Opinion
CIV. No. 2:13-980 WBS DAD
10-23-2014
SILVA MAMIGONIAN, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL BIGGS; TIMOTHY AIKEN; SUSAN CURDA; ALEJANDRO AYORKAS; JOHN MORTON; ERIC HOLDER, JR.; JANET NAPOLITANO; and the DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RECORD AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Silva Mamigonian, an Armenian national, brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, challenging the decision of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") to deny her applications for an adjustment of immigration status. Presently before the court are plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., (Docket No. 39), defendants' renewed motion to dismiss plaintiff's First Amended Petition for lack of jurisdiction and their cross-motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 47).
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff has resided in the United States since February 3, 2002, when she arrived in Los Angeles from Armenia. (Pl's First Am. Pet. ("FAP") at 5 (Docket No. 36).) On May 28, 2003, plaintiff married a naturalized U.S. citizen, and today the couple remains together and has two U.S. citizen minor children. (Id.) Plaintiff has no criminal record. (Id.)
On October 11, 2005, USCIS approved plaintiff's petition for a relative immigrant visa. (Id.; Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 14.) A year later, plaintiff applied for an adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident, but USCIS denied the application on the grounds that when she arrived in the United States, she presented a U.S. passport belonging to another person and thereby misrepresented herself as a citizen for the purpose of gaining entry into the country. (FAP at 6.)
An immigration judge ("IJ") held removability hearings, where the government alleged three grounds for plaintiff's removal to Armenia: plaintiff falsely represented herself as a United States citizen, sought to procure entry to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation, and was not in possession of a valid unexpired visa or other entry document. (Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 1 at 1.) At the hearings, plaintiff testified that she did not intentionally present a passport that did not belong to her. (Id. at 5-7.) Plaintiff paid a man to help navigate her immigration to the United States, believing the high price he charged for the services, in addition to his representations, guaranteed her entry would be legal. (Id. at 5.) The man gave plaintiff a sealed envelope, which unbeknownst to plaintiff contained a U.S. passport belonging to another person. (Id.) When plaintiff opened the envelope at the border to present her documentation to an immigration officer, plaintiff discovered for the first time its contents and immediately indicated the passport was not hers. (Id. at 6.)
Finding "plaintiff credibly and consistently maintained that she was unaware that the passport she provided to the immigration inspector was not her own passport," the IJ dismissed the charges for falsely claiming citizenship and fraud or material misrepresentation. (Id. at 11.) However, the IJ sustained the third charge, ordering plaintiff removed to Armenia for being present in the United States without a valid visa. (Id.)
Although the IJ expressed concern over the plausibility of plaintiff's explanation for why she was not suspicious of the circumstances following her entry, ultimately he accepted the following testimony as credible: "[T]he respondent testified that she had heard that if you paid enough money, the people at the United States Embassy in Armenia would provide legal travel documents, and she assumed she just followed the wrong procedure when she first applied for a visa." (Id. at 11.)
The government concedes that this third ground, which the IJ did sustain, is no longer a bar to plaintiff's adjustment of status because she is the beneficiary of an approved visa petition. (See Defs.' Mot. at 8.)
Plaintiff made several more unsuccessful attempts to apply for an adjustment and to reopen the removal proceedings. (FAP at 6.) On December 28, 2010, USCIS denied plaintiff's second and third applications, stating to the media that she was ineligible in part because of her false claim to citizenship, contrary to the IJ's previous findings. (Id. at 6-7; Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 8.) On February 14, 2011, plaintiff petitioned the district court to enjoin her deportation and order USCIS to grant her adjustment of status. (FAP at 5.) The next day, February 15, 2011, USCIS denied plaintiff's second and third adjustment of status applications. (FAP at 7.) The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiff appealed. Id.
In Mamigonian I, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action challenging USCIS's denial of her application for an adjustment of immigration status. See Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 938-40. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion "because there had been no final agency action by USCIS on [plaintiff's] pending adjustment-of-status applications at the time she filed her petition." Id. at 938. Because USCIS had denied her pending adjustment-of-status applications between the time she initiated that action and the time the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion, the court concluded that "the District Court now has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Mamigonian's claim that USCIS improperly denied her adjustment-of-status application on nondiscretionary grounds." Id. at 946.
USCIS based its most recent denial of plaintiff's second adjustment application, filed July 30, 2009, and third adjustment application, filed October 5, 2010, on plaintiff's "preconceived intention to immigrate to the United States." (Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 2 ("USCIS 2011 denial") at 156.) Plaintiff subsequently brought this action challenging USCIS's denial of her applications for an adjustment of immigration status. (Docket No. 1.)
Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to Rule 56. (Pl.'s Mot. at 1.) In addition to opposing plaintiff's motion, defendants renew their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative, move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. (Defs.' Mot. at 1.)
Defendants also appear to move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, (see Defs.' Mot. at 6), but it is improper to raise a 12(b)(6) motion in conjunction with their opposition to plaintiff's Rule 56 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. 12(h) ("Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); by a motion under Rule 12(c); or at trial).
II. Jurisdiction
"[D]istrict courts have jurisdiction to hear cases challenging final agency determinations enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) made on nondiscretionary grounds, provided there is no pending removal proceeding in which an alien could apply for such benefits." Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 945. Section 1255, the adjustment-of-status provision, is among those agency determinations enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's proclamation that the court now has jurisdiction, defendants previously moved to dismiss this action on the ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because USCIS's denial of plaintiff's application was a "discretionary" act. (Docket No. 16.) The court denied defendants' motion, holding that "even if USCIS's decision was nominally 'discretionary,'" the court could still determine whether USCIS relied on impermissible factors in denying plaintiff's application. (Jan. 28, 2014 Order at 6 (Docket No. 33).)
In its Order, the court held it "at the very least" had jurisdiction to decide whether USCIS was collaterally estopped from finding plaintiff had "preconceived intent." (Jan. 28, 2014 Order at 6.) However, the court's jurisdiction goes beyond the issue of collateral estoppel because it may review agency determinations based on nondiscretionary grounds. See Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 945.
Defendants now renew their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that because USCIS's reliance on "preconceived intent" was not barred by collateral estoppel, "the USCIS decision is wholly discretionary in nature." (Defs.' Mot. at 7.) Defendants' circular reasoning adds nothing to the argument the court previously rejected. Accordingly, the court will deny defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because the court has jurisdiction to review USCIS's denial of plaintiff's application based on non-discretionary grounds.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The APA permits a reviewing court to "hold an agency action unlawful and set aside actions, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). "[T]he ultimate standard of review . . . is a narrow one," such that the reviewing court "is not empowered . . . to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," but it "must conduct a searching and careful inquiry into the facts." Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing Motor Vehicle Mfr.'s Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
"A motion for summary judgment may be used to review agency administrative decisions within the limitations of the APA." Yu An v. Napolitano, Civ. No. 5:13-0600 EJD, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2014 WL 572485, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014). Normally, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "However, in an action . . . in which the plaintiff challenges the final decision of an administrative agency, the court does not utilize the standard analysis for determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Cal. RSA No. 4 v. Madera County, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (Snyder, J.). A court conducting judicial review under the APA instead determines "whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." Occidental Eng'g Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing the use of summary judgment in a traditional district court proceeding with the use of summary judgment where the court is reviewing a decision of an administrative agency that conducted its own fact-finding).
Generally, when the parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must consider each motion separately to determine whether either party has met its burden, "giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences." ACLU of Nv. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003). This framework is inapplicable here, because the court is limited to determining whether the administrative record permitted the agency to deny plaintiff's adjustment application. Therefore, the court will treat defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment as an opposition to plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record.
E.D. Local Rule 230 states "all motions shall be noticed on the motion calendar of the assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge." The court notes that defendants instead raised their Rule 12(b)(1) and summary judgment motions in conjunction with their opposition to plaintiff's motion without properly noticing the motions. Plaintiff did not object to this format and responded to defendants' motions in her reply in support of her motion for summary judgment. The modified summary judgment standard applicable in this case, and the court's decision to treat defendants' motions as its opposition, moots the issue of whether defendants' failure to follow the local rule precludes the court from considering their motions.
B. Adjustment of Status Under § 1255
Section 1255 permits the Attorney General to adjust the status of an alien to that of permanent resident where
(1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent resident, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). If these requirements are met, "the burden is always upon the alien to establish that his application for such relief merits favorable consideration." Santos v. I.N.S., 375 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967). Implicit in this "high burden of proof" is that "[a]n evaluation of all the facts requires due consideration to be given to the presence or absence of special equities." Von Pervieux v. I.N.S., 572 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Parties do not dispute that plaintiff has met the three statutory requirements and would thus be eligible for an adjustment. Plaintiff made an application for adjustment, and the government concedes that plaintiff is a beneficiary of an approved visa petition, (see Defs.' Mot. at 8 n.6), and that a visa is "immediately available" to plaintiff, (see id.). USCIS's February 15, 2011 denial was not based on plaintiff's statutory ineligibility, but rather her "preconceived intention to immigrate to the United States." (USCIS 2011 denial at 156.) Plaintiff argues USCIS's denial of the adjustment application, based on the reasons it cited, was impermissible as a matter of law. (Pl.'s Mot. at 7.)
C. Preconceived Intent
USCIS's finding of "preconceived intent" was flawed by an erroneous interpretation of the law. The court may not determine whether USCIS abused its discretion, Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005), or "reweigh the facts" upon which the agency relied in making its adjustment-of-status determination, Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). But the court has jurisdiction to review and set aside USCIS's "fact-finding which is flawed by an error of law." Arteaga-De Alvarez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2012).
Mamigonian I's holding that district courts can review nondiscretionary aspects of agency decisions still does not appear to permit district courts to engage in review of the agency record for an abuse of discretion. See Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 946 (holding that the district court has jurisdiction to review plaintiff's claims that USCIS improperly denied her adjustment-of-status application on nondiscretionary grounds).
Preconceived intent is a term of art that evolved from earlier versions of § 1255. "Prior to 1960, entry into the United States with a preconceived intent to remain was a statutory bar to adjustment of status." Choe v. I.N.S., 11 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993). Section 1255 originally provided that eligibility for an adjustment of status was limited to "bona fide nonimmigrants, " or, as restated in the same provision, those "aliens who entered the United States in good faith as nonimmigrants." See 8 U.S.C. § 245 (1952) (current version at § 1255), Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 85-700, § 1, 72 Stat. 699 (1958).
The full text of the original version of § 1255(a) read: "(a) The status of an alien who was lawfully admitted to the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant and who is continuing to maintain that status may be adjusted by the Attorney General in his discretion (under such regulations as he may prescribe to insure the application of this paragraph solely to the cases of aliens who entered the United States in good faith as nonimmigrants) to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence as a quota immigrant or as a nonquota immigrant under section 101(a)(27)(A), if (1) the alien makes application for adjustment, (2) the alien is admissible to the United States for permanent residence under this Act, (3) a quota or nonquota immigrant visa was immediately available to him at the time of his application for adjustment, (4) a quota or nonquota immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved, and (5) if claiming a nonquota status under section 101(a)(27)(A) he has been in the United States for at least one year prior to acquiring that status. A quota immigrant visa shall be considered immediately available for the purposes of this subsection only if the portion of the quota to which the alien is chargeable is undersubscribed by applicants registered on a consular waiting list. Any alien who shall file an application for adjustment of his status under his section shall thereby terminate his nonimmigrant status." 28 U.S.C. § 245(a) (1952).
Congress amended the statute in 1960, removing preconceived intent as a statutory bar. Choe, 11 F.3d at 930. Today, "[it] is only one factor to be considered in exercising discretion on an adjustment application." Id. An applicant's intention in applying for a nonimmigrant visa is nevertheless an important consideration in the discretionary granting of a status adjustment. Ameeriar v. I.N.S., 438 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971). "The 1960 Committee Report makes clear that . . . '[i]t [was] intended that only those aliens who enter the United States in good faith and without any intention of circumventing quota restrictions . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of section 245(a), as amended." Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 86-1651, at 3147 (1960)). Similarly, the purpose of holding an applicant's "preconceived intent" against her today is to avoid granting an adjustment to someone who came to the United States on a temporary nonimmigrant visa, concealing her true intentions to remain in the country and later apply for an adjustment of status to permanent resident. See Jain v. I.N.S., 612 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he legislative history of section 245 . . . offers some support for the [] position that the good faith entry of a nonimmigrant is relevant to the favorable exercise of discretion under that provision.")
Although "preconceived intent" is no longer a statutory bar, it is narrowly circumscribed. In fidelity to the legislative history of § 1255, the federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have only applied "preconceived intent" to individuals who come to the United States on a non-immigrant visa concealing an intent to permanently reside there. Chen v. Foley, 385 F. 2d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 1967) (recognizing the Board of Immigration Appeals has "consistently held that a preconceived intent to establish permanent residence via the nonimmigrant route . . . is a factor to be considered in denying relief under Section 245" and applying the doctrine where there was "doubt as to the bona fides of the respondent's entry as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure"). One court's explanation of the reach of "preconceived intent" is particularly helpful:
See also Choe v. I.N.S., 11 F.3d 925, 933 (9th Cir. 1993) (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting "preconceived intent" applies where an alien "entered the United States on a 'temporary permission but with a determination to stay here if possible . . . so that his representations to the authorities are false, or fraudulent or misrepresentative'" (quoting Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1960)); Jain, 612 F.2d at 689 ("[A]llowing the Service the discretion to deny section 245 relief to nonimmigrant aliens who enter in bad faith appears to comport with the proper administration of the statute."); Faddah v. I.N.S., 553 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he immigration judge found that Faddah was not a bona fide nonimmigrant at the time of entry; in other words, that he obtained a temporary visa intending to find a way to remain permanently in the United States."); Matter of Rubio-Vargas, 11 I.& N. 167, 169 (1965) (holding an adjustment of status should not be used as a "short-cut" to accelerate immigration to this country for a person who came to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa).
It should be remembered that any alien who applies for a nonimmigrant visa must, as required by statute . . . demonstrate to the satisfaction of the American consul in his home country and to the immigration officials upon his arrival in the United States that he fully intends to return to his home country. Therefore, absent an administrative error, any alien who arrives in the United States with the fixed intention toAmeerier v. I.N.S., 438 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing cases). "Preconceived intent" thus requires a certain gaming of the system--specifically, an individual who uses the powerful combination of a nonimmigrant visa and an adjustment in order to circumvent the process of having to apply for an immigrant visa through a U.S. embassy. The court could find no cases in which a court or administrative agency applied "preconceived intent" to a set of circumstances other than where a plaintiff, who applied for and came to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa, willfully misrepresented her intention to permanently reside in this country in an effort to circumvent the normal visa-issuing procedure. See, e.g., Santos v. I.N.S., 375 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967) ("[I]t would have been entirely proper for the Board to deny relief on the ground that Murillos' application for a visa to visit the country was made with a preconceived intention of bypassing normal consulate procedures for obtaining permanent residence."); Cubillos-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 352 F.2d 782, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1965) (per curium) (holding there was no abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application where in coming to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa, petitioner harbored the preconceived intent to remain there permanently); Matter of Tonga, 12 I & N. Dec. 212 (1967) (denying adjustment because applicant had preconceived intent to remain in the United States permanently at the time he obtained his nonimmigrant visitor's visa); Matter of Vega, 11 I. & N. Dec. 337 (1965) (denying adjustment to applicant since he sought and gained entry into this country with a preconceived intention to established permanent residence there); Matter of Rubio-Vargas, 11 I. & N. Dec. 167 (1965) (denying adjustment to applicant who in an effort to circumvent normal immigrant visa-issuing process by the United States consul abroad, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor with the preconceived plan of remaining permanently).
remain permanently has misrepresented his intention to the immigration authorities. An applicant who has thus misled immigration officials in an attempt to circumvent established procedures presents a weak case for the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. There are many cases where the Attorney General has refused to exercise favorable discretion in adjustment proceedings, based on his finding that the nonimmigrant alien had entered the United States with the intent to remain permanently (if he could), by applying for and successfully pursuing adjustment of status under Section 245.
Thus, as a matter of law, "preconceived intent" cannot apply to plaintiff as a basis for denying her adjustment application. Plaintiff, who did not use the visitor visa route to come to the United States, and therefore could not have "misrepresented her intentions" in the manner contemplated by law, see id., is beyond the reach of the doctrine. Even if "preconceived intent" is a discretionary basis for denying an adjustment application, USCIS's discretion is constrained by the precedent of the federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he BIA has no discretion to make a decision that is contrary to law."); see also Sang Seup Shin v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 122, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting as broad as USCIS's discretion is, "it may not proceed at whim, shedding its grace unevenly from case to case.").
USCIS found plaintiff had a "preconceived intention to immigrate to the United States." (USCIS 2011 denial at 156). But then it held against plaintiff, as two "very strong negative factors," that plaintiff had both an "intent to immigrate" and had "circumvent[ed] normal visa processing." (Id. at 157.) Both factors are actually elements of preconceived intent. A mere "intent to immigrate," without an effort to circumvent, is insufficient on its own to weigh as a negative factor against granting plaintiff an adjustment. See Patel, 811 F.2d at 382-83. Immigrants who come to the United States--both those who follow the rules and those who do not--arguably have an intent to remain here.
That is not to say there are no other grounds available to deny an adjustment to an individual who allegedly attempts to gain entry to this country by "making arrangements that resulted in . . . arriving with [a] fraudulent passport." (USCIS 2011 Denial at 156.) For instance, USCIS could deny such an applicant an adjustment on the ground that he or she made a false claim to U.S. citizenship or made willful misrepresentations to authorities by presenting a fraudulent passport. It so happens that, here, the government did bring such charges against plaintiff, based on her arrival in Los Angeles with someone else's passport in her possession, but the IJ, finding plaintiff had not fraudulently claimed citizenship and made no willful representations, dismissed them.
In Mamigonian I, the Ninth Circuit noted that USCIS's finding of "preconceived intent" appeared to be contrary to the IJ's findings in the 2009 removal proceedings. See Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 939. While the court will not address plaintiff's collateral estoppel argument, finding the foregoing grounds sufficient for granting plaintiff's motion, the court notes USCIS's use of "preconceived intent" as a basis for denying plaintiff's applications for an adjustment is suspect. On December 28, 2010, after the removal proceedings before the IJ, USCIS denied plaintiff's second and third applications, allegedly without providing plaintiff any explanation. (Pl.'s Mot. at 5.) However, on that same day, the government issued a public statement in response to complaints about their handling of the case, stating, "When [Mamigonian] arrived in the United States in 2002, she had no legal basis to enter the country. In an effort to gain admission, she presented officers with a passport belonging to someone else and falsely claimed to be a U.S. citizen." (Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 8 at 370.) This statement suggests the February 15, 2011 denial of plaintiff's application based on "preconceived intent" was disingenuous.
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Because USCIS's most recent denial of plaintiff's applications for an adjustment of status rested on a misinterpretation of "preconceived intent, " the court overturns an agency decision that is "arbitrary" and "capricious" and cannot stand. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record.
The court cannot, as the plaintiff requests, order USCIS to grant her application, because such a grant ultimately lies within the discretion of the agency. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) ("[T]he only agency action that can be compelled under the APA is action legally required.") The court will therefore remand this case to USCIS. Despite the "amount of resources that have already been expended on this case by the federal courts," Mamigonian I, 710 F.3d at 946, although hopefully unlikely, it is imaginable that upon remand, USCIS will find yet another reason to deny plaintiff's application, and the parties may return to district court in due time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; the February 15, 2011 denial of plaintiff's adjustment application be, and the same hereby is, set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); and in a manner consistent with this Order, defendants shall fully and fairly adjudicate plaintiff's 2009 and 2010 Form I-485 applications to adjust status to permanent resident within 60 days from the date on which this Order is signed. Dated: October 23, 2014
/s/_________
WILLIAM B. SHUBB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE