Opinion
CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00151-MWB-GBC
03-30-2021
TOMMY J. A. MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND TO REVERSE AND REMAND DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for decision. Tommy J. A. Maldonado ("Plaintiff") seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's decision finding of not disabled. As set forth below, the undersigned recommends to GRANT Plaintiff's appeal and REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision in this case.
I. Legal Standards of Review
To receive disability or supplemental security benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), a claimant bears the burden to demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that an individual:
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff must demonstrate the physical or mental impairment "by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (effective from August 24, 2012, to present). The process requires an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to decide whether an applicant (1) is engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" (2) suffers from a "severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment;" (3) suffers from "an impairment(s) that meets or equals one" listed in the regulation's appendix; (4) has a residual functional capacity ("RFC") allowing for performance of "past relevant work;" and (5) can "make an adjustment to other work." Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2005).
If at any of the steps a determination exists that a plaintiff is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 551. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Id.
In reviewing a decision of the Commissioner, the Court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner has applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations"). Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is "less than a preponderance" and "more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
The Court may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. The Court will not set the Commissioner's decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
II. Procedural History
On March 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1382-1383, with a last insured date of December 31, 2017, and an alleged disability onset date of September 12, 2011. (Tr. 20, 82). Plaintiff alleged disability due to: (1) thoracic/lumbar neuritis, radiculopathy; (2) lower back fusion surgery; (3) major depression severely III /anxiety /insomnia /bipolar; (3) cervical spine degenerative with bulge disk (C2-C7); (4) abnormal cervical curve; (5) chronic pain syndrome and migraine; (6) arthritis/chest-costochondritis/spondylosis, and; (6) dextroscoliosis. (Tr. 82-83). On January 24, 2018, the ALJ held a hearing where Plaintiff proceeded with representation and a translator. (Tr. 45-64). On July 10, 2018, the ALJ held a second hearing where Robert B. Sklaroff, M.D. testified as a medical expert and Plaintiff was represented and proceeded with a translator. (Tr. 65-81). On September 21, 2018, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 14-39). Plaintiff sought review of the decision, which the Appeals Council denied on September 16, 2019, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the "final decision" of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (Tr. 6-13).
Disability insurance benefits are paid if the individual is disabled by the last date that a claimant meets the requirements of being insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1).
On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff, filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal a decision of Defendant denying social security benefits. (Doc. 1). On April 16, 2020, Defendant filed an answer and an administrative transcript of proceedings. (Doc. 8, 9). On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal. (Doc. 15 ("Pl. Br.")). On August 31, 2020, Defendant filed a brief in response. (Doc. 18 ("Def. Br.")). On September 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 19 (Reply)).
III. Issues on Appeal
The issues before the court is whether the ALJ erred in: (1) the allocation of weight to the medical opinions; (2) failing to discuss the opinion of treating physician, Dr. Juan Deniz; (3) omitting an upper extremity limitations in the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"); (4) crafting an RFC that did not adequately reflect the severity of Plaintiff's limitations in social interactions and limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; (5) allocating little weight to the opinions of Mr. Perez (counselor) and Mr. Tanner (physician assistant); (6) the consistency evaluation of Plaintiff's testimony and allegations; (7) allocating little weight to the third-party source, and; (8) failing to address medication side effects of somnolence, poor concentration, drowsiness, and dizziness. Pl. Br. at 24-34. IV. Analysis
"As the parties are familiar with the record, we raise here only those facts that are essential to our decision." Kibe v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 787 F. App'x 801, 802 (3d Cir. 2019).
A. Failure to Address Medical Opinions and Medication Side Effects
The ALJ's failure to address the January 2016 opinion from treating physician, Dr. Raul Benitez Perez, M.D., and the February 2016 opinion from treating neurologist, Dr. Juan Deniz, M.D., (Tr. 804-14) requires remand. See SSR 96-2p; ); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). An ALJ must acknowledge treating source opinions and provide specific reasons for rejecting an opinion. See SSR 96-2p (treating source opinions "must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927"); see also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (An ALJ "cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason") (citing Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Third Circuit explained:
we do expect the ALJ, as the factfinder, to consider and evaluate the medical evidence in the record consistent with his responsibilities under the regulations and case law. . . .This Court has long been concerned with ALJ opinions that fail properly to consider, discuss and weigh relevant medical evidence. . . . Where there is conflicting probative evidence in the record, we recognize a particularly acute need for an explanation of the reasoning behind the ALJ's conclusions, and will vacate or remand a case where such an explanation is not provided.Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). While there are instances where an ALJ's failure to address certain medical opinions can be deemed as harmless error, the Court finds these omitted decisions, viewed with other evidence in the record, create a factual conflict that requires remand. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). The ALJ's reliance on records indicating Plaintiff is stable while taking benzodiazepines and experiences less pain-related limitations while on medication conflicts with opinions from Drs. Deniz and Perez which suggest these same medications render Plaintiff too incapacitated to work. See Walters v. Saul, 452 F. Supp. 3d 164, 180-81 (M.D. Pa. 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1531369 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020) (remanding where the ALJ's finding of medical improvement depended, in part, on claimant's maintaining a medication that later produced adverse side-effects and the prescription had to be discontinued). The opinions of Drs. Deniz and Perez viewed in totality with the prescription records and documented side effects also support Mr. Irving Perez' (Plaintiff's counselor with the same surname) April 2018 opinion (Tr. 1992-99) indicating Plaintiff experiences greater limitations in the ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace than what the ALJ credited for the RFC.
See e.g., Horr v. Berryhill, 743 F. App'x 16, 20 (7th Cir. 2018); Watters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 530 F. App'x 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2013); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011); McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011); Huff v. Astrue, 275 F. App'x 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2008); Battease v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 3824146, at *8 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2016); Joyce v. Astrue, 2009 WL 313345, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2009).
See (Tr. 24, 26, 28) (ALJ decision citing Tr. 1065-1079 (records from June 2016 to September 2016), Tr. 1583-1593 (records from November 2016 to October 2017), Tr. 1864-1876 (records from September 2016 to December 2017), Tr. 1980-1990 (records from December 2017 to March 2018)).
Benzodiazepines is a class of drugs of which the following are in the medical record: (1) alprazolam (Xanax); (2) clonazepam (Klonopin); (3) diazepam (Valium); (4) lorazepam (Ativan), and; (5) temazepam (Restoril). See e.g., (Tr. 290, 647, 810, 923, 932-33, 1112-1128, 1132-35).
(Tr. 26) (ALJ decision noting records where Plaintiff was "doing 'relatively well'" with medication in 2016 and 2017 citing Tr. 1594-1863 (records from March 2016 to November 2017)).
A record dated April 15, 2014, indicated Plaintiff was prescribed Valium for spasms. (Tr. 647). Prescription records list the following medications from December 2014 to November 2016: (1) Amitriptyline HCL; (2) bupropion XL (Wellbutrin); (3) Carisoprodol; (4) clonazepam (Klonopin); (5) cyclobenzaprine; (6) divalproex sodium ER; (7) gabapentin; (8) hydrocodon-acetaminophen; (9) hydroxyzine PAM; (10) Lorazepam; (11) Nabumetone; (12) oxycodone-acetaminophen; (13) Pantoprazole; (14) quetiapine fumarate; (15) Sertraline HCL; (16) sumatriptan; (17) temazepam; (18) topiramate; (19) tramadol HCL, and; 20 trazodone. (Tr. 923, 932-33, 1112-1128). A record dated November 3, 2015, lists Tramadol, Gabapentin, amitriptyline, Sumatriptan, Zoloft, Celebrex, Lyrica, Meloxicam, Valium, Oxicodone, Hydrocodone, Wellbutrin, Klonopin, and Lorazepam. (Tr. 810). A pharmacy record lists the medications prescribed by Drs. Perez and Salvador Lopez Rojas from October 2015 to March 2016 which includes Bupropion HCL, Temazepam, Clonazepam, Amitriptyline, Quetiapine Fumarate, Gabapentin, Cyclobenzapr, Tramadol, Divalproex ER, and Nabumetone. (Tr. 290, 1132-35).
In a record dated February 10, 2016, Dr. Deniz opined Plaintiff would not be able to work due to the secondary effects of medications which causes, somnolence, poor concentration, drowsiness, and dizziness. (Tr. 803). On January 12, 2016, Dr. Raul Benitez Perez indicated he treated Plaintiff for severe depression from October 19, 2015, to October 19, 2016, listed medications included Elavil, Seroquel, and Wellbutrin, and opined Plaintiff was not allowed to travel outside of Puerto Rico "due to medications that cause extreme somnolence." (Tr. 804) see also (Tr. 2059-2065 (Dr. Raul Perez' treatment records from November 2015 to January 2016)). Other records support the opinions from Drs. Deniz and Perez. In August 2013, hospital discharge directions indicated Plaintiff was prescribed Percocet and forbade Plaintiff from driving or operating machinery while taking Percocet. (Tr. 841). Accompanying October 2014 records from "Phys of Rehab, Ind Spine Medicine," a medicine information record for Tramadol, states "Do NOT use this medicine if . . . [under the influence of] sedatives or sleeping medicines (e.g., temazepam . . . ). (Tr. 674). May 2015 hospital discharge directions signed by Larissa Clayton, D.O., indicated Plaintiff was prescribed Ativan and forbade Plaintiff from driving or operating machinery while taking Ativan. (Tr. 865-66). In a psychiatric hospital discharge summary dated September 26, 2017, Dr. Rabia Salman, M.D. described Plaintiff was initially given two milligrams of Ativan for anxiety but was found "extremely sedated and lying on the bathroom floor after being on the higher dose for one day," "his Ativan was tapered to one milligram and he was educated about his increased sedation secondary to the higher dose but [he] somehow remained insistent that he wants 2 mg Ativan until the day of discharge." (Tr. 1445). On October 11, 2017, Dr. Travis Treadway, M.D. summarized during a recent psychiatric admission, his medications were changed to include 1 milligram of lorazepam twice daily for anxiety and Dr. Treadway advised Plaintiff to cease taking lorazepam because combined with his pain medication can "cause significant issues and because of his suicidal ideations he has had in the past this combination would not be appropriate," and suggested Plaintiff discuss this medication conflict with his psychiatrist. (Tr. 1832). On October 31, 2017, Dr. Treadway reiterated Plaintiff could not continue opioid pain medicine and lorazepam. (Tr. 1844). In a treatment record dated December 11, 2017, Dr. Shiv Aggarwal, M.D. noted Plaintiff requested the discontinuance of Ativan as per the recommendation of his primary care provider stating his doctor will no longer prescribe oxycodone if Plaintiff remains on benzodiazepines. (Tr. 1864).
The discharge records are signed by a physician or nurse practitioner and the signature is illegible. (Tr. 841, 866).
See note 2. --------
Based upon the forgoing, the undersigned recommends remand for the ALJ to address the abovementioned medical opinions and impact of pharmaceutical side-effects on Plaintiff's RFC.
B. Conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
While the ALJ acknowledges Plaintiff is illiterate pursuant to the regulations (Tr. 30 (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b), 416.964(b)), this illiteracy is not reflected in the RFC or in the jobs identified by the ALJ that Plaintiff is capable of doing. The ALJ determined that with the given RFC, Plaintiff was capable of working as a (1) machine feeder represented under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") number 699.686-010; (2) utility laborer represented under the DOT number 529.686-034; and (3) assembler represented under the DOT 762.687-042. (Tr. 31). Pursuant to the DOT, machine feeder, utility laborer, and assembler jobs require a language level one which entails the ability to: (1) "[r]ecognize meaning of 2,500 (two- or three-syllable) words. Read at rate of 95-120 words per minute. Compare similarities and differences between words and between series of numbers; (2) the ability to "[p]rint simple sentences containing subject, verb, and object, and series of numbers, names, and addresses, and; (3) the ability to "[s]peak simple sentences, using normal word order, and present and past tenses." 699.686-010 Machine Feeder, DICOT 699.686-010; 762.687-042 Handle Assembler, DICOT 762.687-042; 529.686-034 Factory Helper, DICOT 529.686-034. The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Rivera-Negron v. Astrue, wherein the court reasoned:
[G]iven that the ALJ determined that Rivera-Negron is illiterate and the VE testified that Rivera-Negron can perform the jobs which, according to the DOT, require a minimum level of proficiency in English, there is a conflict.Rivera-Negron v. Astrue, 2013 WL 5823713, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2013); accord Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001); Saez-Ortiz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 324922, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2019) (collecting cases). In this instance, the RFC failed to reflect Plaintiff's language and literacy deficits in the RFC and the ALJ failed to address this conflict while questioning the vocational expert during the hearing. (Tr. 78-80).
SSR 00-4p requires the ALJ to provide a reasonable explanation for accepting the VE's testimony over the DOT description when the two conflict. SSR 00-4p; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ did not resolve the conflict. He did not explain why he concluded that Rivera-Negron, who did not speak English, could perform the jobs that the DOT described as requiring Level 1 Language Development. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). Without any explanation for why the ALJ credited the VE's testimony despite the conflict with the DOT, we cannot conclude that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Stated differently, there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that a Spanish-speaking only individual could perform the jobs identified by the VE, all of which have a Level 1 language requirement.
. . . .
Applied literally, the DOT language requirement would render every non-English speaking individual per se disabled because every job described in the DOT requires an ability to communicate in English at various levels depending on the job. The DOT has no language level below Level 1. Consequently, with respect to claimants found to be illiterate, the DOT will always conflict with the VE's testimony. In those cases, SSR 00-4p imposes an affirmative duty on the ALJ to ask the VE how an illiterate person can perform the identified jobs. Making that inquiry will overcome the anomaly created by the DOT language requirements and will foreclose an argument that all illiterate people are per se disabled. Hence, the VE must explain how, despite the DOT language requirement, a non-English speaking individual can perform those jobs.
. . . .
Had the VE been asked whether a conflict between her testimony and the DOT existed and then proceeded to identify the conflict, she likely could have explained that Rivera-Negron could perform the identified jobs despite her illiteracy in English. However, the VE was never asked and no explanation was provided. Accordingly, her testimony cannot support the finding that Rivera-Negron is not disabled.
The Court also finds there exists a conflict with the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT regarding the jobs Plaintiff can do with an RFC that instructs an individual to avoid hazards. (Tr. 24 (ALJ Decision). The ALJ gave great weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Robert Sklaroff who opined Plaintiff should avoid hazards such as machinery and heights due to his psychiatric issues. (Tr. 19 (citing Tr. 73 (Dr. Sklaroff's July 2018 opinion ))). The RFC and hypothetical to the VE specified Plaintiff should avoid ladders, ropes, scaffolds, exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, irritants, hazards, and unprotected heights. (Tr. 24 (RFC in ALJ Decision), 78 (hypothetical to VE during July 2018 hearing). The DOT describes the machine feeder as someone who:
Feeds or removes metal, plastic, or other stock and material from automatic fabricating machines: Places stock into hoppers, onto conveyors of self-centering machine bed, or lifts coils of sheet metal or wire onto feedrack. Removes stock from conveyor and piles it into boxes, truck, or on feed conveyor for next operation. May push dual control buttons to activate machine. May work in pairs to feed or remove pieces from machine. May thread sheet metal or wire through machine.699.686-010 Machine Feeder, DICOT 699.686-010. The DOT describes the handle assembler as someone who:
. . . drills holes for bolts or rivets, using portable power drill. Inserts bolts or rivets in holes, and tightens or fastens them, using handtools or riveting press. May stamp handles with name or size.762.687-042 Handle Assembler, DICOT 762.687-042. The DOT describes the factory helper as someone who:
