Opinion
June 26, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, the motion is granted, and venue is changed from Westchester County to New York County.
On August 16, 1988, the plaintiff wife left the marital residence located on East 58th Street in Manhattan, where the parties had continuously resided since their marriage in 1981. After staying for a while in Connecticut, Washington, D.C., and New York City, the plaintiff signed a month-to-month lease on October 3, 1988, for a suite at the La Reserve Hotel in White Plains. On October 4, 1988, she then commenced the instant action in the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a divorce and ancillary relief, including a demand for exclusive occupancy of the marital residence. The Supreme Court, Westchester County, denied the defendant's subsequent motion for a change of venue to New York County.
We disagree. Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, it is readily apparent that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently establish her residency in Westchester County for purposes of placing venue there.
The residence of a party for purposes of venue must be determined as of the time of the commencement of the action (see, Jonas Equities v. 614 E. 14th St. Realty Corp., 282 App. Div. 773), and indicia of residence acquired after the commencement of the action are irrelevant to the determination (see, Siegfried v. Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916). It is clear that "residence" is not generally synonymous with "domicile" (see, Antone v. General Motors Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 20, 30), and that it is not necessary to show an intent to make a place a permanent home in order to establish residence (see, Unanue v. Unanue, 141 A.D.2d 31). However, mere physical presence is not necessarily sufficient to establish residency for purposes of venue (see, Beckett v. Beckett, 133 A.D.2d 968; see also, Oelkers v Hulseberg, 200 Misc. 352, affd 279 App. Div. 669; Hislop v Taaffe, 141 App. Div. 40). To consider a place as a residence for venue purposes, one "must stay there for some time and have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency" (Katz v Siroty, 62 A.D.2d 1011, 1012).
In this case, the mere renting of a room in Westchester County one day prior to the commencement of the action was insufficient to establish that county as the plaintiff's residence for purposes of venue (see, Siegfried v. Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916, supra; Turner v. Turner, 84 Misc.2d 229). Accordingly, the proper venue was New York County where the defendant resided. Bracken, J.P., Eiber, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.