Opinion
B327280
04-17-2024
EVAN MANCUSO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
Evan Mancuso, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Room, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Armando Zambrano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie J. Lee, Deputy Attorney General for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21STCP02831 Mary Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
Evan Mancuso, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Room, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Armando Zambrano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie J. Lee, Deputy Attorney General for Defendant and Respondent.
MOOR, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and respondent the Contractors' State License Board (the Board) revoked plaintiff and appellant Evan Mancuso's contractor's license for at least three years and ordered him to pay the costs of investigation and enforcement, based on Mancuso's violation of three provisions of the Contractors' State License Law (CSLL; Bus. &Prof. Code, § 7000 et seq.). Mancuso filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court denied Mancuso's writ petition, and Mancuso appealed. We affirm, finding Mancuso has not shown the trial court's decision to be in error.
All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Facts and Disciplinary Proceeding
Consistent with our standard of review, we state the facts established by the evidence "in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all evidentiary conflicts to uphold the court's judgment." (Lozano v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 715 (Lozano) [affirming denial of former police officers' challenge of city's decision to terminate their employment].)
1. Facts Leading to Homeowner's Complaint
Mancuso has held a sole ownership contractor's license since 1988. David Acosta, who has never held a contractor's license, owned California ADU Center, Inc., and also worked with Red Vision Construction, Inc. ("Red Vision"). During the relevant time frame, Marco Ortmond owned a residence in Arleta, California.
For the sake of clarity, we use the name Mancuso to refer to both the individual and his company, Gold Constructors.
Ortmond had previously built a permitted recreation room and carport on the Arleta property in 2016. In October 2018, Ortmond met with Acosta about converting the recreation room and carport into an accessory dwelling unit (ADU). Working with Acosta, who he understood to be a contractor, Ortmond signed a $74,000 contract with Red Vision to convert the recreation room and carport into an ADU with two bedrooms, two bathrooms, a kitchen, and a living room (the ADU Contract). When the original financing arrangement was taking too long, Acosta suggested seeking a loan through Energy Efficient Equity (E3) for a lower amount. Ortmond electronically signed a new loan application on November 30, 2018 (the E3 Loan Application), not noticing that it listed Mancuso as the contractor, instead of Red Vision, and that the lower loan amount of $68,900 reflected a different scope of work, only including installation of three energy certified items: an air conditioner, tankless water heater, and roofing (the Financed Items).
While there was no contract between Mancuso and Ortmond, Mancuso acknowledged that he was hired to install the Financed Items, and that the only documentation for the agreement was the E3 Loan Application, which identified Mancuso as the contractor.
On December 12, 2018, Mancuso signed a Certificate of Completion for the Financed Items, despite the items not being installed by the end of December 2018, and despite no work having been started on the ADU Contract until January 3, 2019. On December 14, 2018, the entire loan amount of $68,900 was disbursed by E3 to Mancuso. Mancuso transferred $60,000 to Acosta in three separate payments: $10,000 on December 12, 2018; $20,000 on December 19, 2018; and $30,000 on January 17, 2019. Mancuso retained the remaining $8,900. Demolition work on the Arleta property started in early January 2019, and was left unfinished on February 18, 2019. During the relevant time frame of the work reflected in the E3 Loan Application, Mancuso did not have workers compensation insurance coverage.
After unsuccessfully trying to have Acosta complete the ADU work and learning that Mancuso was the contractor responsible for installing the Financed Items, Ortmond filed a complaint with the Board in June 2019.
2. Investigation, Administrative Hearing, and Discipline
Veronica Medina, an Enforcement Representative, handled the Board's investigation, by reviewing licensing records, obtaining statements from Ortmond and Mancuso, and working with an expert witness.
In his written statement, Mancuso claimed he had hired ADU Centers, Inc., David Acosta, to install the Financed Items. According to Mancuso's response, in December 2018, Acosta verified the job was completed; an E3 representative said he had verified the Financed Items had been installed and funds were ready to wire; Mancuso drove by to see that the work was completed; and Ortmond and his mother had signed the Completion Certificate so Mancuso could get paid. Mancuso's response also claimed that the only payment Mancuso received for his services was $8,900. According to Mancuso, the first time he spoke to Ortmond was by phone on July 20, 2019, when he explained that his services only included installation of the Financed Items, all done through David Acosta, ADU Centers, Inc.
An expert witness, Michael Fegan, inspected the property in December 2019, and determined that the contracted work under the ADU contract had not been completed. There is no evidence in the record that the Financed Items were ever installed.