Feeds candy processing and packaging machines and performs any combination of following tasks in candy manufacturing establishment, working individually or as interchangeable member of crew: Feeds one or more candy processing or packaging machines.529.686-034 Factory Helper, DICOT 529.686-034. The Court finds persuasive Cochrane v. Berryhill, wherein the court reasoned:
In formulating the RFC, the ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of the state agency consulting physicians that Plaintiff could perform the full range of light work. Tr. 19 (citing Tr. 85-93; Tr. 95-104). These opinions included limitations prohibiting Plaintiff from ever climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and the need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights. Plaintiff's opiate therapy was the reason given for these restrictions. Although the ALJ adopted these opinions, he failed to include these specific restrictions in his hypothetical to the VE . . . .Cochrane v. Berryhill, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1333-36 (D. Or. 2017). Similarly, the court in John C. v. Saul reasoned:
Defendant argues that the error is harmless because both of the occupations identified by the VE require no climbing or exposure to hazards. . . . Defendant is correct that both descriptions state that "Moving Mech[anical] Parts: Not Present—Activity or condition does not exist." . . . . Defendant points to Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-15 for the proposition that recognized hazards include "dangerous moving machinery." SSR 85-15, available at 1985 WL 56857, at *8.
. . .
I agree with Plaintiff that the error is not harmless. Notably, the state agency physician opinions are to "avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights." The limitation is not restricted to hazardous machinery and it is written in such a way that any machinery could be considered a "hazard." The language does not clearly establish what exactly is meant by the word "machinery" or that it is concerned only with machinery that has dangerous moving parts. While that may be the case, it is not clear. The description of the limitation and the requirement that a person performing the photofinishing counter clerk position operate film processing equipment or machinery creates enough ambiguity that on this record, it cannot be determined that Plaintiff can actually perform the jobs with her limitations and thus, this error cannot be considered harmless.
By its very name, the job of machine feeder obviously involves contact with moving machinery, a fact confirmed by a DOT definition that lists several different ways in which these workers need to interact with machines. Similarly, the job of off-bearer, per the DOT, requires working with conveyor belts. As these job descriptions clearly indicate concentrated exposure to moving machinery, they directly conflict with [the plaintiff's] RFC, which prohibits such work. And nothing in the hearing transcript shows that the ALJ "obtain[ed] a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict" as to either of these jobs, Brown, 845 F.3d at 255 (quotation marks omitted)—merely asking the VE to confirm that his testimony is consistent with the DOT is not akin to probing the obvious contradiction between the two.John C. v. Saul, 2021 WL 794780, at *3-4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2021). The Court concludes since all of the jobs identified by the ALJ require working with machines, the broad limitation in the RFC to avoid "hazards" is vague in this context and in light of the abovementioned side-effects, and the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Sklaroff's opinion that Plaintiff should avoid machinery, creates an ambiguity that requires the ALJ to clarify through further questioning of the vocational expert. See John C. v. Saul, 2021 WL 794780, at *3-4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2021); Cochrane v. Berryhill, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1333-36 (D. Or. 2017). Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision and the Court recommends remand.
C. Other Allegations of Error
Plaintiff's additional claims of error may be remedied through the case's treatment on remand. Thus, the Court declines to address those claims. A remand may produce different results on these claims, making discussion of them moot. Burns v. Colvin, 156 F. Supp. 3d 579, 598 (M.D. Pa. 2016). See also Steininger v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2077375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (declining to address plaintiff's other arguments for remand, "as the ALJ's findings may be revised in any decision issued following the new hearing"); LaSalle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 1456166, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011); Bruce v. Berryhill, 294 F. Supp. 3d 346, 364 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
V. Recommendation
The undersigned recommends the Court vacate the decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED: 1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's benefits under the Act be vacated and the case remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security to develop the record fully, conduct a new administrative hearing and appropriately evaluate the evidence. 2. The Clerk of Court close this case. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus
petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The Judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The Judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.Dated: March 30, 2021,
s/Gerald B. Cohn
GERALD B. COHN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE