Opinion
10-26-2011
Manhasset Limousine Service Co., Respondent, v. Douglas Lustberg, Appellant.
PRESENT: : , J.P., TANENBAUM and LaCAVA, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Norman Janowitz, J.), entered January 21, 2010. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $300.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Manhasset Limousine Service Co. brought this commercial claims action to recover the principal sum of $300 from defendant. The evidence at trial showed that defendant, Douglas Lustberg (Lustberg), had worked as a chauffeur for plaintiff, and that on February 27, 2009, in the course of an eight-hour job, defendant had been given $300 cash by a passenger. While defendant claimed that the cash had been a tip, plaintiff contended that it had been paid to defendant on account of the total amount of $568.80 plaintiff charged its client for the chauffering service, and that defendant wrongfully kept the $300 instead of giving it to plaintiff. Based on a credibility determination, the District Court awarded judgment to plaintiff.
Evidence was also presented at trial, and it was undisputed, that prior to plaintiff's commencement of this action, Lustberg had sued Manhasset Limousine Service Co. in the Small Claims Part of the District Court of Nassau County for unpaid wages for a number of jobs, including the eight-hour job he had performed for Manhasset Limousine Service Co. on February 27, 2009, and had received a judgment against that entity. Lustberg argued at trial, and contends on appeal, that the instant action is accordingly barred under principles of res judicata.
The District Court's conclusion, that the $300 constituted part payment of plaintiff's bill, rather than a tip, turned on its determination respecting the credibility of the witnesses, a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).
The doctrine of res judicata bars future actions "between the same parties on the same cause of action" (Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]); collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from litigating in any subsequent action or proceeding an issue which was clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party (id. at 349). Even though the prior small claims action involved the same parties and the same underlying event as the present action, the legal issue presented in the prior action was whether Lustberg was entitled to unpaid wages, an entirely different cause of action from plaintiff's claim herein that Lustberg, in effect, converted the $300 given to him by the passenger. Since the causes of action were different, and there was no prior determination of the purpose of the $300 payment, we find no basis to disturb the District Court's determination that plaintiff's cause of action was not barred under principles of res judicata. As the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804-A, 1807-A; see also North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v Aetna US Healthcare, Inc., 27 AD3d 439, 440 [2006]), the judgment is affirmed.
Molia, J.P., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.