On February 12, 2021, the Board filed a first amended accusation against Mancuso, alleging seven causes for discipline.An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing over three days in late May 2021, during which Mancuso and the Board presented evidence and testimony. The ALJ issued a decision on June 16, 2021. The ALJ found the Board had established three violations by clear and convincing evidence: (1) filing a false completion certificate (§§ 7115 &7158, subd. (a)); (2) committing willful and/or fraudulent acts by fraudulently taking loan funding (§ 7116); and (3) failure to maintain workers' compensation coverage (7125.4, subd. (a)). Based on the evidence supporting the three violations, as well as Mancuso's unwillingness to accept any responsibility and his lack of remorse, the ALJ revoked Mancuso's contractor's license and ordered him to pay reasonable investigation and prosecution costs of $25,498.49. The Board adopted the ALJ's proposed decision, effective September 13, 2021.
The seven alleged bases for discipline were: (1) failing to supervise construction activities (§ 7068.1); (2) abandoning a construction project (§ 7107); (3) aiding and abetting an unlicensed person in evading the CSLL (§ 7114, subd. (a)); (4) submitting a false completion certificate (§§ 7115 & 7158, subd. (a)); (5) fraudulent acts (§ 7116); (6) contracting with an unlicensed contractor (§ 7118); (7) failing to maintain workers' compensation coverage (§ 7125.4, subd. (a)).
3. Writ Proceeding
Seeking to overturn the Board's disciplinary actions, Mancuso filed a verified petition for writ of mandate on August 30, 2021, and a first amended petition on March 17, 2022.
Following briefing and a hearing on the merits, the trial court took the matter under submission. On January 24, 2023, the court issued a ruling denying the petition. Judgment was entered on February 14, 2023, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Adequacy of Mancuso's Briefing
This court granted Mancuso's July 10, 2023 request for judicial notice on July 28, 2023. The Board's November 29, 2023 request for judicial notice was granted on December 14, 2023. Mancuso's June 5, 2023 motion to augment the record and his January 31, 2024 request for judicial notice are denied. [*] Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Mancuso has represented himself throughout the administrative and judicial proceedings, including the current appeal. The Board argues that by failing to designate a complete record on appeal, and failing to support the factual and procedural summary and arguments with proper citations, Mancuso has waived all of his appellate arguments. In addition, the Board contends that it is not this court's role to review the Board's decision for error, and that some of Mancuso's arguments are forfeited because he did not raise them before the trial court.
Self-represented litigants "are held to the same standards as attorneys." (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.)" 'In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.'" (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 (United).) The appellate court is not required to develop an appellant's arguments for him. (Ibid.) "We may and do 'disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.'" (Ibid.) To the extent we can discern cogent legal arguments, identified by headings and supported by authority, and to the extent the evidentiary support for the trial court's findings are discernible from the appellate and administrative records, we elect in this instance to proceed to the merits of such arguments, examining on an issue-by-issue basis if Mancuso forfeited any particular argument by failing to raise it before the trial court. (See San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 436 [discussing forfeiture and appellate court's discretion to consider pure questions of law even when not raised before the trial court].)
Standard of Review
The trial court reviewed the Board's license revocation under the independent judgment standard of review, taking into account the clear and convincing standard of proof in the underlying administrative proceeding. (Li v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 836, 849, 865 [disagreeing with Yazdi v. Dental Bd. of California (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 25, 33-34, to extent it suggests that Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 does not apply in administrative mandamus proceedings].)
When a trial court reviews an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, "the standard of review on appeal of the trial court's determination is the substantial evidence test." (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we must uphold the trial court's factual findings "unless they are so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence, but instead are bound to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the respondent, giving it every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]" (Lozano, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p 723.) On purely legal questions, including matters of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Ibid.)
Mancuso Has Not Demonstrated a Procedural Due Process Violation
Mancuso contends his procedural due process rights were violated because it was unclear whether the investigation was focused on the ADU contract with Red Vision or the E3 Loan Application. We reject this contention.
" 'Procedural due process requires notice, confrontation, and a full hearing whenever action by the state significantly impairs an individual's freedom to pursue a private occupation.'" (Naidu v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 300, 314.) Individuals who have obtained the license required to engage in certain professions or vocations, have a" 'fundamental vested right'" to continue in that activity, and "[a] licensee, having obtained such a fundamental vested right, is entitled to certain procedural protections greater than those accorded an applicant." (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 788-789; see also Sieg v. Fogt (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 77, 93 [rejecting contractor's claim of procedural due process violation].)
The administrative record plainly demonstrates that Mancuso received notice of Ortmond's complaint and an opportunity to respond before the Board filed its accusation against him. He participated in a three-day evidentiary hearing in May 2021, during which he was given a full opportunity to defend against the accusations. The ALJ made detailed factual findings and concluded that the Board had proven three of its seven charges by clear and convincing evidence, dismissing the other four charges. While he may disagree with the ALJ's evaluation of the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, he has not identified any defect that would support his procedural due process claim.
The Trial Court's Denial of Mancuso's Petition is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Mancuso contends the Board's findings were an abuse of discretion because they were not supported by substantial evidence; he further contends there was insufficient evidence to support a determination that any violation of the CSLL was "willful." Additionally, much of the "Factual and Procedural History" portion of Mancuso's opening brief implicitly argues that the record evidence supporting the Board's decision was either inadequate or outweighed by contrary evidence.
In considering Mancuso's arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, we keep in mind that we are applying a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's decision. "We cannot substitute our view of the evidence for that of the trial court. 'So long as there is "substantial evidence," . . . [we] must affirm, even if [we] would have ruled differently had [we] presided over the proceedings below, and even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result.' [Citations.] Substantial evidence means 'evidence . . . "of ponderable legal significance, [which is] reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value."' A single witness's testimony may be sufficient to satisfy the substantial evidence test. [Citation.] If more than one rational inference can be deduced from the facts, we may not replace the trial court's conclusions with our own. [Citation.]" (Sieg v. Fogt, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 88-89.)
We also keep in mind that the CSLL "is to be given a 'reasonable and practical construction' '[i]n light of the intent of the Legislature and the purpose behind the statutory scheme-to protect consumers and the public from dishonest or incompetent contractors.'" (ACCO Engineered Systems, Inc. v. Contractors' State License Bd. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 80, 88 (ACCO).)
The evidence underlying the Board's decision is relatively straightforward. Based on the E3 Loan Application, Mancuso agreed to install the Financed Items in exchange for payment of $68,900. Mancuso signed the completion certificate on December 12, 2018, E3 wired $68,900 to him on December 14, 2018, and after making payments to others, Mancuso retained $8,900. The Financed Items were not installed, by either Acosta or Mancuso. During the relevant time frame, Mancuso did not have a workers compensation insurance policy in place.
To the extent Mancuso asks us to focus on evidence that he contends could support a finding that Mancuso believed the work was completed, he misunderstands the substantial evidence standard of review. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Mancuso understood the work was not completed, because the record includes ample evidence to support that finding. To the extent Mancuso argues he cannot be found to have violated the CSLL because he reasonably believed the work was completed, and therefore did not "willfully" violate the law, we decline to depart from our reasoning in ACCO, where we concluded that even when the statutory language uses the term "willful" in describing conduct subject to disciplinary action, only general intent, not specific intent, is required. (ACCO, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 89-93.)
Mancuso's Remaining Claims Lack Any Merit
Mancuso contends he has an affirmative defense under Civil Code section 945.5, subdivision (d), because Acosta abandoned the ADU project. Civil Code section 945.5 is part of legislation commonly known as the Right to Repair Act (Stats. 2002, ch. 722, principally codified at Civ. Code, §§ 895-945.5). The Right to Repair Act "establishes a prelitigation dispute resolution process that affords builders notice of alleged construction defects and the opportunity to cure such defects, while granting homeowners the right to sue for deficiencies even in the absence of property damage or personal injury." (McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 241, 246-247.) We see no basis for applying an affirmative defense under Civil Code section 945.5 to a disciplinary proceeding under the CSLL.
Mancuso also contends on appeal that because the Board's investigation made a finding that the E3 scope of work included the full ADU conversion, rather than just installation of the Financed Items, he has established equitable estoppel. In its Respondent's brief, the Board points out that Mancuso's equitable estoppel argument to the trial court concerned a different topic- that the Board allegedly misrepresented that Ortmond had to pay the full E3 loan when E3 had released the lien and forgiven the loan. The argument raised before us on appeal, however, was not made below, and it has been forfeited for purposes of this appeal. Regardless of the basis for Mancuso's equitable estoppel argument, we see no persuasive basis to find that the Board was equitably estopped from imposing discipline upon Mancuso.
Because we affirm the decision to deny writ relief to Mancuso, he has no basis to seek tort damages.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent, the Contractors' State License Board.
We concur: BAKER, Acting P. J. LEE, J. [*]