her position, and that a substantially younger person tilled the position after she was discharged. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (1999). Plaintiff has met her burden of producing evidence sufficient to support a finding in her favor as to each element of her prima facie case. Despite her poor performance on the night in question, she does appear to have been qualified for the position that she held.
Plaintiff has not, however, produced any evidence sufficient to rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her that Defendant has advanced. Defendant has given a detailed explanation of its policy regarding sleeping on duty, and Plaintiff has been unable to identify any younger but similarly situated employee who was not discharged. Nor has she produced any other evidence to support an inference that her termination was motivated by age discrimination, other than a few stray comments about her age.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not raised any genuine issues of material fact sufficient to sustain her claim of age discrimination in employment. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.