Summary
In Mallory v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 02-cv-7800, 2003 WL 22391296 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2003), the plaintiff sued a carrier for emotional distress after the carrier lost the plaintiff's Gucci sunglasses.
Summary of this case from Krauss v. Iris USA, Inc.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CV-7800
October 20, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before this Court are: (1) Defendant Allied Van Lines, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. No. 11); and (2) Defendant Liberty Moving Storage's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 13). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Factual Background and Procedural History
In August, 2000, Plaintiff Carol Mallory ("Mallory") moved from New York, New York to Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, and contracted with Defendants Allied Van Line, Inc. ("Allied"), through its disclosed agent, Liberty Moving Storage ("Liberty") to transport her property. Compl. ¶ 1, 8 (Dkt. No. 7). According to the Complaint, Defendants negligently, carelessly and recklessly lost "certain priceless documents" and a pair of Gucci sunglasses during the move. Compl. ¶ 9.
On August 26, 2002, Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.See Defendant Allied's Petition for Removal ("D. Pet.") ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 1). On October 9, 2002, Allied removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, D. Pet. ¶¶ 1-9, and on January 16, 2003, it filed a motion requesting an entry of a Rule upon Plaintiff to file a complaint. Defendant Allied's Motion for Rule to File a Complaint ¶¶ 1-3 (Dkt. No. 4). On January 22, 2003, this Court directed Plaintiff to file a complaint by February 17, 2003. (Dkt. No. 6). On February 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants. For ease of disposition, we will treat the Complaint as having two Counts. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that she has been deprived of the aforementioned documents as a result of Defendants' negligence and, in Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered psychological injury and mental anguish as a result of Defendants' negligence. Plaintiff seeks damages in an amount not in excess of $150,000.
The Court will treat Paragraph 12 of the Complaint as Count One and Paragraph 13 of the Complaint as Count Two. Compl. ¶ 12-13.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 11 13). Allied argues that the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (West 1997), preempts Plaintiffs common law cause of action for negligence which arises from her contractual relationship with Defendants. Defendant Allied's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss ("Allied's Mem.") 4-7 (Dkt. No. 12). Liberty, on the other hand, argues that "damages for emotional disturbance and distress are generally not permitted in a breach of contract case" under Pennsylvania law. Defendant Liberty's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss ("Liberty's Mem.") 1-2. In response, Plaintiff argues that it has adequately pled a claim under the Carmack Amendment, see Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Response to Defendant Allied's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Pl. Mem. Allied") 5-6 (Dkt. No. 15), and, relying on Gordon v. United Van Lines. Inc., 130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997), that she is entitled to damages for emotional injury. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Response to Defendant Allied's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("PI. Mem. Liberty") 3 (Dkt. No. 16).
Standard for Dismissal under 12(b)(6)
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well — pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Maio v. Aetna. Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) therefore is limited to those instances where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
Analysis
Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment in 1906 to establish uniformity and consistency among states in the application and resolution of interstate commerce transactions. See Howe v. Allied Van Lines. Inc., 622 F.2d 1147, 1157 (3d Cir. 1980). The Amendment "imposes liability on a common carrier for the actual loss or injury to goods in an interstate commerce shipment." Beta Spawn, Inc. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 218, 223 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2001).
The Carmack Amendment provides, in relevant part:
A carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this subtitle. That carrier . . . and any other common carrier that delivers the property and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for actual loss or injury to the property caused by (1) the receiving carrier [or] (2) the delivering carrier. . . .49 U.S.C. § 14706(1995).
"Implied federal preemption may be found where federal regulation of a field would interfere with Congressional objectives." Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (citingRive v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947);Silkwood v. Kerr — McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)). With respect to the Carmack Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that, "[a]lmost every detail of the subject [of interstate carriers' liability under a bill of lading] is covered so completely that there can be no rationale doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and supercede all state regulation with reference to it."Adams Express Co. v. E.H. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-506 (1913). Thus, the Carmack Amendment preempts a state law cause of action if it involves loss of goods or damage to goods caused by the interstate shipment of those goods by an interstate common carrier. See id; see also Sorokin v. Nat'l Van Lines. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2002 July 30, 2002); Faust v. Clark Reid Co., Civ. A. No. 94-4580, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16743, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1994).
Although the Third Circuit has not considered the scope of preemption under the Carmack Amendment, other jurisdictions have consistently held that the Carmack Amendment preempts state law under almost all circumstances. See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. N. Am. Van Lines. 890 F.2d 1112, 1115-21 (10th Cir. 1989).
Recently, four Circuit Courts extended the holding in Adams to conclude that the Carmack Amendment "preempts any common law remedy that increases the carrier's liability beyond `the actual loss or injury to the property'. . . unless the shipper alleges injuries separate and apart from those resulting directly from the loss of shipped property."Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving. Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1) [recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 14706]); Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2002) ("While we agree that situations may exist in which the Carmack Amendment does not preempt all state and common law claims, including ones for outrage, only claims based on conduct separate and distinct from the delivery, loss of, or damage to goods escape preemption"); Gordon v. United Van Lines. Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 285-89 (7th Cir. 1997) (The Carmack Amendment preempts any federal common law claims for punitive or emotional distress damages unless the "shipper alleges liability on a ground that is separate and distinct from the loss of, or the damage to, the goods that were shipped in interstate commerce."); Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that no federal common law right to recover punitive damages exists in a Carmack Amendment suit). These courts have held that federal common law remedies are inconsistent with the Carmack Amendment because their availability would create an uncertainty in liability that the Amendment was enacted to eliminate. See Cleveland, 30 F.3d at 379 ("[T]he availability of punitive damages [under federal common law] would frustrate the goal of the Carmack Amendment.").
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that she has been deprived of certain "priceless and irreplaceable documents" as a result of Defendants' negligence. Compl. ¶ 12. To establish a prima facie case against a common carrier under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) delivery of the goods to the initial carrier in good condition, (2) damage of the goods before delivery to their final destination, and (3) the amount of damages." See Beta Spawn, 250 F.3d at 223 (holding that a plaintiff must prove each of these elements to establish a prima facie case against a common carrier under the Carmack Amendment); see also Nichols v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, No. 030273JCM(RJJ), 2003 WL 21981994, at *5 (D. Nev. June 19, 2003) (concluding that a plaintiff must allege the Beta Spawn elements in order to survive a motion to dismiss);Newens v. Orna Servs., Inc., No. 02-01570, 2002 WL 1310734, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2002) (same). Although Plaintiff does not mention the Carmack Amendment in her Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff alleges these three elements, in that she avers: (1) "Defendants had in their custody . . . items belonging to Plaintiff in connection with her move from New York to Pennsylvania, Compl. ¶ 8; (2) During the move, Defendants negligently, carelessly and recklessly lost "certain priceless documents" and a pair of Gucci sunglasses, Compl. ¶ 9; and (3) Plaintiff incurred damages in an amount not in excess of $150,000, Compl. ¶ 14. See Nichols, 2003 WL 21981994, at *5 (finding that the plaintiffs, who made "no mention of the Carmack Amendment in their Amended Complaint" stated a cause of action under the Carmack Amendment); Newens, 2002 WL 1310734, at *2 (treating the plaintiffs first cause of action as a Carmack Amendment claim despite the fact that the Carmack Amendment was not explicitly referenced). Thus, Count One of the Complaint states a claim under the Carmack Amendment.
In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered psychological injury and mental anguish as a result of Defendants' negligence. Compl. ¶ 13. As noted above, the Carmack Amendment preempts any common law claim for emotional injury unless the shipper alleges injuries distinct from those resulting directly from the loss of shipped property. Relying on Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997), however, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover damages for emotion injury in the case at bar. See Pl. Mem. Liberty 3. Plaintiffs reliance on Gordon is misplaced.
In Gordon, a shipper sued an interstate common carrier for failing to deliver the shipper's family memorabilia and heirlooms, and for subsequently engaging in a four — month course of deception in connection with that non — delivery. Gordon, 130 F.3d at 283-84. Although the shipper prevailed in their action for liability under the Carmack Amendment, the district court dismissed her state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress as preempted.Id. at 284. After considering the holdings in Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987), N. Am. Van Lines. Inc. v. Pinkerton Sec. Sys., Inc., 89 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 1996), and Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 809 (1997), the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Carmack Amendment does not preempt those state law claims, such as intentional torts, "that [are] separate and distinct from the loss of, or the damage to, the goods that were shipped in interstate commerce." Gordon, 130 F.3d at 289.
Unlike the plaintiff in Gordon, Mallory does not allege that Defendants "engage[d] in conduct that is sufficiently distinct from the contract of carriage that a separate and independent claim arises."Gordon, 130 F.3d at 290. On the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that her emotional injury claim arises solely from the loss of her goods: "As a direct and proximate result of this incident and the negligence of the Defendants, jointly and/or severally, the Plaintiff has been caused to suffer severe and permanent psychological injury and mental pain and anguish." Compl. ¶¶ 12-13; see also Pl. Mem. Liberty 3 ("Plaintiff suffered psychological injury as a result of the lost property."). Therefore, this Court finds that Count Two is a common law claim for emotional injury and, therefore, is preempted. See The Paper Magic Group, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 318 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that under the Carmack Amendment, the measure of damages is the actual loss or injury to property; "special, or consequential damages" are not recoverable unless the shipper actually notifies the carrier that the goods shipped require special handling). Accordingly, Count Two is dismissed.
AND NOW this ___ day of October, 2003, upon consideration of Defendant Allied's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. No. 11) and Defendant Liberty's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. No. 13), for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED in part, in that Count Two of the Complaint is preempted, and DENIED in part, in that Count One of the Complaint states a claim under the Carmack Amendment.