Opinion
# 2017-032-003 Claim No. 125059
04-12-2017
MICHAEL MANCUSI v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Franzblau Dratch, P.C. By: Brian Dratch, Esq. Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Douglas R. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel
Synopsis
Following a trial, claim alleging defendant's failure to properly maintain a walkway at a correctional facility is dismissed.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-032-003 |
| Claimant(s): | MICHAEL MANCUSI |
| Claimant short name: | MANCUSI |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 125059 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | JUDITH A. HARD |
| Claimant's attorney: | Franzblau Dratch, P.C. By: Brian Dratch, Esq. |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Douglas R. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | April 12, 2017 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS), seeks damages arising from a slip and fall at Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility on February 11, 2013. Following joinder of issue and the exchange of discovery, a trial on the issue of defendant's liability was held at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York on November 2, 2016. At the close of claimant's proof, defendant moved to dismiss the claim on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The Court, having reserved on the motion at trial, now grants said motion on the ground that claimant failed to establish a prima facie case of defendant's negligence.
FACTS
Claimant was the sole witness to testify in support of his claim. He stated that, in February 2013, he was incarcerated at Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility in the Town of Moreau, Saratoga County. Claimant testified that, at approximately 6:00 a.m. on February 11, 2013, he was walking from his dormitory to the infirmary to obtain his medications, as had been his routine since he arrived at the facility about 40 days earlier. Claimant explained that the walkway between his dormitory and the infirmary was a "blacktop" road and that the walk took him between seven and eight minutes (T: 14). Claimant stated that it was cold that morning but there was no snow on the ground, nor was it snowing or raining at the time. As claimant approached a gate near the facility's truck trap, he "slipped and fell on a patch of black ice" (T: 16). Claimant testified that he did not see the ice due to inadequate lighting on the walkway and stated that, if he had been able to see it, he could have avoided it (T: 23-24). Claimant indicated the location of his fall in a photograph, noting that the patch of ice on which he slipped was "a few inches up from the bottom" of the photograph (T: 16; Exhibit 2). Claimant testified that it was his understanding that other inmates comprise the lawn and grounds crew responsible for shoveling snow and sanding for ice, but that he had never observed the crew salting or sanding the walkway while he was at the facility (T: 20). After his fall, claimant stated that he proceeded to the infirmary, where he informed the nurse and filed an injury report stating, "There was no light and ice on the floor when I was walking to meds and I fell and broke my ankle" (Exhibit 3).
All page references preceded by "T" are to the trial transcript.
Although Exhibit 1, a record of Climatological Observations, indicates that there was some precipitation in the City of Saratoga Springs, New York on February 11, 2013, the observation time is listed as 1600 hours, or 4:00 p.m., which is approximately 10 hours after claimant's fall that morning. Further, the Court, sua sponte, takes judicial notice that Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility, when it was open, was located in Saratoga County but not in Saratoga Springs.
As more fully addressed below, defendant objected to claimant's allegations regarding the inadequate lighting of the walkway on the ground that such allegations were not sufficiently stated in the notice of intention to file a claim or in the claim itself.
Exhibit 2 was admitted for the limited purpose of depicting the location of claimant's fall (T: 18). Although the photograph depicts snow on the portion of the walkway where claimant fell, claimant conceded that there was no snow there on the morning of the incident (T: 17-18). --------
Claimant rested his case at the conclusion of his testimony. Prior to presenting its defense, defendant moved to dismiss the claim as both jurisdictionally defective and lacking in merit.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court will first address defendant's motion to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As relevant here, "[a] claimant seeking to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence . . . or unintentional tort of an officer or employee of the State must file and serve a claim or, alternatively, a notice of intention to file such a claim, upon the Attorney General within 90 days after the accrual thereof" (Maude V. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 82 AD3d 1468, 1469 [3d Dept 2011]; see Court of Claims Act § 10 [3]). Here, claimant served a notice of intention to file a claim upon the Attorney General on March 20, 2013, alleging that, on February 11, 2013 at approximately 6:13 a.m., "he slipped and fell on an unsalted patch of 'Black-Ice' and as a result of his fall his right ankle was broken as well as multiple ligaments being torn" (Notice of Intention to File a Claim ¶ 4). The notice further alleges that "defendant failed to properly maintain the area of the facility's common walkway where the claimant's slip and fall occurred, with reasonable care," and that defendant's actions were generally "negligent" (Notice of Intention to File a Claim ¶¶ 7-8). Defendant argues that said notice was insufficient in that it did not include allegations regarding inadequate lighting, which claimant raised at trial as a component of defendant's negligence. Accordingly, because claimant failed to serve his claim upon the Attorney General within one year of accrual of the action, defendant moves for dismissal of the claim as untimely pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (3-b). For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.
"The guiding principle and 'purpose of the notice of claim requirement [is] to allow [defendant] to investigate the claim and to estimate its potential liability' " (Davila v State of New York, 140 AD3d 1415, 1416 [3d Dept 2016], quoting Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 24 NY3d 275, 282 [2014]; see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]). The sole requirements for a notice of intention to file a claim, as set forth in Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), are that the notice must specify "the time when and place where such claim arose" and "the nature of same." "What is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable the State to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances. The statement must be specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State" (Heisler v State of New York, 78 AD2d 767, 767 [4th Dept 1980]; see Davila v State of New York, 140 AD3d at 1416; Morra v State of New York, 107 AD3d 1115, 1115 [3d Dept 2013]; Deep v State of New York, 56 AD3d 1260, 1261 [4th Dept 2008]).
Affording a liberal construction to claimant's notice of intention to file a claim, accepting the allegations therein as true, and according him the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Garofolo v State of New York, 80 AD3d 858, 860 [3d Dept 2011]), the Court finds that the notice was sufficiently definite "to allow the State to investigate the claim and to estimate its potential liability" (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 24 NY3d at 282). In accordance with Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), the notice specifies the time and place of claimant's fall, states that he was in defendant's care and custody at that time, and alleges injuries sustained as a result of defendant's negligence. Furthermore, "[w]here an agency of defendant has performed the internal investigation of an incident and is therefore the primary or, perhaps, even the sole source of information upon which a claim is based, it cannot be readily found that a lack of specificity has interfered with defendant's ability to investigate a claim, nor that defendant has been improperly required to assemble information regarding a claim" (Davila v State of New York, 140 AD3d at 1417 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Oliver v State of N.Y. [SUNY] Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn, 40 AD3d 719, 719 [2d Dept 2007]; Matter of O'Shea v State of New York, 36 AD3d 706, 706-707 [2d Dept 2007]; compare Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d at 207-208; Morra v State of New York, 107 AD3d at 1116). Here, in the injury report that he filed with DOCCS immediately after the incident, claimant stated that one reason for his fall was inadequate lighting on the walkway (see Davila v State of New York, 140 AD3d at 1417; compare Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d at 207-208; Morra v State of New York, 107 AD3d at 1116). Accordingly, in view of the particular circumstances posed here, the Court finds that the subject notice of intention met the statutory requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), and, based upon the information therein, the State could have promptly investigated the instant claim and ascertained its liability, if any (see Davila v State of New York, 140 AD3d at 1416; Rodriguez v State of New York, 8 AD3d 647, 648 [2d Dept 2004]). The portion of defendant's motion seeking dismissal upon jurisdictional grounds is therefore denied.
II. Substantive Grounds for Dismissal
In addition to the above jurisdictional grounds for dismissal, defendant moved to dismiss the claim as lacking in merit, stating that claimant failed to demonstrate that it created or had knowledge of a defective condition on the walkway. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees and dismisses claimant's action.
" 'As a landowner, [defendant] owes the same duty of care as that of a private individual: the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in maintaining its property in a safe condition' " (Gonzalez v State of New York, 60 AD3d 1193, 1194 [3d Dept 2009]; lv denied 13 NY3d 712 [2009], quoting Mesick v State of New York, 118 AD2d 214, 216-217 [3d Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 611 [1986]; see Preston v State of New York, 59 NY2d 997, 998 [1983]). "In a slip and fall case such as this, claimant has the burden of establishing a dangerous or defective condition that defendant created or had knowledge (actual or constructive) of, and that such condition was a cause of the accident" (Gonzalez v State of New York, 60 AD3d at 1194; see Seaman v State of New York, 45 AD3d 1126, 1127 [3d Dept 2007]; Heliodore v State of New York, 305 AD2d 708, 709 [3d Dept 2003]; Malossi v State of New York, 255 AD2d 807, 807 [3d Dept 1998]; Rios v State of New York, UID No. 2016-041-510 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Nov. 1, 2016). "To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it" (Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 [1986]; see Heliodore v State of New York, 305 AD2d at 709).
Here, claimant offered no credible proof that defendant created the alleged condition of black ice by failing to salt or sand the walkway, or that defendant knew or should have known that it existed. Claimant's bare allegation that he had never seen anyone salting or sanding the walkway is insufficient to demonstrate that any correction officers or other DOCCS employees had actual notice that the black ice existed (see Seaman v State of New York, 45 AD3d at 1127; Heliodore v State of New York, 305 AD2d at 709). Further, claimant offered no proof to indicate that, if present, the ice "had remained for any 'appreciable length of time' " (Heliodore v State of New York, 305 AD2d at 709, quoting Hamilton v Rite Aid Pharms., 234 AD2d 778, 778 [3d Dept 1996]). With respect to the issue of inadequate lighting, claimant's allegation was that, if he had seen the ice, he "would have avoided it" (T: 23). In light of the Court's finding that defendant did not have notice of the condition, the Court need not determine whether additional lighting would have prevented claimant's fall (see Seaman v State of New York, 45 AD3d at 1127). Were the Court to reach the issue, however, claimant's testimony did not support the conclusion that better lighting on the walkway would have prevented his accident (see id.). Accordingly, inasmuch as claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of claimant's alleged injuries, defendant's motion must be granted and the claim dismissed (see id.; Vizzini v State of New York, 278 AD2d 562, 563 [3d Dept 2000]; Diaz v State of New York, 256 AD2d 1010, 1010 [3d Dept 1998]).
Based upon the foregoing claim no. 125059 is dismissed.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
April 12, 2017
Albany, New York
JUDITH A. HARD
Judge of the Court of Claims