Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0909-13T4
04-24-2015
MONIQUE J. MANFRA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and POINT PLEASANT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
Monique J. Manfra, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale and Hoffman. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 430,605. Monique J. Manfra, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Point Pleasant Board of Education has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Monique J. Manfra appeals from the September 19, 2013 final agency decision by the Board of Review (the "Board"), concluding that she was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits because she left her job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We affirm.
Manfra worked for Memorial Middle School in Point Pleasant as an attendance secretary from August 28, 2012 until she resigned on May 21, 2013. Manfra then filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits on May 26, 2013. A deputy in the Division of Unemployment Insurance found that Manfra was disqualified for benefits because there was "no evidence that the working conditions posed any risk to [her] health," and therefore she did not leave her job for good cause attributable to the work. Manfra appealed this determination to the Appeal Tribunal, which conducted a telephonic hearing on July 22, 2013.
At the hearing, Manfra testified that she began ten days of medical leave on May 8, 2013, pursuant to a note from her doctor, which cited "her current condition." Manfra stated that her condition, a rapid pulse and high blood pressure, was caused by a "hostile negative environment" at work. Manfra claimed that she was yelled at "probably twice a week" by another employee in the office, that this employee would also use her desktop and access her files when she was not at her desk, and that she would often be left alone to run the office.
Manfra emailed her resignation to the Point Pleasant superintendent on May 21, 2013, one day before the completion of her ten-day medical leave. On June 21, 2013, Manfra's doctor provided a note stating that Manfra's "absence from work was completely due to her current high risk pregnancy and was a preventative measure to avoid complications."
On July 24, 2013, the Appeal Tribunal determined that Manfra "left the work voluntarily as a result of being yelled at by another employee at the workplace, namely by another employee in a higher position," which "occurred over several occasions." The examiner further indicated that Manfra "would have continued working for the above named employer had the aforementioned employee not worked at the work place."
The Appeal Tribunal found that Manfra's "medical documentation did not instruct [Manfra] to leave the work completely, but rather to take time off from work." The examiner further found that "the matters for which the claimant left the work voluntarily, namely being hollered at . . . was not so severe insofar as to justify" Manfra leaving her employment, and also that the record did not show that Manfra asked her employer for a leave of absence.
The Appeal Tribunal, therefore, concluded that Manfra was disqualified under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) from May 26, 2013, because she "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work." Manfra appealed to the Board, which affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal.
On appeal to us, Manfra argues that she was forced to leave her job involuntarily because the hostile, belligerent, and negative work environment caused her medical condition. Therefore, she contends that she left her job for good cause attributable to the work. We disagree.
Our review of an agency's final decision is limited. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). The agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We "'can intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy.'" Ibid. (quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).
Furthermore, "'[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
In this matter, the Board found that Manfra was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which provides that an individual may not receive benefits if he or she "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work[.]" Although the statute does not define "good cause," it has been construed to mean "'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
The test for determining whether an employee's decision to leave work constitutes "good cause" is one of "ordinary common sense and prudence." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 214 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The employee's decision to quit "'must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones.'" Ibid. (quoting Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288). "A claimant has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.'" Ibid. (quoting Heulitt v. Bd. of Review, 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)).
Furthermore, N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d) provides that "[w]hen an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to work."
We conclude that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Board's determination that Manfra left her employment without good cause attributable to the work. Manfra failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to demonstrate that the workplace environment caused or aggravated her medical condition. The notes from Manfra's doctor indicated that she required "time off" from work, but did not state that she needed to leave her job. Additionally, Manfra resigned from her position prior to the lapse of her ten-day medical leave, without attempting to return to work.
Applying our deferential standard of review, we find no basis to interfere with the Board's decision that Manfra was disqualified for unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Manfra failed to demonstrate that she left her position for a reason "so compelling as to give [the employee] no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION